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Democratization has become a
central political theme in the post-
Cold War world. This series
considers democratization as a
concept, bringing together interest
both in the processes of democratic
institutional reform and in the under-
lying theoretical issues defining
these processes—rights, citizenship,
representation and participation.
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Democratization through the looking-glass argues that our
perspectives on democratization reflect the intellectual origins of
the inquiry. What we see and how we understand it are influenced by
what we bring to the table. A range of disciplines from anthropology
to economics, sociology and legal scholarship, as well as different
area studies, offer a rich combination of analytical frameworks,
distinctive insights and leading points of concern.
On one level the book provides for anyone interested in
democratization a wide-ranging distillation of the main themes,
issues, and topics, concisely written by leading experts in their field.
On a second level the book advances the case for a broadly-based
comparative study that includes Europe and North America
alongside developing regions, while maintaining that multi-
disciplinarity enhances our understanding of democratization far
more than a narrow political science approach.
The book is aimed at students of politics willing to explore the
boundaries of their subject and all social scientists who need an
introduction to this important contemporary phenomenon.

Peter Burnell is a Professor in the Department of Politics
and International Studies, University of Warwick
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1Perspectives
peter burnell
The Looking-Glass for the Mind; or Intellectual Mirror (1792)
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn, 1989)
In the last decade or so democratization has been the focus
of a burgeoning political science literature. Democratization
is multifaceted and multidimensional. As both an idea and
a practical phenomenon it belongs exclusively to no single
discipline or branch of academic learning, and to no one
geographical area. The purpose of this book is to show how
our knowledge and understanding of democratization are
enriched by studying through the lens of multidisciplinarity
(Part I) and from a broadly-based comparative analysis – one
that is deeply informed by area studies that are themselves
comparative at the regional level (Part II). The volume takes
the form of authentic accounts by specialists of what their
own subject brings to the study of democratization. They
pose some distinctive questions, with the potential to un-
cover unique insights. Of course, some areas of interest are
bound to overlap, and there will be points of convergence
too: their identity will become clear also.
The book is addressed especially but not only to the
political science community, being an invitation to each one
of us to ‘think outside the box’ of the usual parameters that
shape our study of democratization. It aims to demonstrate
that by being receptive to multidisciplinarity and equipped
with a broadly-based geopolitical knowledge we should be
better placed to:
• address some of the gaps that political scientists recog-
nize are present in the political science literature on
democratization;
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• pursue a more comprehensive understanding of demo-
cratization as a process that takes a variety of forms and
is not solely a political phenomenon;
• provide explanations of democratization that will more
easily satisfy the criteria of coherence, consistency, and
plausibility while making sense of the variety of experi-
ences undergone by different societies at different times;
• anticipate the wider compass of democratization’s con-
sequences for the human condition at all levels;
• critically assess strategies for extending and ‘deepening’
democracy that have as their goal improvement in demo-
cracy’s quality and its chances of being sustained;
• move in the direction of foretelling the future of demo-
cracy and democratization with greater accuracy.
While the underlying claims about the value of multi-
disciplinarity and broadly-based area studies might seem
far from heretical, they do face resistance – as is borne out
by the literature. For example, on the spread of democracy
Remmer’s (1995: 105) view is that disciplinary traditions
‘have created major barriers to the development of theory
capable of comprehending new international realities’, that
is, theories fit for the purpose of ‘integrating data drawn
from both national and systemic levels of analysis’. The
situation Remmer described then has not changed greatly,
notwithstanding a welcome increase of attention to the in-
ternational dimensions of democratization. Mair (1996: 317)
noted the ‘now virtual absence of comparative analyses with
a global, or even cross-regional ambition’. More recently
still it has been said ‘democratisation studies would greatly
profit from expanding its disciplinary and geographical con-
straints’ (Kopecy´ and Mudde 2000: 517). This chapter, ‘Per-
spectives’, amplifies such sentiments, presenting reasons
why students of politics should reject parochialism in their
attempts to understand democratization.
Political studies as an open discipline
The proposition that comparative analysis will have most
to offer when informed by a broadly-based knowledge of
different regions hardly needs elaboration. For one thing
PERSPECTIVES 3
there is Remmer’s (1995: 107) reminder that the ‘theoretical
pay-off of research conceived within a traditional case study
format has been limited’. For another, comparability ‘is a
quality that is not inherent in any given set of objects; rather
it is a quality imparted to them by the observer’s perspect-
ive’ (Rustow 1968: 47). By limiting comparative analysis
to areas of close proximity we risk creating an appearance
of inter-regional differences that owes too much to the
way regions are defined and to regionally-specific research
agendas – ‘an areal version of an old problem, that is, case
selection determining the conclusions drawn’ (Bunce 2000a:
721). By comparison the case for multidisciplinarity, though
not idiosyncratic,1 might seem less obvious, and so receives
greater elaboration here.
Disciplines can be differentiated in terms of what they
study – their substantive concerns – and how they study it
– their methodologies, as well as in some cases by special
purpose and the development of a distinctive ‘jargon’ or
technical vocabulary. There is a long-established view that
although politics may be defined in terms of the activity
studied, it is not definable in terms of a singular method of
study, let alone a unique method that it can call its own.
Instead, politics is what might be called an ‘open’ discip-
line: it relies, uniquely so, on the methods and the modes
of explanation of other branches of knowledge, and what is
more without obvious sense of embarrassment or the urge
to pretend otherwise. Thus, in the words of a Professor of
Political Theory and Government, ‘the suggestion that the
student of politics is an eclectic is very well observed, for
he draws on so many ways of analysis as seem to suit his
purpose’ (Greenleaf 1968: 1–2). Political science ‘has always
borrowed much more than it has lent’ (Dogan 1996: 102),2
perhaps lending support to the view that politics should not
be called an autonomous discipline, for that very reason
(Wiseman 1969: 96).
However, if it is in respect of its principal choice of sub-
ject matter that the study of politics most clearly stands out,
then the precise identity of that subject or its core has itself
been much debated. For Duverger ‘the essence of politics,
its real nature and true significance, is to be found in the
fact that it is always and at all times ambivalent’ (Duverger
1966: xiii). For political analysts who find the institutions
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of government to be far too narrow a focus – and that now
means the great majority – bounded disciplinary perspectives
are considered unhelpful to the investigation of the problems
they want to focus on. Some go further than others: for
instance Leftwich (1984: 159) travels beyond multidisciplin-
arity to say ‘there is no contradiction (except in semantic
terms) to say that the discipline of Politics must be inter-
disciplinary in its focus and its frameworks’.
Moreover, it is not just that the boundaries of the ‘polit-
ical’ appear both porous and fuzzy once we have taken into
account all the different views of what politics is; but that
the different views each incline towards their own view of
how politics should be studied. They generate different ideas
about the relationships between politics and ‘sister discip-
lines’, and about which disciplines have the nearest blood
ties and which ones have the most to offer the study of
politics. For example there is Oakeshott’s (1991) conviction
that politics is a ‘conversation with tradition’. This invites
a particular kind of historical approach. Then there is the
view that politics is essentially about reconciling interests,
which leads towards rational choice theory and the statist-
ical modelling of individual and group behaviour. In fact,
although one implication shared by all the main ideas
of what politics comprises is that democratic values and
practices lie more or less close to the heart, they do this
for different reasons. In consequence they give rise to their
own questions and sense of priorities relevant to the range
of issues that democratization is likely to provoke; and
moreover they imply different ways of going about finding
answers.
Among disciplines offering approaches that can be em-
ployed to advantage in the study of politics generally, and
democratization specifically, the disagreements over method
extend to arguments about what constitutes a satisfactory
explanation. Thus in one corner lies the historians’ search
for qualitative information to supply context and identify
the reasons and intentions, to get at the meaning and signi-
ficance of ideas and events for the actors themselves both
individually and as rooted in specific social contexts. This is
a world where human agency is potentially very significant.
And there may be a place for historical accident or chance
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too. In a different corner social scientists sift quantitative
information, looking for ‘forces’ that in the view of some are
analogous to causes; they hope to subsume the explanandum
under a covering law or law-like generalization. Disciplines
impose their own canons of acceptable forms of evidence
and offer different frameworks of analysis, in addition to
their own choice of starting-points, lead questions and
principal concerns. How did something happen? Why did it
happen? What brought it about? What are the consequences
and why do they matter? How will it end? What is it, any-
way? Are these questions interdependent or can they be
answered separately? And all the time politics in the real
world is moving on, and with it the study of politics
develops as well. To dismiss the contributions that some
other specialisms might make to understanding something
like democratization simply on the grounds that they do
not happen to coincide with today’s fashions in political
science would be short-sighted indeed.
Of course, the fruitfulness of applying several disciplines
to the analysis of politics will vary across different kinds
of political phenomena. But we should rule out any a priori
assumption that mutually exclusive choices must be made.
It is far more helpful to recognize that there can be differ-
ent levels of explanation, some more immediate, some more
‘fundamental’. And that variations in the degree of com-
pleteness can be quite legitimate; they can all be judged in
relation both to the specific point of the inquiry and the
existing knowledge and understanding of the inquirer.
Looking-glass – a ‘mirror for looking at oneself’
The construction of democratization as a unit of study will
reflect the intellectual standpoint of the inquirer. Put simply,
the understanding we are likely to gain will be affected by
where we are coming from and what we bring to the table.
This will be just as true for area and country specialists
as for analysts whose main intellectual training and vocabu-
lary of discourse are in some field other than politics. We
would not expect, say, Europeanists writing abut eastern
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Europe and Africanists writing about southern Africa to
make identical approaches to studying democratization;
and regions differ in terms of which particular aspects of
democratization they illuminate most sharply. Equally we
would not expect the accounts by economists to duplicate
those of, say, anthropologists – if not because of basic epi-
stemological differences then because of variations in the
conceptual lens and methodological apparatus they bring to
bear. In principle, the contributors to this volume ask dif-
ferent questions, address different problems, will strike dif-
ferent emphases and offer their own concerns; but in practice
there is also much to be gained from establishing where
they touch at certain points and share similar observations
and reflections.
However, there are caveats, which the following chap-
ters will illustrate. First, we should not be surprised to find
evidence of contestation over the precise nature of the pre-
ferred method or mode of explanation not just in political
studies but in other disciplines and sub-disciplines as well.
Like the study of politics, the other disciplines too are
dynamic, and their approaches can even vary according to
distinct national cultural and educational or professional
institutional traditions. There are differences of time, place
and circumstance that impact on the way political phe-
nomena, including democracy, are viewed – and not just by
political scientists. Second, even where there are shared
convictions over a discipline’s main parameters and sub-
stantive concerns, the meaning and significance of demo-
cratization may still be the subject of lively dispute. Indeed,
the disagreements over the meaning and significance of
something like democratization could be more vigorously
contested inside a single discipline such as sociology or
within a distinct geopolitical region than are the divisions
that appear most clearly to set the disciplines or regions
apart. After all, neither Marxism and dependency theory
nor social constructivism and post-modernism have any
respect for national or disciplinary boundaries. Put starkly,
it is feasible that political researchers interested in demo-
cratization could gain more by collaborating with colleagues
from other disciplines than by engaging with specialists
from certain other branches of political science (Dogan 1996:
123–4).
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Studying democratization
In Britain the academic study of politics began half a century
ago from foundations in constitutional law, philosophy
and history. In the years since, the study of politics and
law seem to have grown apart, comparatively speaking, with
few notable exceptions, such as in politics the writings of
Drewry, who sees (1996: 201) ‘a natural affinity between
law and politics, which takes many forms’. Yet constitu-
tional engineering in new democracies, the determination
of procedures for institutionalizing the rule of law, and the
pros and cons of judicial activism are but three notable
areas where in principle political inquiries have much to
learn from legal scholarship. Thus political scientists study-
ing democratization appear much taken with the idea of
judicial autonomy as part of the institutional architecture
for ensuring the horizontal accountability of the executive
– a seemingly necessary counterpart to the vertical account-
ability that legislatures and electorates seem only imper-
fectly to exact. But here (Chapter 7) McEldowney’s approach
from the side of legal studies highlights instead a growing
tension between the principle of democratic accountability
and the increase of judicial power. If, as some observers
believe, the world is moving inexorably towards the elabora-
tion of a right to democratic rule in international law, then
both Drewry’s point and McEldowney’s cautioning could
both take on even greater import.
The last fifteen years or so have seen the rise of the
so-called ‘new institutionalism’ in social sciences generally
and political science specifically. This stresses the relative
autonomy of institutions, and rejects earlier reductionist
tendencies that made political phenomena the dependent
variable of other primarily social or economic forces. The
‘new institutionalism’ encourages us to revisit the arrange-
ments that embed political behaviour in rules, norms,
expectations and traditions. One implication is that not
only legal analysts, but possibly anthropologists too should
be consulted for their insights into the complexities of
‘crafting’ democratic institutions appropriate to individual
societies. Anthropological studies shed light on the world
of informal practice of customs and conventions that can
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profoundly affect the working of formally democratic arrange-
ments, especially at the ‘microphysical’ level. Traditionally,
the way the embedded neo-patrimonial and clientelistic
relationships of power complicate the transfer of Western-
style democracy to Africa has been paradigmatic. In Africa
Chabal and Daloz (1999: 9) say politics ‘is not functionally
differentiated, or separated, from the socio-cultural con-
siderations which govern everyday life . . . there is a constant
and dynamic interpenetration of the different spheres of
human experience, from the political to the religious’.3
But in Chapter 2, below, Gould goes further in examining
the perspectives that recent anthropological thinking con-
tributes, including fundamental reservations about demo-
cratization both as explanatory tool and (even more so) as
normative ideal. On the other side, a political scientist’s
view of the perspectives and dimensions of democratization
found in Africa is explored in Chapter 9, by Southall.
In this context political sociologists too should come into
their own, especially now that the idea of political culture
– a concept whose validity or usefulness political analysts
have often questioned in the past – has experienced major
rehabilitation in the politics literature on democratization.
There is a growing tendency to root variations in the suc-
cess and failure of democratic experiments as much in the
values and attitudes of the people as in qualities of formal
institutional design. At the same time in the ‘third world’
Kamrava (1995: 699) judges a democratic polity to be requi-
site for forging what is still clearly lacking in some societies:
a ‘nationally cohesive political culture’. These are pers-
pectives that offer alternatives to those grounded in levels
of economic development and the accompanying socio-
economic structure. That said, neither the contemporary
standing of the ‘new institutionalism’ nor the rediscovery
of political culture as a significant influence have dimin-
ished the amount of attention given to economic and socio-
economic factors in supporting long-term democratic trends.
On the contrary, it is in regard to the interaction among
all these variables and others besides that there is now
the most pressing need to improve our understanding. To
illustrate, from a feminist perspective Rai (Chapter 4) rightly
raises the issue of the costs of participation, for women.
Are the cultural impediments to political equality between
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men and women and to greater female political participa-
tion more resistant to all-round improvements in material
circumstances in some societies than in others – and if so,
why? Similarly, is the persistence of neo-patrimonialism
more debilitating for democratic progress when supported
by large inflows of conditionality-based international eco-
nomic aid, or would it be better if the underlying scarcity
of domestic resources was allowed to persist?
Economists, with their fondness for the rigorous applica-
tion of statistical techniques to the measurement of aggre-
gate data, are, like sociologists, well equipped to investigate
the social and economic consequences of democratization
– consequences that in turn will have implications for
the quality and sustainability of democracy. Chapter 3 by
Addison shows that economics’ fundamental commitment
to a priori reasoning and a deductive approach creates no
blind spot to the political significance of distributive con-
cerns, while noting that whether or not society is a demo-
cracy might matter less for economic growth than whether
it is highly polarized. Yet, unsurprisingly, it is in the soci-
ological literature reviewed by Wood (Chapter 8) that we
find the most recurrent concern with the political impact of
such forces as absolute and relative poverty, together with
the rise of corporate financial and economic power. Here,
recognition of the role played by the likes of social move-
ments (discussed in a South Asian context by Gurharpal
Singh in Chapter 14) offers a valuable corrective to the elite-
level focus that has typified much of the political science
literature on democratic transition to date.
But whereas the search for evidence of statistical correla-
tions is de rigueur in both economics and political sociology,
a somewhat contrary orientation is implied by path depend-
ence – another fashionable theory and approach. This draws
attention to the kind of legacy left by the previous political
regime and its impact on the dynamics of change, with the
outcomes seen to be influenced by the manner in which
change comes about and the route that is taken. Here the
accumulation of historical evidence portraying in detail the
‘inner’ connections of temporal processes looks to be most
relevant. This will incline research towards case-studies
of the origins and genesis of change. What is perhaps sur-
prising, then, is that it was in economics (more accurately,
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economic geography) where the idea emerged that a richer
appreciation of the role of historical processes in generating
variations in political life would be gained if we applied the
idea of increasing returns. The idea of ‘increasing returns’
maintains that the sequence of events can have specific
consequences (‘democratization backwards’ is a striking
example).4 But its main value is said to lie in challenging
the continuing supremacy in political science of the func-
tionalist approach, which, in seeking to explain all institu-
tions by referring to their performance in serving some
particularly useful purpose, can offer only a partial insight
(Pierson 2000: 263–4).
Finally, in an increasingly seamless world, where the
boundaries between the domestic and the international are
becoming broken and indistinct, it is now generally accepted
that the international context and the influence of trans-
boundary forces must be included when trying to compre-
hend ‘domestic’ events. The limitations of trying to make
sense of national democratization trends in purely endo-
genous terms are becoming ever more apparent. This is
especially true of democratic transformation in some of the
former Soviet bloc states, explored by Lewis (Chapter 10).
In that region a strong desire to be admitted to full mem-
bership of the European Union (EU) has driven the tempo
of political and economic reform, even though a democratic
deficit lies at the core of the EU’s own arrangements. At
the global level the title of an essay in international rela-
tions (IR) theory ‘Why is there no international democratic
theory?’ (H. Smith 2000) speaks volumes, and exposes
the limitations of traditional approaches based on realist
assumptions.5
Similarly, the foreign policy of democracy-promotion by
the West offers a research agenda that has yet to be fully
explored through the prism of ‘alternative’ IR approaches
that maintain that theory constructs reality.6 But one thing
is certain: it is important to examine whether and how the
institutions of regional and global governance can them-
selves be democratized. The European Union, an obvious
test case, is explored by Warleigh (Chapter 12); more spe-
cifically, the significance of both the European Court of
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights for Britain’s
parliamentary democracy is considered by McEldowney in
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Chapter 7. Moreover Cerny explains (Chapter 6) why the
consequences of globalization, broadly conceived, for demo-
cratic self-governance could hardly be less significant. The
point is valid regardless of whether we view the global polit-
ical economy’s dissemination of capitalism as on balance
dangerous to liberal democracy or instead as something that
can be more constructive, for instance by lending impetus
to a project of democratization more radical than that in
operation in ‘really existing democracy’. Of course, Cerny’s
presentation could be construed as taking up a position
on one side of a particularly vigorous debate, namely one
that could be summed up as ‘hyper-globalist’. It should be
read as an example of international political economy (IPE)
theorizing, and is not necessarily representative of every
position that IPE scholars adopt towards the topic. Never-
theless, given the enormity of the issues, arcane questions
about whether international relations constitutes a separate
discipline (and foreign policy analysis just a sub-section of
that), or instead refers to just one specialized dimension of
political studies, hardly seem important.
Why democratization?
The benefits to be gained from multidisciplinarity and by
drawing on a wide range of area studies are not peculiar to
the study of democratization. There are other political and
social phenomena that offer themselves as prime candidates,
nationalism and globalization (and their interconnections)
being obvious examples. So why does this volume privil-
ege democratization? Democracy combines unprecedented
worldwide interest with an ancient lineage, democracy’s
roots being in the ancient Greek polis and classical political
philosophy. Democracy remains to this day a strongly con-
tested idea, occupying a large literature in social and polit-
ical philosophy that needs no elaboration here. Moreover the
politics of democratization too is more than a struggle for
democracy – it is a struggle about the very nature of demo-
cracy (Luckham and White 1996: 277). That makes demo-
cratization an essentially value-laden project, a realm where
no discipline can claim a monopoly on wisdom. And it is
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no mere coincidence that disciplines other than politics
have construed democratization as a social process or as an
economic process well before politics discovered the ‘third
wave’. They see its relevance to a variety of ‘sites’ other than
just government or the political system, such as the family
or the workplace, and situated not just at the national but
at local and international levels too. Political democracy
may never acquire the sort of unparalleled global legitimacy
that premature claims to the end of history at one time
appeared to suggest. But, if the Nobel prize-winning eco-
nomist Amartya Sen (1999: 3) is right in saying that the rise
of democracy is the most important occurrence of the twen-
tieth century, then the case for using all available means
to raise the levels of understanding now looks unanswerable.
That said, there is a special reason why political scientists,
especially observers of international politics, should be
sympathetic to the idea that the subject of democratization
is a prime candidate for the approach taken in this book:
the systematic study of politics has itself been a notable
beneficiary of democratization. Huntington, widely known
as author of The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century (1991), said ‘where democracy is strong,
political science is strong; where democracy is weak, polit-
ical science is weak’ (Huntington 1988: 7). His claim is
borne out by the evidence, as can be seen in the expansion
of political studies in the post-communist countries, fed by
scholars branching out from hitherto politically safer dis-
ciplines, such as history, sociology and philosophy. Thus
democratization has left its mark not simply on the world
of politics but quite specifically on the study of politics
(as well as on other disciplines too). That means decisions
about whose politics are worth studying and about the
practical possibilities too: for instance, Russia’s opening up
to public attitude surveys, and innovations like David
Beetham’s ‘democratic audit’. Lewis (Chapter 10) shows how
studies of central and eastern Europe are extending the con-
ceptual sensitivity and the aspiration to general theories
grounded in data analysis that have been well established
traits in the comparative political science of Western Europe,
even if the achievements so far are modest. And organizations
such as Freedom House (established in 1941), a Washington,
DC-based, non-profit non-governmental body whose annual
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surveys of freedom in the world are cited in a number of
the chapters in this book, have acquired greatly increased
international prominence.7
The literature on democratization has also added new
words to our politics vocabulary, such as ‘transitology’ and
‘consolidology’, together with a large assortment of terms
to depict states of near-but-not-quite democracy, or ‘demo-
cracy with adjectives’. In a citation index ‘low-intensity
democracy’ (Gills, Rocamora and Wilson 1993) is one such
term that would feature very strongly. The study of demo-
cratization has provided a new arena for replaying recurring
big debates in politics, such as those over the competing
claims of voluntarism and determinism. At the same time
it has promoted a revival of interest in some hitherto
neglected terms, ‘civil society’, for example,8 and not just
among political scientists; analysts of international affairs
are now beginning to consider how democracy’s prospects
could benefit from the emergence of global civil society.
Newer concepts have come to the fore, such as ‘social cap-
ital’ (discussed by Gonzalez and King in Chapter 15). We
have been led to re-examine such long-standing puzzles as
the relationship between structure and agency in order to
pinpoint who or what accounts for different stages or phases
of democratic political change. Here, Karl’s (1991: 5–8) idea
of ‘structured contingency’ looks a particularly promising
analytical suggestion and has been widely endorsed, but is
far from simple to put into operation.
Democratization has changed both the curriculum and the
political science profession in ways that go beyond merely
repackaging, relabelling, or reshuffling, although there have
been numerous examples of those things too.9 And just
as the spread of democratization inspires some thoughts
that a universal study of politics, employing concepts, the-
ories and empirical generalizations that are more or less
universally valid, could be coming that much closer, so it
has made the profession more cosmopolitan (Norris 1997).
Intellectual communities in countries that were hitherto
marginalized have entered the central flow, even if, as
Blondel (2001: 4–5) claims, too much empirical political
research is still country-based and not enough is oriented
towards general comparative model-building. The academic
study of politics is making its own distinctive contribution
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to ‘globalization’ in the form of a knowledge-based com-
munity that transcends national boundaries, assisted by
democratization. Indeed Norris (1997: 30–1) argues this com-
mon node of study could be helping to bridge the methodo-
logical rift that has existed between European and American
political science, although inter-collegial transatlantic col-
laboration still remains limited. The links between scholars
and bureaucrats, and between academics and the media,
have also increased as a result of public interest in demo-
cratization and the increase of international programmes
and projects of democracy assistance. However, none of
this is to claim that the general social standing of political
scientists has increased, or that political studies now exerts
greater influence on world events.
Everything has its limits
Politics has been defined inter alia as the art of the possible.
This book is not an encyclopaedia and makes no pretence
to be comprehensive; it has been selective in the choice both
of disciplines and of the building-blocks for comparative
politics. And while the chapters in each Part are arranged
alphabetically, readers should make their own choice of
starting-point; there is for instance no logical reason for
starting with anthropological perspectives.
On the one side, the rationale for including Europe and
North America is that democratization is unfinished busi-
ness; in theory democracy could become weaker there, and,
according to some critics that is precisely what is happen-
ing (the increase of judicial power in Britain being but one
possible example). A significant literature on growing disaf-
fection towards politicians and the established institutions
of ‘mature’ democracies has brought to attention distinctive
issues of both a theoretical and practical nature, not least
the significance of social capital and civic trust. There is a
growing crisis over the financing of political competition –
its reputation for lack of integrity – which implies lessons
for much newer democracies. The possibility that old demo-
cracies could be infused with new vitality by different
kinds of participation, like those involving ‘third sector’
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associations, and by experimenting with forms such as
deliberative democracy, is a more positive contribution to
the debate, and has resonance in emerging democracies.
On the other side, the omission of the Middle East and
the Arab world from this collection owes more to pragmatic
grounds. Democratization is generally reckoned to have
made least headway there, and the outlook is unpromising
(both the record and the prospects in black Africa now look
more fragile too, compared with the early 1990s). Of course,
in the broader scheme of things any region’s omission is
inexcusable. For our understanding of a phenomenon may
well be assisted by comparisons with locations where it
has not occurred, especially if there are some shared fea-
tures with more successful newly democratizing countries
– economic backwardness, for example. Ignoring a region
like the Middle East clearly will not help us to predict if
the countries there will ever successfully introduce demo-
cracy and if so how, when and what kind of democracy.
Turf wars over boundaries between disciplines and the
demarcation of sub-disciplines can cause genuine confu-
sion. International political economy is one example: is it
a ward of international relations, a descendant of politics,
or of economics, or an extension of political economy in
the original sense of the late-eighteenth-century Scottish
Enlightenment? Is it in the process of becoming a discipline
in its own right? The inclusion of a chapter on the unique
perspectives offered by gender and women’s studies may
well not be controversial, even though ‘the majority of
the mainstream democratization literature has remained
gender-blind’ (Waylen 2003: 157). After all, it has been said
that ‘if democracy (or lack of it) is something which tran-
scends all human relations, then, surely, relations between
the genders lie at the heart of democracy?’ (Allison 1994:
100). Rai’s call (in Chapter 4) to expand our definitions to
encompass not only the public but the private sphere chimes
with this, offering not so much a view within politics but a
view of politics itself. And of course it is true that a case
could be advanced for several other branches of knowledge
– development studies, race (or racial) and ethnic (ethnicity)
studies, and nationalism studies, and so on – that are not
included here. But although these branches of inquiry are
all institutionalized in the sense of having such things as
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research institutes, university departments or teaching pro-
grammes and major journals devoted to them, it is less
obvious that they offer distinctive methods of inquiry or
techniques. Nor do they appear to offer their own modes of
explanation. Their raison d’être is to privilege certain is-
sues, explanations and facets of the human condition pre-
cisely because other disciplines (political science included)
could have given them greater prominence but so far have
failed to do so. They are studies and are not (yet) generally
thought to possess the conventional status of disciplines.
Take each one in turn.
First, development studies might be held to offer great
purchase for examining the future prospects for democrat-
ization, given that not just the country long called the
world’s largest democracy (India) but all of today’s least
democratic countries are found in the developing world.
Furthermore, it is the changes that have taken place in
development thinking that help explain the growth of inter-
national democracy-promotion. But much more even than
political science, development studies draws on economics
and sociology (as well as on politics), to name but some of
its tributaries. China, of course, is the most dynamic large
economy in the developing world. Recent claims that
China’s political evolution in the 1990s had unparalleled
significance for democratization trends worldwide (Youngs
2001: 165) look to be an exaggeration. Even so, as the most
populous country China could potentially make a dramatic
difference to surveys like Freedom House’s annual review
of democracy and freedom in the world. Breslin’s sceptical
account (in Chapter 11) shows that not just in China but in
East Asia more generally a historical perspective and recent
international economic developments should both be taken
into account when assessing democratic trends and pos-
sibilities. The other groups of countries that development
studies feature most prominently are typically found in
South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. All these regions
are already represented in this volume, with for instance
Philip (Chapter 13) explaining how the persistence of demo-
cracies without democratic consolidation is a distinguishing
feature of politics in Latin America today.
Second, there can be no disputing the claim that attempts
to establish democracy in multiethnic and multicultural
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societies raise special questions about who constitutes the
demos and the underlying sense of community. A discus-
sion of the politics of identity becomes unavoidable. The
growth in citizenship studies itself owes something to the
spread of democracy, both as an emancipating trend and as
a potentially destabilizing force in divided societies that pre-
viously were tightly controlled by highly centralized states.
Innovative ideas of global citizenship are currently being
advanced as part of the international studies agenda. But in
principle there is no reason why other well-established fields
of study such as anthropology and sociology cannot shed
more light on these subjects (see for example Chapter 2).
And here, relevant area studies are offered as a proxy (see
for example the discussions of identity and ethnic and/or
racial dimensions in Chapters 12, 14, and 15).
Lastly, there is the argument that the political science
literature on democratization underestimates the importance
of nation- and state-building, which betrays its origins in
the study of Latin America and southern Europe. According
to Kopecy´ and Mudde (2000) this shortcoming in the liter-
ature limits its ability to illuminate the more recent experi-
ence of democratization in such places as central and eastern
Europe. Whatever the merits of that argument, the threat
globalization now poses to nation and national identity
even in established democracies is assessed in Chapter 6,
by Cerny, who details the transient historical circumstances
giving rise to the nation-states system that enabled, and
perhaps necessitated, democracy as we know it. In any event,
we can always turn to the historical literature on earlier
‘waves’ of democratization in Western Europe if we want
to investigate nationalism’s contribution to stimulating
or subverting movements towards greater democracy, as
Kopecy´ and Mudde (2000: 529) themselves admit. Thus it
is self-evident that an understanding of the past should not
necessarily compete with our interest in the present and our
desire to foretell the future. Instead history should be viewed
as a complementary source of revelation (see Chapter 5, by
Calvert); the fact that previous ‘waves’ of democratization
ended in democratic reversal only serves to sharpen the
point. If prediction is the Grail of political science then the
comparative historical method is at the very minimum a use-
ful handmaiden. And for analysts with a more prescriptive
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intent, such as the democracy-promoters and their ‘demo-
cracy trainers’, history – including the failed attempts by
Western powers to transfer democracy in previous decades
– should be considered essential reading.
Notes
1 Comparative politics ‘does not consist only in cross-national analysis. It
is also necessarily a cross-disciplinary endeavor, because in comparative
research we are crossing units (nations) and variables (numerical and
nominal). . . . The relations between variables are often more important
for theoretical explanations than the discovery of analogies and differ-
ences between nations’; ‘Comparative politics across disciplines means
first of all crossing history’ (Dogan 1996: 122, 123).
2 Barry (1999: 435) claims that the political science profession ‘is still
more hospitable to those with doctorates outside the subject than its
sister disciplines’.
3 ‘The vote is not primarily a token of individual choice but part of a
calculus of patrimonial reciprocity based on ties of solidarity’ (Chabal
and Daloz 1999: 39). Political anthropology gained ground in studies of
Third World politics as a critical reaction to ‘a simplistic zero-sum view
of tradition and modernity’; social anthropology followed on, evincing
a desire to ‘fill the gap in dependency theory’ (Randall and Theobald
1998: 6). Dogan (1996: 117), however, argues that in post-colonial re-
gions area studies have taken over the mantle of anthropology without
respect for disciplinary boundaries.
4 ‘Democratization backwards’ refers to the introduction of competitive
elections before establishing the basic institutions of a modern state,
such as the rule of law and the institutions of civil society (Rose and
Shin 2001).
5 The study of international relations ‘takes aspects of theory from all
sorts of different places; but if you try to think of what IR has exported
to any of the other disciplines, or indeed whether any of the other
disciplines pay any attention to it at all, it’s a much bleaker landscape’
(Buzan 2001: 12).
6 But on the United States see Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi (eds) (2000). A
sizeable literature exists on the ‘democratic peace’ hypothesis, which is
said to warrant unambiguous support for the internationalization of
democracy.
7 Freedom House’s annual assessments of political rights and civil
liberties around the world define democracy as, at minimum a political
system in which people choose their authoritative leaders freely from
among competing groups and individuals who are not chosen by the
government. Democracies are judged to be either free or partly free
(scores 1.0–3.0 = free; 3.0–5.5 = partly free; 5.5–7.0 = not free). Although
this idea of democracy and the organization’s methodology for scoring
countries are challenged, especially by European social scientists, the
assessments are widely used and there appears to be no superior, more
generally accepted source of convenient data.
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8 However, reputations have not fared equally: the renewed prominence
of Alexis de Toqueville (author of Democracy in America, 1835 and
1840) undoubtedly reflects the preponderant American displacement in
the political science of democratization. By comparison John Stuart Mill’s
On Liberty (1859) and Considerations on Representative Government
(1861) are rarely mentioned.
9 Among the more visible signs of democratization’s impact on academia
are a stream of major conferences and workshops (for example IPSA’s
sixteenth World Congress in 1994 was on ‘Democratization’; the Polit-
ical Studies Association in Britain chose ‘The Challenge of Democracy
in the 21st Century’ for its 50th annual conference, in 2000); specialized
book series on democratization (three in Britain alone); new book titles
(web sites list several hundred titles in English containing the keyword
‘democratization’ and several thousand containing the keyword ‘demo-
cracy’); the publication of encylopaedias of democracy (in the US, 1995)
and democratic thought (in Britain, 2001); dedicated new journals, most
notably the Journal of Democracy (the first issue each year publishes
the latest Freedom House assessments) and Democratization, publish-
ing many issues each year (in total well over 1,000 articles to date); and
numerous ‘special issues’ of many longer-established journals and area
studies periodicals. There are many special ‘Centres’ or ‘Institutes’ of
research into democratization scattered around the globe; and universities
have constructed graduate programmes and customized undergraduate
modules on democratization.

Part I
Disciplines
Allie
2Anthropology
jeremy gould
There is no self-evident consensus on what constitutes
genuine anthropology. For some, anthropology is defined
by its fieldwork-based methodology; for others, it is its non-
reductionist commitment to fleshing out complex causalities
from the empirical foliage of thick description. For others
still, anthropology is simply a general social science of non-
Western societies.
This writer’s understanding of the anthropological enter-
prise revolves around the need for a self-reflective perspect-
ive on the nature and use of normative discourse in social
interaction. My empirical work highlights the use of nor-
mative argument to legitimize the exercise of power. The
focus on normative discourse highlights the realm of nar-
rative practices, but to become meaningful these must be
situated – and studied empirically – within the concrete
matrices of social action. The demand for self-reflection
implies incessant interrogation of one’s own relationship
to the value-claims of the observed actors. Although no
transcendental authority is claimed for this version of an-
thropology, it reflects concerns common to the endeavours
in the discipline.
There is, similarly, no fixed definition of democratization.
As a non-specialist I reflect here on the uses of democratiza-
tion most prevalent in my own observations of external pres-
sures for state reform in some southern and eastern African
countries. Hence the writer’s exposure to the rhetoric of
democratization stems largely from the normative discourse
of Western governments and transnational agencies concern-
ing desirable modes of institutional practice – what they
often refer to as ‘good governance’ – in the political systems
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of the region. This understanding of democratization relates
specifically to a programmatic agenda of state reform pro-
moted by transnational actors and enforced via conditions
associated with foreign aid and, more recently, debt relief.
Donor-endorsed versions of democratization claim to be
grounded in a liberal notion of inalienable individual rights.
This encompasses, among other things: political pluralism
(the freedom to form political parties); free and regular elec-
tions; an unconstrained (and privately-owned) media; and
the separation of powers among the branches of the state.
To some extent, the transnational narrative of democratiza-
tion also includes demands for decentralizing state authority
and for greater freedom of participation for ‘civil society’ in
political processes. Of late, demands for ‘pro-poor’ policies
on the part of the state have been incorporated as well.
The juxtaposition of a normative-instrumental political
agenda with an adamantly non-normative intellectual tradi-
tion obviously works against efforts to identify areas of
synergy between the two. The ensuing tale, in other words,
is not about how anthropological insights might best be
harnessed in the service of Bretton Woods-endorsed cam-
paigns for state reform in highly indebted countries. Instead,
the intention is to link this analysis of anthropology and
democratization to a broader narrative about the tension
between instrumental interests and reflexivity. This theme
is not specific to the study of political change, but it comes
into quite distinct focus when viewed through the eyes of
an anthropologist contemplating efforts to reform the post-
colonial African state.
The normative enigma of democratization
The notion of democratization has, at best, an uneasy status
in the anthropological vocabulary. For a number of reasons,
both extra-scientific and scholarly, many anthropologists
have been ambivalent about democratization and hesitant
to embrace democratization as an explanatory tool, let alone
as a normative ideal for passing judgement on the maturity
of polities and political processes. Part of the reason for this
can be found in the normative character of ‘democratization’
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as a research agenda. Where the die-hard liberal protagonist
claims that anthropology ‘has abandoned its claim to truth
and is given over to an insidious relativism’ (see Shils 1992:
183), the anthropologist would ask: Where does the liberal
certainty in its universal truth reside? And to the accusation
that such relativism ‘undermines democratic values and
gives the young little reason to believe that [anthropology]
can contribute anything to the betterment of society’ (Shils
1992: 183), an anthropologist might respond that it is pre-
cisely through self-reflection based on the contemplation
of alternative versions of ‘betterment’ that society can best
agree upon means to address pressing problems.1
One source of the aloofness with which anthropologists
observe the rhetoric of democratization is the left-leaning
liberal political sensibility endemic to the anthropological
community. The core of this sensibility gelled in the radical
ferment of the 1960s, when various versions of ‘radical’ and
‘Marxist’ anthropology gained academic currency. Anthro-
pologists publicly voiced scepticism about (and overt opposi-
tion to) all aspects of Western dealings with the Third World
committed in the name of democracy. Noted anthropo-
logists, from Claude Lévi-Strauss to Eric Wolf, expressed
indignation over imperialist interventions ranging from the
assassination of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo to United
States aggression in parts of Southeast Asia. Anthropologists
were well situated to experience the ambivalence of demo-
cratization. University campuses teemed with opposition
to Western interventions in the Third World. The destruct-
ive consequences of these interventions – both military and
technical – were becoming increasingly apparent. Like many
other social groups, anthropologists found themselves in
sympathy with popular demands for greater democracy
at home as a protest against heinous deeds committed in
the name of democracy abroad. Thus the American legal
anthropologist Laura Nader (1969: 293) argued that anthro-
pologists needed to ‘study up’ to reveal the workings of
power relations within American society in order to achieve
greater ‘democratic relevance’ for the discipline.
However not all anthropologists were radical or Marxist.
Many members of the profession, including the young
Clifford Geertz (1963), became involved in the post-colonial
project of modernization. Interestingly, democratic politics
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did not play a significant role in the discourse of modern-
ization, either. The advice of the Columbia University
anthropologist Conrad Arensberg to American development
‘technicians’ abroad is telling:
The overseas American will have to learn the particular dis-
tinctions of the country where he [sic] is working; he will be
compelled to accept the local definitions of differences to some
extent if he wishes his projects to succeed. It may be possible
to gradually introduce some democratic procedures into these
countries, but the individual worker will probably be wasting
his time and ensuring the failure of his program if he demands
an immediate acceptance of democratic methods. (Arensberg
and Niehoff 1964: 41–2)
Beyond the ideological skirmishes of the Cold War and
the profession’s instinctive aversion to universalizing value
claims, it is evident that democratization is a troublesome
notion for anthropology. This is because, generally speaking,
‘anthropologists . . . have a problem with politics’ (Spencer
1997: 3). That is not to say that anthropologists have ignored
political analysis. They incessantly probe the exercise of
power as it is played out via dense social matrices of intense
and intimate interaction. They have been particularly keen
to unravel the puzzling mesh of continuity and rupture in
the reproduction and transformation of power relations over
time. Anthropology’s fascination with the microphysics
of power, and the way that power participates in the nego-
tiation of subjectivity, both predate current articulations
of these issues that sociologists and others might more
commonly associate with the French philosopher Michel
Foucault.
Central to anthropological research on politics is a rich
literature on ‘local political arenas’ (defined below). But this
work has rarely concerned the politics of mainstream polit-
ical institutions – parties, parliaments, elections and so on;
the major exception is F. G. Bailey (see for example 1969).
Instead, the politics studied by anthropologists, especially
over the past decade, has been on (externally-supported)
state interventions in the socio-economic configurations of
local communities. The core of this mode of analysis relates
to development interventions and their consequences.
The politics of development is, of course, very much a
politics of the state. Indeed, for many communities, the face
ANTHROPOLOGY 27
of the state takes the form of a development project. Yet,
‘development’ begets a particular kind of politics, involving
very specific forms of engagement. Resistance to the oppres-
sive or arbitrary use of power within a development inter-
vention seldom leads to effective demands for democracy.
Project designs are not the product of representative bodies,
nor do project staff enjoy a popular mandate. The politics of
development is articulated through a vocabulary of empower-
ment, consultation and participation, not one of account-
ability or responsible leadership.
This vocabulary reflects, in Ferguson’s (1991) seminal
coinage, the way in which the exercise of power in develop-
ment interventions has been depoliticized. The basis of this
depoliticization is, as Ferguson suggests, the way that multi-
lateral aid bureaucracies like the World Bank dictate the
goals and design of interventions. Recipient states have little
sovereign power over the machinations of ‘development’
and cannot, therefore, be held accountable for the repercus-
sions of the interventions. An esoteric technical language
(‘development speak’) obscures the lack of statutory political
procedure in the processing of decisions about development
means and ends. Over the past decade numerous inquiries
have sought to deconstruct the technical discourse of de-
velopment so as to reveal the empirical intrigues of power
behind the depoliticized façade, for example Marglin and
Marglin (1990) and Escobar (1995).
Two streams emanate from this literature. One is a
normative alignment with the ‘victims’ of development. A
sprawling sub-literature is devoted to problems of participa-
tion and empowerment in development projects. Ironically,
much of this work is funded by aid agencies, either directly
or via non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that them-
selves rely on official funding by the donors. Perhaps for
this reason, the empowerment literature largely reproduces
the depoliticized character of development speak.
Another strand of analysis does, in contrast, underscore
democratic politics; but the focus is the need to democratize
development aid, and to create mechanisms for holding
transnational elites accountable for the consequences of their
actions (Escobar 1995). This perspective is not guilty of
wholly ignoring large-scale power structures or the specific
example of the transnational financial system. Yet, here
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too, the state and the political configurations upon which
it stands are scarcely subjected to critical scrutiny.
Why this reticence to confront the state? Nagengast
(1994: 16) claims that anthropology has viewed the state
as an ‘unanalyzed given’. Trouillot (2001: 126) traces this
oversight to anthropology’s empiricist and methodological
individualist legacy, exemplified by the founding ancestor
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955), who ‘conceptualize[d]
the state into oblivion’. Anthropologists do indeed have a
methodological predisposition toward an immediate, richly
contextualized empirical engagement with social processes.
Intensive, long-term, localized field-work allows ethno-
graphers to document and analyse social experiences of
power and domination, authority and leadership as recounted
by groups of respondents enmeshed in dense social net-
works. As a result, anthropologists have had much to say
about patterns in the narration of political experience and
about the unarticulated or unacknowledged structures of
meaning informing political action.
Reliance on first-hand evidence implies both strengths
and weaknesses for the study of aggregated processes at the
level of ‘regime transition’ and ‘state formation’. The ethno-
graphic perspective provides a rich basis for assessing the
empirical substance of state–citizen relations and for de-
tailed deconstructions of the mechanisms of rule. Yet the
demands of methodological/normative context specificity
can be difficult to reconcile with the summative analysis of
multidimensional political transformation on a national,
much less a global scale (Trouillot 2001). Can the localized
assessment of political relations link up with the analysis
of qualitative change in the aggregate? Naturally this will
depend on the choice of theoretical framework and its
origins.
The liberal conundrum
The prevailing, mainstream usage of democratization under-
scores its roots in liberal political theory. Applying this to a
specific context subsumes a wide range of institutions and
associations within a model of political action grounded on
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certain assumptions about the relative autonomy of politics
with respect to other spheres of social activity, about indi-
viduality, freedom and the dictatorship of individual pre-
ference. This is problematic for anyone who consider liberal
political theory to be a culture-specific perspective on
social action (and human nature), the applicability of which
cannot be assumed beyond the scope of its Euro-American
origins, if indeed even there.
The relation of the individual to the social is a the-
oretical quandary upon which modern social science was
founded. Anthropologists have not resolved this issue (nor
can we even agree about the terms of the problem among
ourselves). Yet one can safely say that anthropologists are
on the average more sceptical than, say, many political
scientists about claims concerning the universality of the
‘rational-instrumental individual’ as a general template for
conceptualizing the Subject of social action (Englund 2002).
Anthropologists insist that the motives and preferences
of individual actors be situated in an empirical social con-
text. This often draws accusations of particularism and
relativism.
The fact is that anthropologists tend to eschew an aggre-
gated, over-generalized view of moral personhood. Instead,
when seeking to understand human behaviour they prefer
above all to comprehend moral choice as an outcome of
negotiated meaning among social actors involved in a spe-
cific historical and institutional situation. But to label the
entire anthropological enterprise as relativistic is to miss
the crucial methodological point. Most anthropologists
would not reject the possibility of ‘universal human qual-
ities’, or even the likelihood that certain ‘norms and values’
(a preference for justice, for example) could have quasi-
universal appeal under normal circumstances. But this is a
far cry from the quintessential liberal claim that predefined
individual rights and freedoms will be compelling to social
actors irrespective of and prior to a detailed empirical
analysis of the circumstances within which social actors
interact.
In this sense an agenda of inquiry harnessed to the norm-
ative telos of liberalism is anathema to the anthropological
endeavour. This is not because anthropologists subscribe to
the unassailable moral authority of communitarian values,
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but because the very idea of positing pre-empirical assump-
tions about the strategic parameters and ideal commitments
of social actors contradicts the rationale of ethnographic
inquiry.
That said, there is clearly nothing in the methodolo-
gical or theoretical arsenal of the anthropological discipline
that counsels hostility to democratic politics. Quite the
contrary: as concerned citizens anthropologists are no
doubt as agreeable as anyone to ideas of accountable and
responsible leadership, government based on consensus
rather than coercion, and political processes that are
responsive to the preferences of those affected by a given
policy, decision or legislative enactment. For example, in
the writer’s experience many and perhaps most Zambians
(among whom he has work extensively), would also
endorse such ideals. The problem is that in practice ‘demo-
cratization’ as discussed above does not always seem to pro-
mote these concrete democratic ends. The much heralded
‘democratization’ process in Zambia that brought the
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) to power in
1991 with strong Western endorsement has hardly promoted
democracy. A good ten years later Zambia’s politico-legal
system is in ferment as citizen groups and opposition pol-
iticians campaign to bring the MMD’s ex-President Chiluba
to trial on counts of massive embezzlement, fraud and
corruption. Elsewhere, Lund (1998) recounts vividly how
poorly managed processes of politico-legal liberalization
in Niger produced chaos in the administration of local
justice. The extent of unpredictability and confusion in
the legal system was so great that it led one informant to
muse plaintively, ‘When will this democracy be over?’ (Lund
1998: 204).
One might ask, then, if anthropology has little to con-
tribute to the instrumental agenda of democratization, what
views do anthropologists have about the factors promoting
or hindering mechanisms of political accountability, equity
and justice in everyday life? For insights we can turn to an
emerging wave of political anthropology. Compensating for
decades of indifference to state politics, these new anth-
ropologies of the state constitute one of the most dynamic
areas of intellectual activity in the discipline.
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Anthropologies of the state
The impetus for a rekindled anthropological interest in state
politics is above all empirical. In the 1990s the relationship
between anthropologists and post-colonial state politics
underwent a belated post-colonial shift. Democratization
and other modes of conditionality-induced state reform
played a crucial role here. Because of widespread political
pluralism and liberalization of the media, the rhetoric of
liberal democracy experienced an ‘indigenization’ in many
places where anthropologists work. Somewhat unexpectedly,
local political parties and social movements emerged in
highly centralized polities articulating a vocabulary of lib-
eral democratic politics, nowhere more so than in southern
Africa. Of course, the indigenization of the rhetoric of
democracy was not unrelated to the generous provision of
‘democracy support’ to pro-liberalist groups and organiza-
tions by the US and other Western governments. Neverthe-
less, in empirical terms, the rhetoric of democratization
suddenly appeared as an indigenous cultural register lodged
in popular discourse, in many instances reaching right down
to the proverbial grass-roots of society.
The upshot has not been at last an anthropological dis-
covery of liberalization and democratization as empirical
givens or explanatory models for ethnographic analysis.
Anthropologists vent little enthusiasm for democratization
as a self-fulfilling liberal narrative of the modern state. Yet
increasingly we have been obliged to accept that the social
manifestations of power observed in the field are inextric-
ably tied up with the dynamics and ‘effects’ of the state
(see for example Mitchell 1999). Rather than a reversion to
normative universalism, however, what is emerging is a
growing ethnographic interest in ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy’
as rhetorical elements and legitimizing narratives in the
contestation of power between and among the various state
and non-state actors.
The rising anthropological interest in empirical states has
been paralleled by a growing puzzlement about how ‘the
state’ should be theorized. The closer one looks at local con-
figurations of power in the wake of the ‘third wave’, the
more ephemeral ‘the state’ appears. On one level, as Lund
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(2002) argues, actors and institutions are intensely preoccu-
pied with the state; and yet it is increasingly difficult to
locate a single source of public authority. This too must be
seen in context. The privatization of state assets and social
services has led to a widespread deregulation of social life.
Viewed from the perspective of ordinary citizens, it is evid-
ent that state institutions can no longer claim an effective
monopoly over legitimate violence or over the administra-
tion of justice (Hansen and Stepputat 2001). The progres-
sive deregulation and arbitrary devolution of state authority
has called the very idea of the state into question. Or more
precisely, the cogency of the state idea has not so much
declined as multiplied. The image of an absolute state
authority that dominated generations of colonial and post-
colonial actors lives on in the social imaginary, but its
empirical referent has become indistinct. ‘The state’ of recent
anthropological interest is less an efficacious regulatory
force, than a quasi-mythical entity with which competing
actors attempt to associate, and thus legitimize, their claims
to public authority.
There are two ways in which recent anthropological
engagements with the state can fertilize debates about demo-
cratic politics. First, ethnographic study reveals how local
actors translate notions like democracy, liberalization or
human rights within specific social contexts. Second, an-
thropological analysis deconstructs mechanisms of rule
and hierarchy in local political relations, thus providing a
litmus test of the validity of political claims promoted at
more aggregated levels of society. There are several areas of
empirical investigation – corresponding to various aspects
of state–society relations – where recent anthropological
findings provide insights into these relations. The remainder
of this chapter discusses just two of them, very briefly: iden-
tity politics (registers of citizenship), and issues of public
authority in local political arenas (legitimacy).
Identity politics
Political pluralization in Africa, as elsewhere, has heightened
political competition and multiplied the issues around which
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support for parties and agendas can be mobilized. The bulk
of the attention addressed to this phenomenon has accen-
tuated the politicization of ‘ethnicity’. Ethnic politics is
commonly stigmatized as ‘uncivil’ and thus anathema to
democratization, in that it promotes divisive rather than
inclusive social solidarities. Karlström (1999: 110), how-
ever, argues that since ethnic-based solidarities are unlikely
to weaken in the near future, ‘the analytical task will be
to try and understand the conditions under which they can
perform [a] mediating role constructively and the circum-
stances under which they become divisive and destructive’.
Karlström’s analysis of the political trajectories of Buganda
royalism in Uganda – a rather special case, granted –
suggests that the Ugandan government’s policy of ethnic
accommodation may well have defused civil conflict. It
thereby secures the political stability upon which President
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement is striving to
consolidate its version of ‘no-party democracy’ – something
that conventional models of liberal democracy in the West
have difficulty in embracing.
Karlström’s primary interest is not in ethnicity per se
but in the conceptualization of ‘civil society’ in an Africa
context. The broader issue at stake is the multitude of ways
that different categories of citizens position themselves in
relationship to the state. Clearly, membership in a group
defined by language, territory or custom can be an import-
ant rallying-point for political mobilization. Werbner, how-
ever, suggests that the importance of ‘ethnic’ identities has
been greatly exaggerated: They are in fact ‘merely a small
fraction of the many identities mobilised in the postcolonial
politics of everyday life’ (Werbner 1996: 1) Increasingly,
anthropologists have been broadening their purview to inter-
rogate other registers of political selfhood. The marker that
has attracted most attention is probably that of citizenship.
Citizenship is central to most understandings of demo-
cratic politics, embodying as it does a normative standard
for assessing the quality of the relationship between sub-
ject and authority. Conventionally, citizenship is discussed
as an element of state–society relations. In place of the con-
ventional, jural notion of citizenship, anthropologists tend
to stress its historically contingent, dynamic and contested
nature. Rather than engage with the core juridical issues of
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constitutional politics, anthropologists have been more inter-
ested in the margins of political selfhood – in transnational
situations such as those involving migrants, or vigilantism,
and transborder residents, or in situations where countervail-
ing authorities compete with the state for the loyalty of
subjects. Indeed, in problematizing the very category of ‘the
state’ recent anthropological work on post-colonial Africa
poses a question that is particularly challenging to the dis-
course of democracy: Citizenship of what?
Public authority in local political arenas
Questioning the validity of the state, both as analytical
category and as real-life authority, inevitably invokes the
notion of legitimacy. For anthropologists the fact of legitim-
ate authority is, once again, an empirical puzzle that can only
be solved within the context of the meanings embraced (and
contested) by the actors whose compliance (or resistance) is
at stake. This is quite different from privileging a ‘culturalist’
explanation of legitimacy – one that evokes fixed custom-
ary/symbolic referents to explain certain modes of behaviour.
The debate between anthropologist Lentz (1998) and political
scientist (1993) on the essential nature of ‘African power’ is
illustrative.
Schatzberg claimed that the ‘moral matrix of African
governance’, unlike the ‘transformative’ nature of Western
power, is grounded in cultural parameters linked to consum-
ption (‘father, family and food’). Lentz (1998: 46) counters
that social debates about the ‘morality of power and desir-
able modes of governance’ in Africa are too complex to be
reduced to such simple terms. Thus legitimacy is not a one-
dimensional quality, to be measured in degrees, but rather
a ‘conflict-ridden and open process in which “big men” and
politicians as well as their audiences intervene’ (Lentz 1998:
47). In her view, then, ‘big men’ perform the testimony of
their legitimacy for specific audiences or ‘moral communities
. . . [that] in part overlap and share similar images of legiti-
mate power and wealth’ (Lentz 1998: 47). Actors are not
free to invent and manipulate the standards by which they
are assessed; structures of ‘expectation’ constrain the ploys
of those with public/political ambitions. But although Lentz
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differs from Schatzberg on the complexity and, by inference,
the substance of the ‘moral matrix’ of legitimacy, she does
not disagree with the basic premise that grounds legitimacy
in the realm of socially constructed moral judgement.
A different, albeit not contradictory, approach to the legiti-
macy puzzle can be found at the juncture of legal history
and anthropology. Studies of customary law in colonial
Malawi and Zambia (Chanock 1985) and of the historical
transformations of legal processes on Mt. Kilimanjaro (Moore
1986) highlighted the complexity of factors affecting the
codification of local normative systems. Such studies invest-
igate how a plurality of normative codes compete for legiti-
macy and how social actors navigate and manipulate these
codes in the course of their various economic and political
pursuits. For the legal anthropologist, it seems, social actors
are fundamentally instrumental actors who draw on what-
ever normative argument supports their immediate aims.
The primary fonts of continuity and change reside not so
much in the transformation of moral sensibilities, as in the
material forces that sculpt the politico-economic conditions
with which actors must come to terms.
At the other extreme, van Binsbergen (1995) inflates the
‘moral community’ premise into a culturalist axiom. His
account of ‘grassroots political culture’ in two African coun-
tries addresses the predominant sub-theme in the Africanist
literature on competing modes of legitimacy: the relation-
ship between ‘traditional authorities’ (chiefs) and the state.
He positions himself in diametric opposition to the modern-
ist notion – argued compellingly by Mahmood Mamdani
(1996) – that central state authority is more democratic and,
hence, intrinsically more legitimate than the traditional
leaders’ authority. For van Binsbergen, genuine grass-roots
democratization presumes the incorporation of traditional
– spiritually legitimized – authority. In his view:
The continuity of a cosmologically-anchored local world-view
with its own conceptions of legitimate political power and pro-
cedure; the interaction between, on the one hand, traditional
leaders and, on the other, those of their subjects pursuing modern
careers outside the village settings; the prominence of religious
alternatives for the symbolic restructuring of society . . . these
would seem to be important factors in the production of a
democratic political culture in the global sense. (van Binsbergen
1995: 12–13)
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This culturalist hyperbole rows vigorously against the con-
temporary anthropological tide. The actors populating the
narratives of mainstream analyses today are far less ob-
sessed with cosmological continuity than with the rational-
instrumental ends of material security, respect and power.
But what unites all the above-mentioned anthropologists is
the conviction that it is vital to have a detailed empirical
understanding of what is going on in grass-roots politics.
Rethinking the local state
The study of ‘local politics’ is a path well traversed by an-
thropologists. With its extensive literature and blossoming
sub-fields such as ritual and performance analysis and reli-
gious studies, even a cursory overview is not possible here.
Instead, the focus is on a body of work that is unique in the
fragmented field of political anthropology for its theoretical
and methodological coherence – the research of the ‘APAD’
school of rural anthropology, which has systematically sur-
veyed transformations of local political arenas, primarily in
francophone West Africa, since the early 1990s.2
Olivier de Sardan characterizes the work of APAD as
‘development anthropology’; much of the APADian liter-
ature deals with development interventions – a theme noted
earlier. Unlike most writing on development, however,
APADian analyses generally proceed from an elaboration of
the social context of the intervention, not from the logic of
the project. Thus, while they participate in topical debates
about the effects of ‘development’ in the countries concerned
(mainly local sites in Benin, Niger and Senegal), the tran-
scendental value lies in the analysis of fundamental social
processes and institutions in these societies.
APADian researchers generally work on the ‘local level’,
but stress the importance of comparative analysis. This is
made possible by a common approach – akin to that of the
legal anthropologists discussed above – that conceives of
local political arenas as ‘semi-autonomous fields’ occupied
by instrument-rational social actors (see for example Lund
1998). These arenas are characterized by a game-like logic
of interaction: actors are in competition with one another
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for various rewards, and yet, there is no single set of rules,
rewards or sanctions governing the political ‘game’. Instead
actors all develop personal and professional strategies, deployed
in keeping with various criteria: for some, increasing patrimonial
land, for others, obtaining a vehicle and the fuel to make it run,
. . . : enhancing one’s position within an institution, obtaining a
better contract, increasing one’s network of social contacts, be-
coming indispensable, earning more money, keeping an eye on
a neighbour or rival, pleasing one’s friends and relations, keeping
a low profile and playing it safe, etc. (Olivier de Sardan 1995)3
Thus while actors are assumed to behave in a strategic,
even instrumental way, they can be motivated by virtually
any mode of utility, from predatory to altruistic.
Issues of decentralization and local power constitute
a major theme running through the work of APAD. The
general thrust of APAD’s and similar studies is that decen-
tralization has become part and parcel of a donor-endorsed
agenda of state reform, and has a recurrent (if uneasy) status
on the agendas of ‘good governance’ and ‘democratization’
promoted by the international ‘development community’.
Decentralization is widely recognized to be a problematic
element in state reform; the successful devolution of
powers and responsibilities from central government is never
smooth, owing to the shortage of qualified managers and
the weak institutional capacity of bottom-rung administrat-
ive structures in post-colonial states.
Decentralization remains popular with donor agencies,
however, for many reasons. As an aid conditionality,
demands for decentralization can be used to undermine the
power monopoly of an entrenched political elite. Also, the
possibility of channelling aid to an empowered local admin-
istration promises to shorten the distance that development
resources have to travel from donor to ultimate recipient
(and to lessen the possibilities for rent extraction by inter-
mediaries). Furthermore, the combined effect of prolonged
fiscal crisis, economic stagnation and downsizing of the
public sector under structural economic adjustment have
tremendously weakened the capacity of central government
to regulate and administer rural areas. In any event, then,
with or without an explicit programme of decentralization,
most African states are undergoing a process of ‘decentral-
ization by default’.
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Decentralization reforms are seldom implemented as
planned, owing to capacity problems, and because of resist-
ance among upstream politicians and within civil service
bureaucracies based in the capitals. Thus it is not only the
effects of the policies that need to be documented, but also
the discrepancies between official intent (as expressed in
policy guidelines) and real outcomes. Both the intended and
the unintended aspects of a reform affect the ‘rules of the
game’ of local politics, creating risks and opportunities for
different sets of actors.
However, APAD’s interest in decentralization is not
primarily concerned with advancing the reform agenda, with
making local administration more efficient, or with improv-
ing the mechanisms of civic participation in decentralized
governance. Instead, the approach starts from the premise
that any effort at radical state reform is fraught with con-
tradictions. Particular studies then proceed to investigate
the ramifications of attempts to decentralize government
for the local, empirical exercise of power. APAD’s empirical
research demonstrates how decentralization reforms have
important, if unpredictable, implications for the configura-
tion of power in local political arenas. Whole new categories
of actors can be brought to the political forefront – as when
a decentralization reform creates a niche for locally based
organizations and entrepreneurs to tender for the contracts
to provide certain public services. Some familiar actors find
their conventional roles, and options, radically changed in
the new configuration. And above all, the relations between
different actors – private/public, formal/informal, centre/
local, political/administrative, ‘modern’/‘traditional’ – are
transformed, as mechanisms of power and political alliances
are reorganized through processes of contestation, negotia-
tion and accommodation.
Conclusion
Over time, the research agenda of anthropologists interested
in the state and democratic politics has evolved, and this is
quite natural. From rather simple, quasi-moral characteriza-
tions of political relationships (clientelism, corruption and so
on), efforts are now emerging to formulate more rigorously
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non-normative conceptualizations of the professional and
personal strategies of local state actors – clearly a basic pre-
condition for understanding the limits of democratic local
governance. From a rough dualistic opposition of state to
non-state, the analytical framework is moving toward a
more complex configuration of public authority, including
a rethinking of legitimacy beyond ‘the state’. Clearly this
sort of examination is central to any meaningful attempt
to understand both ‘decentralization’ (as a donor-driven
programme of liberal state reform) and the possibilities of
democratic politics. The question that remains is: Are local-
ized analyses such as these adequate to grasp the full scope
of the issues at stake?
One possible obstacle is a persisting fetish of ‘the local’.
There is much talk about the impact of globalization on
local political arenas, yet the anthropological predisposi-
tion toward in-depth, localized fieldwork renders translocal
factors hard to grasp. The participation of transnational
actors – international private aid agencies (‘INGOs’), private
corporations, and public agencies – in local processes is
acknowledged, but the trails of these players are not traced
‘up’ or ‘across’ all levels and processes, to garner a fuller
image of their strategies, aims and means.
Anthropologists are beginning to see what critical stud-
ents of international relations have known for some time:
‘democratization’ is a translocal phenomenon in which trans-
national actors such as financial institutions, public aid
agencies, and private advocacy organizations are key players.
Detailed empirical research of the kind carried out by anthro-
pologists indicates that citizens at the grass-roots seem to
have gained little from the ‘third wave of democratization’.
At the risk of appearing cynical, it is perhaps fair to ask
whether the transnational actors that are most vigorously
pushing the reforms are not the real beneficiaries? To answer
such a question, and to understand the scope of its implica-
tions, will require marrying the anthropologist’s attention to
site-specific empirical detail to a sophisticated cognizance
of complex aggregate tendencies at the transnational level.
A related issue, deserving an essay of its own, concerns the
normative (non-)alignments of such inquiry. How should
anthropologists position themselves in the diffuse, dispersed
and multi-sited field of transnational political forces?
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Notes
1 Shils’s immediate reference is to sociology, but he equates sociology
with anthropology in a way that justifies the substitution here.
2 APAD is an acronym for the Association Euro-Africaine pour
l’Anthropologie du Changement Social et du Développement. Olivier
de Sardan (1995) summarizes the theoretical and methodological resources
APAD scholars draw on.
3 Olivier de Sardan’s (1995) book will be published in English by Zed
Press in 2004.
3Economics
tony addison
Industrialization and democratization could not be achieved at
the same time. When my father became president, this country
was in terrible poverty. The first thing he had to do was to save
the country through industrialization and from that followed
democratization. (South Korean presidential candidate, Park
Geun-hye, on her father, Park Chung-hee, who took power in the
1961 military coup, quoted in Financial Times 12 March 2002)
The quotation that starts this chapter expresses a sentiment
that was common currency in the early days of development
economics, but is heard less often nowadays. From the 1940s
to the 1960s it seemed to many observers that living stand-
ards could be raised irrespective of whether a country was
democratic or not. Indeed, some technocrats maintained
that democratic debate could only hinder the implementa-
tion of their carefully crafted development plans. And aid
donors were largely amenable to single-party rule in newly
independent states, especially when it seemed to meet
their own strategic or commercial interests. India was the
big exception – national democratic debate was vigorous
following the adoption of universal adult franchise at inde-
pendence – but otherwise the case for democracy in poor
countries was mostly neglected.
From the 1950s to the 1980s, economic success enabled
the authoritarian governments of South Korea and Taiwan
to achieve a large measure of popular support despite the
absence of democracy and notwithstanding serious human
rights abuses. This lesson was taken to heart by the
Chinese Communist Party, which began the transition to a
market economy in the 1970s, the resulting economic growth
thereby enabling the party to retain political control and
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helping it to overcome periodic unrest (notably Tiananmen
Square in 1989).
But while autocracy seems to have delivered the economic
goods in East Asia, it was a dismal failure in much of Latin
America (during the region’s periodic bouts of military
dictatorship), and a complete disaster for the economies of
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). African leaders sought acquies-
cence to single-party rule in exchange for delivering devel-
opment. However, by the late 1970s this promise was no
longer credible: terms of trade shocks together with erratic
policy-making combined to deepen the region’s poverty and
undermine many (but not all) of Africa’s old dictators. And
for the Middle East, the view that authoritarian rule lies
at the root of the region’s failure to diversify away from
dependence on oil, and to create more employment for its
young population, has gained converts with the debate over
the causes of the terrorist attacks on the United States on
11 September 2001.
This is not to say that democracy will necessarily do any
better in these regions; but it is certainly the case that
autocracy has achieved very little for their economies and
has, in many cases, impoverished people even further. More-
over, democratic transition in South Korea and Taiwan has
now occurred, accelerated in its last phase by the Asian
financial crisis of 1997–98 (which also initiated democratic
transition in Indonesia). This revealed that the structures
of economic management created under authoritarian rule
– which were so successful in the initial phase of industri-
alization – were no longer suitable for managing mature
and globally-integrated high-tech economies. Exposure of
corruption and malpractice in state–business relations in
South Korea was especially important in completing the
country’s democratization. Finally, the importance of good
information communication technology to attracting for-
eign investment and to penetrating global markets makes
it more difficult for national authorities to both promote
rapid structural change and simultaneously suppress the flow
of political information, a dilemma now facing the Chinese
authorities.
In sum, discussion of the relationship between democracy
and development has evolved over the years in the light of
new research as well as of country experiences. This chapter
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identifies the main themes that have emerged in economics.
The principal focus is on the developing countries, but
with some references to the literatures for the developed
and transition countries. The order of presentation will be:
democracy as a determinant of economic growth as well
as growth’s contribution to democratization; the different
consequences of democracy and autocracy for property and
contract rights, and therefore for the incentive to invest;
social polarization and its effects under democracy and
autocracy; and the interaction of democracy with human
development, in particular education and the formation of
human capital. The conclusion argues that democratic
politics can suffer from failure: elections represent ‘incom-
plete contracts’ between voters and politicians. In this
regard, democratic politics is like the market economy: to
work well both need considerable investment in supporting
institutions to protect the public interest.
Democracy’s interaction with economic growth
Does democracy increase economic growth? This has been
a key question for economists. The possible ways in which
democracy may raise (or lower) the growth of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita include its effects on:
the creation of property and contract rights (and thereby
the incentive to invest); the formation of economic policy,
in particular whether it increases or reduces the likelihood
of growth-promoting policies; and the formation of human
capital through education and other services (such as basic
health care), thereby raising growth by increasing labour
productivity. Empirical growth economics has been a highly
active field over the last decade or so, albeit replete with
methodological controversies. Economists typically invest-
igate democracy’s growth effects on cross-sections of coun-
tries by regressing growth on its possible determinants
– usually physical and human capital, population growth,
openness to trade, macroeconomic policy, and measures of
institutional quality – including indices of democracy. The
most commonly used data are the Freedom House index
of political and civil rights (Freedom House 2002) and the
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Polity III data (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Political scientists
have also been active in using these data in quantitative
studies of democracy (see Landman 2000).
What does the empirical evidence show? Kormendi and
Meguire (1985) and Scully (1988) found positive effects of
democracy on growth. Similarly, Nelson and Singh (1998:
690) conclude that: ‘when other factors influencing growth
are controlled for, we find strong statistical evidence that
developing countries with governments that provided higher
levels of political and civil liberties to their citizens
achieved significantly higher GDP growth rates than those
with autocratic governments’. However, other studies show
negative effects. Barro (1996) argues that earlier work was
statistically biased owing to the omission of a number of
growth’s determinants – in particular, measures of the degree
to which property and contract rights are respected – and
that once these deficiencies are corrected for, a moderately
negative effect of democracy on economic growth is found.
Helliwell (1994) finds a negative but non-significant effect
of democracy on economic growth. However, the negative
effect in both the Barro (1996) and Helliwell (1994) studies
is statistically weak. Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) specify a
more detailed model of the linkages between democracy and
growth, and report results that democracy’s overall growth
effects are negative (but again only moderately so).
In summary, the econometric evidence points both ways
on democracy’s growth effect: in some studies it is positive,
in others it is negative. Looking at the last thirty years of
development we can find growth-promoting policies both
in democratic countries (like Botswana and Costa Rica)
and autocratic ones (China and South Korea before 1989).
Growth-reducing policies are evident in democracies (for
example Argentina and Zambia in the 1990s) as well as in
dictatorships such as Burma (Myanmar) and North Korea.
Given this variety of outcomes, the inconclusive nature of
the cross-country econometric work should not perhaps
surprise us.
Before moving the analysis to property and contract rights,
however, it is worth noting that economists have also
had something to say about how growth affects the chances
of becoming a democracy. This is an old, but nevertheless
crucial, question. Barro’s econometric work shows that
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improvements in real per capita GDP significantly increase
the chances of a country democratizing, thereby confirm-
ing Lipset’s (1959) classic argument that democracy tends
to follow prosperity (Barro 1996). Przeworski and Limongi
(1997: 165) find that democracies with per capita income
of less than US$ 1,000 do not last more than 8 years on
average; so economic growth is clearly important to the
survival prospects of new democracies in poor countries.
The omens are therefore not good for SSA: 45 countries
had multi-party constitutions by 1999, compared with only
8 in 1988 (Thomson 2000: 216); but SSA’s GNP per capita
annual growth rate was minus 0.4 per cent during this time
(UNDP 2000: 205). Achieving sustained growth in SSA could
do much to increase the chances of democracy consolidat-
ing itself.
Democracy’s effects on property and contract rights
The econometric work on democracy’s effects on growth is
inconclusive. We must therefore be clearer about the link-
ages between growth and democracy if we are to be more
definitive.
The degree to which property and contract rights are
respected under democracy and autocracy is an important
starting-point. The existence of such rights provides a favour-
able incentive for investment, especially the kind of invest-
ments that involve large immediate fixed costs and a long
time-horizon before profits are realized (such as planting
tree crops whose yield is 4–5 years away, manufacturing
plants that involve an extensive and capital-intensive phase
of construction before they can begin operation, and so forth).
If my property rights are insecure, and I cannot effectively
get redress, then I will be less inclined to invest in produc-
tion. I will be more inclined, if I invest at all, to put my
money into trade, where my fixed costs are lower and my
working capital is the main expense (trade therefore has
much shorter time-horizons than production between the
outlay of capital and the return on investment).
When property and contract rights are only weakly en-
forced then investment is likely to be low, and particularly
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low in agriculture and manufacturing – the main sources of
economic growth, structural change, and employment in
low-income societies. Societies in which insecurity is high
and rising (the situation in many African countries today)
are characterized by the withdrawal of smallholders into
subsistence food production (and away from non-food cash
crops, which typically have longer time-horizons), the con-
traction of manufacturing, and capital flight. Trading in
ever-scarcer goods and the provision of personal services
become the economy’s mainstay as well as the livelihood
for even more people (Afghanistan and Angola are examples).
Respect for property and contract rights is therefore critical
to investment in the production sectors that are at the core
of economic development.
On the basis of his empirical work, Barro (1996 and 2000)
argues that respect for property and contract rights (which
he calls the ‘rule of law’) has a strongly positive effect
on economic growth, whereas the relationship between
democracy and growth is weakly negative, although he
does find some evidence that the relationship is non-linear:
‘more democracy enhances growth at low levels of political
freedom but depresses growth when a moderate level of
political freedom has already been attained’ (Barro 1996:
23). He also finds that democracy has no significant effect
on property and contract rights, although his data are
limited (Barro 1996: 13). On the basis of his empirical evid-
ence, Barro (2000) concludes, somewhat controversially,
that: ‘The problem with the US recommending democracy
in a country such as Zaire (DRC) is not that democracy
harms economic performance but, rather, that it has
little impact. If a poor country has a limited amount of
resources to accomplish institutional reform, then they
are much better spent in attempting to implement the rule
of law’.
Accordingly in Barro’s view authoritarian states can raise
living standards provided that they respect and enforce pro-
perty and contract rights, thereby providing a favourable
climate for private long-term investment. But before we
accept this conclusion we need to go deeper, and specifically
to look at the incentives and constraints facing the people
who make the decisions about rights under democracies
and autocracies. This is the approach taken in the work of
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Mancur Olson and his associates, on which the following
discussion is based (see Clague et al. 1996; Olson 1993,
2000b). They first consider the incentives facing a single
autocrat. An autocrat with a long time-horizon (feels
secure in power), and who is rational (seeks to maximize
self-interest) can gain from granting protection to property
and contract rights. But if his time-horizon is short then he
gains more by expropriation. There are historical examples
of each type of autocrat.
Now consider democracies. A long-standing democracy
will have constructed institutions and laws that constrain
individual behaviour: the democracy will have survived in
large part because leaderships, while self-interested, have
incentives to comply with electoral and constitutional law
(they want to get re-elected), and others – for example the
judges in constitutional courts – have incentives to ensure
that politicians abide by the law. Abuses will certainly
occur, but long-standing democracies also have active
and independent medias, with incentives to root out mis-
creants (and vigorous civil societies with a similar zeal).
But in new democracies this web of institutions may be
barely evident. An active civil society may exist (local
non-governmental organizations, churches, possibly a trade
union movement), but the system of formal laws governing
political practice will be new, often underdeveloped and,
critically, untested (so that a body of statute and precedence
has not been established with which to judge and punish
misdemeanour). Long-standing democracies in the developed
world have histories of often bitter struggle to create and
maintain supporting institutions, and histories in which
democratic reversal has, for periods, occurred.
In new democracies, elected leaders face fewer constraints.
It may be in their self-interest to subvert property and
contract rights, either because such rights cut against their
personal business interests (for example, elected leaderships
may attempt to shut down competitor businesses) or be-
cause they can improve their prospects for re-election (for
example nationalizing without compensation an unpopular
minority or foreign investor). So whether the leaders of a
new democracy act to protect property and contract rights
is critical to whether the democratic transition proves con-
ducive or not to investment and growth:
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in autocracies it is the time horizon of the individual autocrat
(or occasionally the ruling clique) that is the main determinant
of property and contract rights, whereas in democracies these
rights depend on whether the democratic system is durable . . .
Any autocratic society will sooner or later come to have rulers
with short time horizons due to succession crises or other
causes. We therefore hypothesize that democracies that have
lasted for some time and expected to last much longer provide
better property and contract rights than any other type of regime.
(Clague et al. 1996: 246, emphasis in the original)
The empirical results confirm the hypothesis that long-
lasting democracy provides better protection for property
and contract rights, and is therefore better for economic
development, than autocracy. But they also show that these
benefits take time to appear: property and contract rights
are often poor in new democracies, sometimes substantially
poorer than when the countries concerned were autocracies
(Clague et al. 1996: 271).
This may explain the somewhat inconclusive nature of
the literature on democracy’s growth effects that we dis-
cussed in the last section, since these studies generally fail
to account adequately (if at all) for the duration of demo-
cracy. If the results of Clague et al. (1996) are correct, then
it may no longer be the case, as Barro (1996, 2000) argues,
that donors would do better to promote property and con-
tract rights directly rather than to focus on democracy among
aid recipients. For if democratic assistance can help to con-
solidate a new democracy then it will also eventually achieve
an improvement in property and contract rights as well,
which will have long-term development benefits.
Democracy and social polarization
Our discussion so far has one major drawback: it fails to
take account of differences between social groups (by class,
ethnicity, religion, region and so on) and differences in
income, assets, and access to infrastructure and services
between them. Sharp polarization between groups is usu-
ally associated with more competition than co-operation,
as the weak attempt to achieve redistribution and the strong
resist. High income inequality will encourage a poor majority
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to vote for redistributive fiscal measures, and when inequal-
ity is very high the poor may be quite willing to vote for
very high taxes on the rich even though such taxes may
deter investment and thereby reduce growth. This argument
has come to the fore in explanations of why high initial
inequality may be harmful to economic growth (for example
Persson and Tabellini 1994, who also discuss the ‘median
voter’ theorem that is at the core of these models).
Note that this line of reasoning is not exclusive to
democracies; it may also apply to an authoritarian regime
(a populist military leader enacts redistribution in favour
of the poor) or if the poor themselves mount a successful
revolution followed by a redistributional dictatorship.
Moreover, the growth-reducing effect of the redistribution
arises when it takes the form of distortionary (investment-
reducing) taxation. But some forms of taxation may be less
of a disincentive to investment, and if the higher revenues
are allocated to basic pro-poor services then labour produc-
tivity and growth may rise instead of falling (human capital
investment is discussed below). Despite these caveats, the
inequality-democracy-growth argument retains its power,
since it seems to fit many of the facts (growth in high-
inequality Latin America has been much lower than in
more egalitarian East Asia).
High levels of social polarization can also affect the con-
duct of government itself, with detrimental development
effects. Democratically elected governments in polarized
societies can be riven by competing factions, each attempt-
ing to influence policy and institutions for its own ends,
with little consensus on economic policy (at the time of
writing Madagascar has two administrations after a violent
dispute over the results of the December 2001 election).
Again, this problem does not just afflict democratic gov-
ernments. Rather than there being a single autocrat, or a
group that acts like a single autocrat (as in Olson 1993), the
autocracy may instead be split by competing groups able to
co-operate to defend their collective interest against outsiders
but otherwise unable to co-operate on economic policy.
In summary, some economists take the view that whether
a society is a democracy or not matters less for economic
growth than whether it is highly polarized or not: ‘The
crucial distinction is not between autocracy and democracy
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(anyway there’s no evidence that one is better for growth
than the other). It is between a weak central government
made up of a coalition of polarized factions and a strong
central government made up of supporters in consensus’
(Easterly 2001a: 260–1).
Of course, groups may not confine their competition
within the framework of political institutions that set the
‘rules of the game’. In highly polarized societies, groups may
reject the rules of the game (including election results), and
resort to violence to defend or overturn the status quo. In
SSA this violent competition has a strong ethnic dimen-
sion, particularly where colonial governments exacerbated
existing ethnic differences in order to ‘divide and rule’ (as
in Burundi and Rwanda). In such societies, increasing mis-
trust leads people to focus more than ever on the short
term: they look to redistribute the existing social pie in
their favour (through violence if necessary), disregarding
the longer-term benefits of co-operation. The resulting de-
struction and violence does of course reduce the size of the
social pie; but even so one group may come out ahead. Eco-
nomists have therefore increasingly looked to polarization
and social conflict as one reason for development failure.
Easterly and Levine (1997) conclude that ethnic divisions
are a powerful explanation for Africa’s ‘growth tragedy’.
Such considerations imply that efforts to re-establish
peace must have an economic as well as a political dimen-
sion if they are to work. Peace agreements that require free
and fair elections are unlikely to yield peace or democracy
if the underlying causes of social polarization remain. For
instance, the peace agreement that ended 36 years of civil
war in Guatemala included explicit economic measures
to redress the grievances of the disadvantaged indigenous
population (who formed the core of the insurrection). But it
has been tough to fulfil these promises: measures to raise
taxes on higher-income groups to pay for the provision of
basic services to the indigenous and poor population have
struggled through a legislature that is traditionally domin-
ated by Guatemala’s wealthy elite. If groups cannot reconcile
their differences, then secession may occur: this can be
peaceful, but is more often violent.
Traditionally, democracy has strengthened as a middle
class emerges, that is, as social polarization declines, in
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part because economic growth raises people out of poverty
and into the middle class. Such authoritarian states as South
Korea and Taiwan achieved a fast and substantial rise in
living standards that provided these states with consider-
able support in their early stages of growth. But as living
standards reached developed-country levels, a broad middle-
class challenge to authoritarian rule emerged, and this con-
tributed to their democratic transition (similar pressures
are now evident in China). This was accompanied by a
sharp rise in wage levels. Easterly (2001b) finds that a rise
in the share of income going to the middle class raises
political rights (democratization).
Although pressure for democratization can come from
below, it can also arise from changes in strategy within the
elite. In authoritarian societies characterized by a growing
disparity of income between rich and poor, the elite will
have to devote more resources to suppressing the social
unrest associated with rising poverty and inequality. Elites
may be able to use state violence to control the poor for
quite some time (apartheid South Africa is one example).
But the desire to avoid violent unrest and possibly revolu-
tion by the poor (leading to expropriation of the rich) is one
reason why elites may see it as in their own interests to
facilitate democratization, even if democratization is likely
to result in increased taxation of the rich as the newly
enfranchised poor vote for redistribution. Why rich elites
should back redistribution, and the dilution of their polit-
ical power through democratization, is an issue that has
recently captured economists’ attention.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) develop a model of
democratization in which the elite extends the franchise in
order to avoid revolution or social unrest. This constitutes
what economists call a ‘commitment device’. They argue
that this was the main reason why the franchise was
extended in western Europe during the nineteenth century.
This may also explain why income inequality began to de-
cline after the franchise was extended, as new voters pressed
for redistributive measures and why, starting at a low level,
income inequality first increased with development (before
the franchise was extended) and then eventually fell back
(the so-called ‘Kuznets curve’) in the development experi-
ences of Western societies.
52 DISCIPLINES
Still, democratization is not a one-way process: par-
ticularly striking is the oscillation of periods of democracy
with periods of autocracy in Latin America. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001) show that the level of income inequality
is an important determinant of whether democracy con-
solidates or not. In high-inequality societies (such as those
in Latin America) elites may have an incentive to renege
on democratization, by supporting a military coup, if redis-
tribution under democratization is especially onerous.
Democracy’s interaction with human development
The discussion so far has focused on economic growth, and
the accompanying rise in per capita income, as a develop-
ment goal. But the last decade has seen an emphasis on
non-income measures of human welfare as well, in particu-
lar such human development indicators as literacy, life
expectancy, and infant mortality (Sen 2001; UNDP 2000).
The poor not only have low incomes, they also have low
human development indicators, and much can be done to
raise the latter without necessarily achieving strong increases
in income as well (although raising incomes does help).
Education is an important aspect of human development,
and it is one of the components of UNDP’s human devel-
opment index (UNDP 2000). Since poor households find
it difficult to borrow to pay for private education, their edu-
cational prospects largely depend on the scope and quality
of public education, especially primary education. We would
expect the poor to receive more education (and basic ser-
vices) under a democracy because they can vote. Historically,
democracy was one of the factors driving social spending’s
share of the economy: Lindert (forthcoming 2002) finds that,
in the nineteenth century, countries where the majority of
adults voted had the highest school enrolment rates. Note,
however, that causation runs both ways: investment in
education increases the likelihood of democratization, its
sustainability, and the scope of the franchise.
The human capital created by education can be an im-
portant source of economic growth. Saint-Paul and Verdier
(1993) argue that democracy leads to redistribution through
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greater education spending, thereby raising human capital,
labour productivity, and growth. This conjecture is sup-
ported by empirical work: Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) find
a positive link from democracy to growth through human
capital (although in their results this positive effect of
democracy is outweighed by other negative effects, so that
democracy is moderately negative for growth).
Note, however, that autocracy is not necessarily inim-
ical to basic education (or other poverty-reducing services
such as basic health care). Although there are plenty of
examples of autocracies that have neglected basic educa-
tion and health, for example Burma, authoritarian govern-
ments have made large investments in basic education and
other basic social services (notably South Korea in the 1960s).
Again, income inequality is important: leaderships in South
Korea and Taiwan engaged in early redistribution through
land reform and higher pro-poor public spending (in part to
win political support against communist insurgency).
In contrast, many societies that have long histories of
high income inequality find it difficult to raise taxes to
finance basic pro-poor services, and what public money is
available is spent disproportionately on services of most
benefit to urban elites and their supporters. Addison and
Rahman (2003) find that across countries the allocation of
public money to primary education – the level of education
of most benefit to the poor – varies inversely with income
inequality. This finding confirms the model’s assumption
that the already wealthy have more influence on the polit-
ical process (irrespective of whether the country is a
democracy or an autocracy) and favour spending on those
education services of most benefit to themselves.
Hence in Latin America, where income inequality is high,
democratization may not lead to the hoped-for investment
in basic education (as well as other inputs into human cap-
ital such as health) that is needed to reduce poverty signi-
ficantly. The majority of countries in the former Soviet
Union and eastern Europe experienced rising inequality as
well as a marked deterioration in mortality and morbidity
indicators in the process of transition to market economies
(occurring simultaneously with their democratization), an
increase that was at least partly due to badly designed eco-
nomic liberalization and privatization programmes. New
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wealthy elites may control and influence legislatures to an
extent sufficient to benefit only themselves (as is very
evident in Central Asia). This may suggest that ‘the current
level of democracy is a very imperfect proxy for the real
level of democracy, namely that in order for democracy
to “work” on inequality through various redistributive
mechanisms, sufficient “democratic time” needs to elapse’
(Gradstein and Milanovic 2000: 21). This conclusion par-
allels the results of Clague et al. (1996) for property and
contract rights, which also show that democracy’s benefits
take some time to emerge.
Conclusions
This chapter has looked at how economists approach
democracy, highlighting some of the main themes of this
work. We have seen that empirical research finds both
positive and negative effects of democracy on growth. Eco-
nomists are still debating the overall effect – some find
it strongly growth-increasing, others find it moderately
growth-reducing – but the recent literature on property and
contract rights seems to indicate that if a democracy can
consolidate then it will generate better long-run economic
performance than autocracy. We have seen that societies
that are sharply polarized can experience economic problems
under both democracy and autocracy; reducing inequality
is therefore essential if they are successfully to democratize
and develop. Finally, we have shown that democracy can
have strongly positive effects on human development, but
that democratic consolidation is essential for such effects
to manifest themselves.
Economic theory is based on the premise that individuals
seek to maximize their well-being (utility in economist’s
jargon) subject to their constraints (income in particular).
Just as rational calculation leads me to choose one com-
modity over another, so it also leads me to choose one
politician over another, and utility-maximizing politicians
compete to offer me the best political menu at election time.
But, like market economies, democratic politics can also
suffer from failure: elections represent ‘incomplete contracts’
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(politicians can fail to keep their promises once elected and
may break the law). So other institutions, such as constitu-
tional courts, electoral law, and an independent media, are
needed to reduce the inherent imperfections of the elec-
toral process. For an economist it is no surprise that the
introduction of competitive elections is but one of many
steps needed on the road to full democratization, just as
economic liberalization is but one step on the road to a
market economy: in both cases institutions must be built
to protect the public interest, so ensuring that social goals
are met.
Note
This chapter is an output of the UNU/WIDER research project on ‘Why
some countries avoid conflict while others fail’. The views expressed
are the author’s alone and should not be attributed to UNU/WIDER or
its funding agencies.
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4
Gender Studies
shirin m. rai
In order to explore feminist perspectives on democratiza-
tion we need to understand both feminist frameworks and
methodologies. This chapter outlines what a feminist frame-
work might be and then uses this perspective to analyse
feminist engagements with the theory and practice of
democratization.
Democratization can be defined as the process of ‘mak-
ing democratic’ regimes, practices and discourses of public
power. Luckham and White (1996b: 2–8) have identified
four areas of inquiry for democratization analysts: (1) the
nature of the particular institutional form of democracy;
(2) causes and contexts of democratization; (3) prospects for
the sustainability and deepening of democracy and (4) the
relationship between democracy and socio-economic de-
velopment. Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) highlighted three
factors that affect the actual working of democracies: (1) the
international factors – such as inter-state relations; (2) the
individual state itself and its political institutions and
leadership – the role of the military as opposed to civilian
leadership, for example; and (3) ‘civil society’, which reflects
the social and interest groups with a stake in society. It is,
they argued, the constellation of these three factors that
makes for the possibilities, or otherwise, of a successful
democratization process. While valuable in themselves, both
these explanatory and analytical frameworks share one fun-
damental characteristic – the focus is on spaces where actors,
states and individuals act in the public political sphere.
The following sections present four insights arising from
the work of feminist scholars that extend our understand-
ing of democratization at the theoretical level. The analysis
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then moves to the specific field of gender and democratiza-
tion and the nature of women’s participation in politics.
The final section reflects upon the wider socio-economic
context in which men and women are engaged in demo-
cratization struggles. The conclusion holds that democrati-
zation is an untidy and unfolding process and that feminist
insights are crucial for understanding it.
Feminist engagements
Public and private spheres of political action
Perhaps one of the most enduring contributions of women’s
activism and feminist theorizing is the challenging of the
boundaries between the public and the private as defining
(out) politics. In Pateman’s (1983: 283) words, ‘the separa-
tion of the private and public is presented in liberal theory
as if it applied to all individuals in the same way’. Feminists
argued that public political life was built upon the absence
of women from it; that the exclusion of the private sphere
was essential for the primacy of the public. By expanding
the definition of politics to encompass both the public and
the private spheres, indeed, by asserting that the two were
mutually constitutive, feminists have been able to chal-
lenge the dominant understandings of politics itself, and
therefore of democratic practice and discourse. For example,
in the democratization movements against the military
dictatorship installed by the coup of 11 September 1973
Chilean women called for democracy in the home as well
as in politics. However, these struggles have not always
been successful. While the discourse about women’s posi-
tion and role within the family has been carried out in the
public sphere, women’s presence in the public sphere has
continued to be a controversial issue.
Differences remain among feminists about the nature of
the public/private divide. While radical feminists have seen
the obliteration of this distinction as necessary to a demo-
cracy that is inclusive of gender-based difference, others have
seen such a bridging of the public and private as a transit-
ory phase – a phase that would allow the entry of women
into the public arena as independent actors (Phillips 1991
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and 1993). Some feminist scholars have argued that, while
democratizing the private domain is crucial for women’s
participation in the public, it ought not to be confused with
issues of civic participation and rights (Dietz 1992). Young,
for example, has stressed the importance of maintaining the
separation between the two spheres. She suggests that the
private sphere should be thought of as ‘that aspect of his or
her life and activity that any person has the right to exclude
from others. The private in this sense is not what public
institutions exclude,’ she argues, ‘but what the individual
chooses to withdraw from public view’ (Young 1990: 119–
20). Lister (1997: 121) quite rightly points out the problems
with this articulation of the public–private divide: ‘it does
leave open the question as to which individuals have the
power to make their choices stick’. I would also emphasize,
however, the need for a simultaneous, but parallel, demo-
cratization of both the public and the private spheres. Here
we should insist, with Dietz, upon keeping the two domains
separate. It is important to mark a conscious transition
that women must make to politicize the issues that affect
them within the private sphere. Rather than focusing on the
issue of exclusion from the private sphere, I would emphas-
ize the terms of inclusion into the public sphere. For it is
only through making the private public that we can move
forward on this issue. While not entirely answering the
question of agency raised by Lister (1997), such an under-
standing of the bringing together of the public and the
private would do so in part through the social mobilization
of women (and men) on particular issues in the public sphere.
Such an analysis of the public/private divide not only allows
us to focus on the importance of the private for the public,
but it also provides us with a measure for assessing the pro-
cesses of democratization. It is both a framework of analysis
and a methodology for assessing political change.
Feminist methodologies
Building upon this debate, the second insight that feminist
scholars have offered is by paying particular attention to
‘experience’ as an important starting-point of knowledge,
which contextualizes the basis of politics itself (Scott 1992).
Gender, as social construction of sex, then is reflected in
the political roles that women and men are able to perform,
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and ‘frames the very definition of politics, and by default,
what does not constitute politics’ (Rai 2000: 156). From an
analytical framework, which challenges the public/private
divide and insists upon experience as a valid form and basis
of knowledge, there emerges a radical visualization of politics
itself. This visualization sees the universalized language of
politics, of citizenship and rights for example, as marking
the erasure of structurally embedded differences between
individuals. As Blacklock and Macdonald (2000: 19) argue,
women’s movements are ‘exposing the limitations of a dis-
course which, in its universalism, conceals a gendered and
racialised subject identity, a Western, ethnocentric concep-
tion of rights, and an ontology which denies heterogeneity
and diversity’.
The importance of context has been the third interven-
tion that feminists have made in the debate about democrat-
ization. Feminists have pointed to the diversity of women’s
histories, and to their differential experiences of ‘the pub-
lic’ on account of class, race, disability and sexuality, to
argue for the essentially contingent and contested nature of
the debate on the distinction between the public and the
private spheres (Lister 1997: 122–5). They have also quite
rightly asked the question: What are the costs – social, eco-
nomic and personal – of political participation for women?
Who has the resources to be able to participate directly?
These costs are not the same, and quite often depend upon
the social and economic resources that women are able to
mobilize in order to access political life, to participate in
informal and formal processes and political institutions.
Religion, class and caste, ethnicity and sexuality, disability
and language all mediate with gender to influence the out-
comes of democratic participation for women and men.
Patriarchy and democratic politics
And finally, feminists have theorized on democracy with
regard to the meta-framework of patriarchy. Patriarchy has
been defined as a ‘system of male authority which oppresses
women through its social, political and economic institu-
tions . . . a sex-gender system and a system of economic dis-
crimination operate simultaneously. Patriarchy has power
from men’s greater access to, and mediation of, the resources
and rewards of authority structures inside and outside the
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home’ (Humm 1989: 159). While there are different feminist
positions on the nature of patriarchy, broadly speaking the
concept does define the feminist position on social relations.
So when feminists have addressed the issue of democratiza-
tion, they have asked different questions and sought answers
that go beyond the mainstream debates on democratization.
Questions of access to and participation in the political and
the socio-economic spheres, the deepening of democracy
within and outside the home, are therefore, considered to
be deeply gendered. The next section of this chapter builds
on these discussions to assess the nature and outcomes
of democratization debates and initiatives from a gendered
perspective.
Gender and democratization
Waylen (1994), in her survey of the democratization liter-
ature, poses four questions about women’s participation in
the process of democratic transitions and consolidations:
(1) Why women choose to organize or not? (2) Where they
exist, what is the nature of these movements? (3) What
is the interaction between women’s political activities and
the process of transition? and (4) What are the outcomes for
women of transitions to democracy, as well as of further
democratization of consolidated political systems?
Women’s movements and democratization
Social movements have been defined as ‘organized efforts
at the grass roots to represent interests excluded from or
poorly represented in formal arenas of authoritative nego-
tiation and value allocation’ (Teske and Tetreault 2000: 9).
In this sense women’s movements have always been part of
political processes in different contexts. It is through their
participation in these movements that women and women’s
groups have been able to stake a claim to equal representa-
tion in political life and institutions (Jayawardena 1986), on
the one hand, and to focus attention on the necessity of
deepening democracy within the home as they negotiate
the terms upon which they participate in social and political
movements in the public sphere. For example, the Hudood
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Ordinances decreed in Pakistan by its military ruler Zia ul
Haq (1977–88) provoked a strong response from Pakistani
women. They led to the establishment of the Women’s
Action Forum, which has not only mobilized against the
Ordinances, which were clearly discriminatory against
women, but also joined and strengthened the struggle for
democracy in Pakistan (Ali 2000: 46–50). The movement
of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Chile against the
Pinochet regime also shows how women have challenged
the separation of the public and the private by building on
their role as mothers within the home to challenge author-
itarian regimes in public: ‘Their refusal to acquiesce in the
loss of their children was not an act out of character, but a
coherent expression of their socialisation [as mothers] . . .
True to themselves, they had no other choice but to act,
even it meant confronting the junta’ (Navarro 1989: 257).
An important and complex area where the overlaps be-
tween the public and private spheres create challenges for
women is that of ‘culture’. Feminist insights have insisted
upon de-mythologizing an ‘essential woman’ through the
study of difference – between men and women and among
women – as a theoretical strategy that underpins women’s
struggles for empowerment (Fuss 1989). However, even move-
ments of democracy create their ideal woman erased of all
differences – authenticity of culture is inscribed on women’s
bodies and roles. Women have sought to democratize this
discourse on two counts – first, by challenging the ‘orient-
alist’ and imperialist discourse of rescue of the women of
particular (non-Christian/Western) cultures (Liddle and Rai
1998); and second by challenging the codes of silence that
their own communities impose on them in the name of anti-
racism. By challenging both these positions women have
attempted to open up and deepen the democratic debate.
This has not always been easy, and at times has sat uneasily
with the mainstream public debate on democratization.
Nature of women’s political participation
Participation in political movements has been a crucial ele-
ment in the struggles for democratization. It has contributed
to the creation and expansion of civil society as well as
being critical to the claims of various marginalized groups
for representation in national political institutions. Feminist
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scholars and activists have long been aware of the dilemmas
of participation. On the one hand it is a powerful means of
access and empowerment, and on the other, it places differ-
entiated burdens and costs on participants. Issues of differ-
ence are important when discussing the nature of political
participation, as is its stabilization within specific political
systems. While on the whole mainstream democratization
theory has been sceptical about participatory politics owing
to its unpredictability and doubtful of its long-term efficacy,
feminists have embraced it despite the above reservations.
Lynch (1998: 162) has argued that ‘theorising about social
movements in the 1970s and 1980s made a double move –
from a critique of capitalism to an interest in the “higher
goals” of rights, peace, and democracy, and from a focus on
“particularistic” movements . . . to movements motivated
by “universalistic” values and objectives’. For the women’s
movements this double move created new opportunities
and solidarities within the broad framework of democrat-
ization. An arena of public politics where women’s move-
ments have attempted to bring together the public and the
private has expanded to include important issues of human
rights1 and citizenship. While rights, like the state, provoke
different responses from feminists (see Rai 1996), human
rights discourse has been central to the struggles for demo-
cracy in the 1980s and 1990s. In Guatemala, for example,
the exposure of human rights violations was the first step
towards building the movement for democratization. How-
ever, the movement also tried to conscientize the popular
masses with ‘the longer-term goal of preparing pobladoras to
become citizens by organising their communities’. By raising
awareness that ‘all people are “entitled” to [human rights],
the women’s organisations are attempting to construct
pobladoras as new “subjects of rights”, new political actors,
and new citizens’ (Blacklock and Macdonald 2000: 22–3).
It is through this linking of state-based rights and citizen-
based conscientization that the women’s movements are
participating in the creation of a civil society that might be
able to sustain the expansion of formal rights, as well as to
challenge a universalized understanding of rights themselves.
Women’s movements have also reflected the unfolding
nature of citizenship. They have pressed for different facets
of women’s lives to be reflected in legal and constitutional
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arrangements – from the early-twentieth-century demands
in many countries for universal political rights, to the cur-
rent insistence upon mainstreaming a gendered perspective
in political institutions. Thus, while feminists and women’s
movements have been wary of institutional power and
discourses of universality, by opening up the issue of dif-
ference they have sought an intersection of the two. The
interest in the ‘third generation’ of group-based human rights
is evidence of this (Kymlicka 1995). In terms of democrat-
ization, this has led to some initiatives of securing women’s
participation in institutional politics through group-based
quotas, with mixed and sometimes controversial outcomes
(Rai 2002).
Women’s participation in institutional politics
While mainstream democratic theory has concentrated
largely on representative as opposed to participatory politics,
it is only relatively recently that feminists have explored
the possibilities of representative institutional politics. Deb-
ates about rights and participation in movements for demo-
cracy have led women’s groups to the recognition that it
is imperative that the gains made through participation are
institutionalized through laws, constitutions, and political
machineries and practices. Interventions of international
organizations such as the United Nations also helped to
emphasize the importance of working with state institutions
in order to improve the living conditions of women.
Here we find significant variations depending upon the
nature of political transitions and political systems, and
political ideologies of leaderships, as well as different tra-
jectories of change. Thus, during the period of transition to
a democratic South Africa, the aim of the Women’s National
Coalition (WNC), which was the umbrella organization for
90 women’s organizations representing about two million
women, was to ensure that by participating in debates on
the writing of the constitution they ‘would be able to secure
a consistent gendered perspective throughout this most
important document’ (Zulu 2000: 174).
While the South African case is a success story for a
gender-sensitive transition politics, the experience of east-
ern Europe has raised important questions for women’s
movements as well as for democratization struggles. The
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democratization of eastern European states did not lead to
more representative political institutions. On the contrary,
there was a ‘dramatic drop in levels of female political rep-
resentation to 10 per cent or less in national assemblies after
the first and second democratic elections in East Central
Europe’ (Einhorn 2000: 108). Together with the enormous
economic pressures that families have had to experience
and the abandonment of the earlier pattern of state-based
participation in political institutions, women have largely
stayed away from political institutions. Women have con-
tinued to be active in some eastern European countries at
the level of informal, civil society politics, where they have
channelled their input into being lobbying and advocacy
groups under ‘severe limitations on their ability to shift
state policies grounded in a culture of exclusionary ethno-
nationalism’ (Einhorn 2000: 109–10).
Within specific contexts, strategies for democratizing the
state as well as civil society have thus been on the agenda
of feminist democratic practice. However, a crucial context
within which these strategies have taken shape and have
been tried out is that of economic liberalization.
Democratization and entitlements
Feminist scholars have long challenged the view that there
is a positive correlation between political and economic
liberalization (Elson 1989). They have argued that the in-
creased pressures arising from economic liberalization are
increasing the burden that women carry in their daily lives
and therefore reducing the time and space for them to be
politically active. Globalization as liberalization is putting
under pressure the idea of a stable social compact between
citizens and the national states (Rai 2002: 157).
Structural adjustment policies and citizenship
entitlements
Reductions in state spending on health are adversely affect-
ing women’s health as families make choices about spend-
ing limited resources on men or on boy children, and is
also increasing the care burden of women as they look after
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elders and children in the absence of state provision. Sim-
ilarly, education of girls has fallen dramatically in countries
where structural adjustment policies (SAPs) have meant cuts
in state education budgets. According to UNCTAD (2000),
girl child enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa has plummeted
with the introduction of SAPs. In terms of the development
of the human capabilities of poor women and particularly
of the women of the South, this falling investment is re-
sulting in the erosion of their future abilities to contribute
to the family income, as well as to participate in the wider
political processes important to the development of their
countries. Even the expansion of women’s participation in
the sphere of waged work in liberalized economies is no
indicator of their empowerment. It could simply ‘be the
result either of progress towards the homogenization and
equalization of the male and female employment roles, or
be caused by persistence of differences in sex roles on the
labour market, with demand for female labour protected by
rigid patterns of sex segregation’ (Rubery 1988: ix).
It could be argued that the dislocations in gendered
regimes of power at the local levels caused by the expan-
sion of female labour in export processing zones has led to
women’s acquiring a higher status within the family, and
the opening up of new spaces outside the home for their
political mobilization. Women have participated in trade
union struggles as well in the wider anti-globalization/
liberalization movements. In November 1998, for example,
‘182 women from 22 countries representing 104 organiza-
tions met in Kuala Lumpur to Resist Globalization and
Assert Our Rights’. They argued that ‘privatisation of health
care is a violation of women’s basic human rights to total
well-being’ and asserted that Third World women have
suffered most from globalization in Asia, where economic
crisis has brought large-scale unemployment and displace-
ment, deepening poverty, food insecurity due to increasing
loss of biodiversity and the appropriation of land and water
resources by large transnational corporations (TNCs) and
the elite. They concluded: ‘our governments, local elites and
local businesses are the collaborators and implementers of
this agenda’.2
Given the context of poverty and exclusion, such struggles
are impressive. However, they also alert us to the limitations
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of the democratization discourse if we do not take into
account the socio-economic context of political processes.
Indeed, an attention to the question of citizenship entitle-
ments of health, education and freedom from poverty is
crucial if the democratization debate is to be inclusive of
those on the margins of civil society. To facilitate women’s
active citizenship, Einhorn argues that what has been called
‘exchange entitlement mapping’ must be enhanced through
the strengthening of the economic as well as the political
rights of women.
Democratization and globalization
As is evident from the above discussion, while it may be
focused on national states and political institutions and
processes, democratization can no longer be discussed
without attention to globalization. Thus, Held has asked:
‘Whose consent is necessary, whose agreement is required,
whose participation is justified in decisions concerning, for
instance, the location of . . . [a] nuclear plant? What is the
relevant constituency? Local? National? Regional? Interna-
tional?’ (1991: 143). We have seen the exponential growth
of financial and trade flows, helped by a revolution in com-
munications. The result has been arguments about the de-
territorialization of politics, the retreat of the nation-state,
and the convergence of economic policies, and about a
reflexivity about the world that we inhabit and whose cit-
izens we are. Thus it could be argued that globalization has
led to the transformation of our daily lives. However, fem-
inist engagements with globalization theory also point out
that ‘it is perhaps a particularly weak version of democracy
that has been institutionalized on a global scale – liberal
democracy in its most elitist, least developmental form’
(Eschle 2001: 151). It has been argued elsewhere that ‘[a]s
the global reach of social and political movements increases
through technological and information networks, and as
the pressures of international trade and markets begin to
impinge significantly on the national economies leading to
a fragmentation and repositioning of nation-states, the rela-
tionship between local struggles, social movements and
the national state is being constantly reshaped’ (Rai 2002:
205). Indeed, increasing attention is being paid to relations
between women’s group across national borders, focused
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on networks of women straddling North and South, and on
the way in which cyber-technology is changing commun-
ications among and for women. Women are participating in
struggles at the local/national as well as local/global levels
(Parpart, Rai and Staudt 2002). Movements of citizens’ boy-
cotts of particular transnational corporations or products,
ecological struggles for the protection of bio-diversity, the
indigenous peoples’ movements and indeed the women’s
movement have all had to operate across traditional national
boundaries, and therefore to negotiate in the global political
space. Issues of accountability, agenda-setting and interest
representation, as well as institutionalization, have become
globalized. Democratization is no longer confined within
national boundaries, even though states continue to be the
focus of convergence of liberal democratic institutional
politics. The pressures to liberalize economies as well as
polities continue to be seen as markers of convergence of
democratic practice even while the outcomes of these pres-
sures sharpen differences between states and among people.
In conclusion
As Luckham and White (1996b: 1) point out, the democrat-
ization ‘wave’ had already begun to recede by the mid-1990s
as entrenched regimes either resisted the trend, or merely
went through the democratic motions, or as newly demo-
cratic regimes succumbed to various forms of authoritarian
reversion. Women’s groups engaged in democratization
struggles have been acutely aware of a need for constant
vigilance in any engagement with state-dominated processes
of democratization. Global economic trends also affect the
processes and stability of democratization. Feminists’ inter-
ventions in struggles for democratization have alerted them
to viewing democratization as a context-bound process. State
formations, the contours of particular civil societies, the
possibilities of women’s mobilizations, the entitlements that
women have (or not), and institutional arrangements that
give shape to particular citizenships have profound impacts
upon the possibilities for women to participate in political
life. As economic downturns affect different governments,
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issues about entitlements to citizenship become increasingly
more important.
Political practice has also clarified the fact that demo-
cratization is not a wave that comes or goes – however much
its jagged nature might be emphasized; it is an unfolding
and untidy process. Successes in one area are not suggest-
ive of a completeness of the process. Issues are, and need to
be, revisited, with startlingly different results. Institutions
that have been stable for decades, as well as new institu-
tions of state power, need to be opened up for scrutiny.
This is important because the dominant discourses of power
have begun to engage with the struggles of marginalized
groups, and need to be stabilized within old institutions
that had been put together in another historical context.
Gains that have been made must be cemented within new
institutions and old. The unfolding nature of democrat-
ization is also evident when we examine the question of
entitlements. As transitions from one set of socio-economic
relations to another make clear, political and social citizen-
ships do not necessarily go hand in hand. The tension within
liberal democracy – of individual rights embedded in a socio-
economic context of unequal access to resources – con-
tinues to haunt throughout all the debates on entitlements.
Newly democratizing nations and old democracies both are
sites for the struggles for the democratization of politics.
Finally, we also need to emphasize the importance of com-
parative work so that women can view, analyse and perhaps
use strategies for enhancing women’s participation in pol-
itics across the boundaries of nation-states. The debates on
citizenship – in the universalist discourse as well as those
focused upon women’s group rights – are particularly im-
portant in this regard (Young 1990; Lister 1997; Yuval-Davis
1997). The language of rights, of equality, of difference, and
of entitlements have all been employed by women as they
strategize in their pursuit of greater freedom. International
fora provide meeting-places where women from different
countries cross boundaries, create networks, confront con-
straints and explore democratic possibilities. Global frame-
works, while necessarily limited, have also been utilized by
women’s movements to build bridges and create solidarities
across national borders in their struggles to democratize
politics. Feminist debates on democratization continue to
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contribute to such a rooted crossing of cultural, historical
and political boundaries.
Notes
1 Only in 1991 did Amnesty International put the violation of women’s
rights on its agenda. Prior to this, feminist activity was not a recognized
‘political’ category except when integrated into the programme of a
political party or trade union (Ashworth 1986: 11).
2 Statement of the Third Women’s Conference Against APEC, 50-
years@igc.org.
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History
peter calvert
The main purpose of this chapter is to show how historians
have contributed to our understanding of the processes of
democratization. In the course of this the main focus will
be on the different views historians have taken of alternat-
ive paths to democracy and particularly its early stages –
the so-called ‘first wave’ (see Huntington 1991). To do this,
however, we have first to take into account the ways in
which different historians have approached the writing of
history.
Democratization here is taken to be a process by which
popular participation is enhanced. It is not confined to
periods of passage from authoritarian to popular government.
It includes (but is not confined to):
• the establishment of the principles of representative gov-
ernment, accountability and the rule of law;
• the extension of participation, either by the formal widen-
ing of the franchise, or by the informal empowerment of
new social groups that have not previously participated,
or both; and
• the continued modification of modern systems to facil-
itate popular understanding of and ability to participate
in government. Such modifications are, in the United
States the passage of the Freedom of Information Act, in
France the end of the prefectoral tutelle, and in the United
Kingdom the devolution of powers in the late 1990s to
the Scots Parliament and the Welsh Assembly.
While it is easy to say that understanding the present
is helped by a knowledge of the past, in practice things are
far more complicated. This is because historians do not and
(more to the point) cannot agree on the past; when presenting
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their narratives they impose their own versions of rationality
and orderly development. But, far from this implying that
historical research only makes the challenge of making sense
of recent democratization even more problematic, the main
inference is that students of democratization in other dis-
ciplines, who constantly rely on historical works to fill out
understanding, absorb the assumptions of history along with
the content, and that they should therefore remain alert
to this.
Different approaches to the writing of history
Perhaps the greatest contribution history can make, there-
fore, to the understanding of democratization is to enable
us to understand better how historians’ questioning of the
foundations of their own discipline can have implications
for our understanding of accepted ‘facts’. The founder of
modern historical scholarship, Leopold von Ranke, uninten-
tionally pointed up the ambiguity between aspiration and
actuality in his celebrated comment (which was meant only
to apply to the specific work): ‘History has had assigned
to it the task of judging the past, of instructing the present
for the benefit of ages to come. To such lofty functions this
work does not aspire. Its aim is merely to show how things
actually were (wie es eigentlich gewesen)’.1
The Rankean view that history based on original sources
is definitive (fact) has long since been modified. It has,
indeed, been wholly abandoned by the post-modernists; but
the arguments of philosophers such as Richard Rorty and
the historian Hayden White basically only amount to an
assertion that nothing can ever be known for certain (see
Jenkins 1995). Yet for a variety of practical reasons we need
to have some agreement about what happened in the past –
if only to try to plan for the future. However partial this
‘knowledge’ may be and however uncertain we may be that
it does in fact constitute ‘knowledge’, the historian does
not have the freedom of the poet or the novelist to dismiss
certainty as impossible and leave it at that.
A more crucial objection is posed by Ankersmit (1983),
who argues that there can be no general descriptions in
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history. Terms such as ‘the Enlightenment’, for Ankersmit,
are simply ‘names given to the “images” or “pictures” of
the past proposed by historians attempting to come to grips
with the past’. If this were true, then this argument that
‘the past itself has no narrative pattern or structure’ would
be equally valid for ‘democratization’ (Ankersmit 1983:
99, 110). McCullagh (1998) accepts that different historians
will have different views about the past, and consequently
that they will have different views about all such classific-
atory terms and generalizations. However, as he points
out, all such views do in fact have much in common. They
may be unique in detail, but they can still be identified as
referring to the same thing and be classified as belonging to
the same family of descriptions. And, ‘once it is admitted
that there are criteria for the application of most general
terms in history, then the possibility of them being true
becomes plain. A general description of the past is true if
the criteria for its application are satisfied’ (see McCullagh
1998: 68).
There is therefore still a discipline termed History, and
it is distinguished by its methodology. Philosophy offers us
one sort of understanding about the world we live in. Sci-
ence and History each offer us alternative understandings.
As it did for Ranke, History still involves the interrogation
of written and other material from some time before the
present in order to arrive at an understanding of the past.
History depends on the existence of written sources, and
without sources is not recognized as such (hence we have
to talk of prehistory for the times before which written
sources are available).
Historians have almost unlimited freedom to dispute what
meaning they should attach to their source material, and in
recent years have shown a great deal of ingenuity in iden-
tifying and interrogating material that was not previously
consulted. What they cannot legitimately do is either to
ignore evidence to the contrary of which they are aware,
or to insert material for which they have no evidence what-
soever. Speculation, up to a point, is perfectly permissible
for the historian,2 but it must be labelled as such. In the
twentieth century interrogation of the sources expanded,
with (a) utilization of new sources (from account books to
oral history); (b) new techniques for interrogation (statistics,
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scientific analysis of materials, radiocarbon dating, archae-
ological research); and (c) ability to access and to store much
larger quantities of data. Historians, however, remained
suspicious of frameworks such as the ‘models’ employed
by other social scientists that are specifically intended to
present a selective picture of reality.
The discipline’s main contribution to understanding also
presents problems, which the post-modernists have been
quick to claim support their pessimism. To be rendered
intelligible to the reader, history has to be set out as narrat-
ive. But history as narrative imposes a sense of rationality
and orderly development that is in some sense the creation
of the historian. Take one example: the concept of a ‘cen-
tury’. The long-held assumption that 1914 marks the true
end of the long nineteenth century has been challenged for
many years (Seaman 1966). And it already has been argued
that the ‘short twentieth century’ began in 1914 and came
to an end as early as 1989, presumably consigning the history
of ‘third wave’ democratization to an equally elastic twenty-
first century (Hobsbawm 1994).
A more serious criticism has been made by various
writers, notably the US historian, Hayden White (1966),
that the narrative form in itself is misleading in its whole-
ness. Though there is no real history for White, what people
experience as history they do not see as a narrative – and
necessarily so, since they do not have foreknowledge of
what is to come. History cannot therefore constitute a log-
ical progression towards the present, still less towards an
ideal future state such as is implied by the term ‘democracy’
as it is currently used. In fact, in some complex situations,
such as the French Revolution, narrative cannot easily cope
with the complexity of events, and it is partly in con-
sequence of this that successive generations of historians
have needed to reinterpret it. We shall see how this has
been done as we examine in turn the three main historical
models of democratization. As was noted above, historians
are rightly suspicious of models. Yet we can identify three
streams of historical debate corresponding to three different
models of the way in which the foundations of democracy
were laid. These are: the myth of American exceptionalism,
the Gladstonian view of British history, and the French
Revolutionary tradition.
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The myth of American exceptionalism
We can begin with Gladstone’s apothegm that the US Con-
stitution was ‘the most wonderful work ever struck off at
a given time by the brain and purpose of man’. One could
challenge this judgement on many grounds. American his-
torians have long since come to see the American Revolution
not as a form of Constitutional debate but as the con-
sequence of a deep-seated conflict of interest between Britain
and its colonies – a view, moreover, with which Thomas
Jefferson would undoubtedly have agreed. The Jeffersonians
correctly saw the seat of popular will as lying in the States,
but for some reason it has always been difficult to persuade
British observers to interest themselves in the minutiae of
state government. The US Federal Constitution deliberately
limited the power of the people (as for example by the crea-
tion of the Electoral College), even while creating a structure
designed to preclude any notion of a return to monarchy. It
was republican rather than democratic. With the election
of 1828 and the arrival of the Jacksonians the system was
radically changed by the growth of political parties, even
while the formal structure of the Constitution remained
unchanged.
By 1843 the extension of the franchise to all white males
had been achieved. The way was open for George Bancroft
in his 10-volume History of the United States from the
Discovery of America (1834–87) and his followers to write
a new ‘democratic’ history, presenting the citizens of the
Republic with a flattering and patriotic self-image with
which they were only too ready to identify. Far from the cor-
ruption and decadence of Europe, they had on the frontier
developed the qualities of self-reliance, liberty and honesty
that found their outcome in the extension of popular
government. Bancroft was not a professional historian. His
impact on the public stemmed from his persuasive thesis
and was reinforced by the massive scale of his work – made
possible by a new technique of treating the writing of his-
tory as a team enterprise. His History of the United States
was to the late nineteenth century what the Encyclopedia
Britannica was to the twentieth. A most unfortunate by-
product was the way in which the frontier thesis effectively
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wrote the native American out of the mainstream of Amer-
ican development. Despite many detailed studies of the
Revolutionary period in the twentieth century, however,
the frontier thesis remains part of the founding myth of the
United States of America. It contributes to the self-image
that that country has a mission to spread its distinctive
brand of democracy to the rest of the world.
Gladstone’s eulogy of the US Constitution is the more
curious because it was uttered so close in time to the
Constitution’s most evident failure. The American Civil
War, 1861–65, marks a critical passage in the survival of
the first-wave democracies. However, if books on Lincoln
are legion, the era of Reconstruction has largely been left to
professional historians. So too has the Progressive Era and
the 1920s, while the Civil Rights movement of 1950–70
appears as if from nowhere. Meanwhile Charles Beard’s
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, published
in 1913, challenged the idealized view of the making of the
Constitution. It substituted for the older view that it was
primarily concerned with civil liberties a well-argued case
for seeing it as first and foremost a document designed to
facilitate the transfer of economic power to a new govern-
ing class.
The rise of the US to world power status, on the other
hand, gave rise to a new sub-genre of US diplomatic history.
With varying degrees of subtlety it conveyed the message
that the US was uniquely privileged to use its unparalleled
powers for the betterment of mankind as a whole.3 The
challenge of the Cold War and the hazards posed by nuclear
armament instead led to an urgent search for leadership
and the rise of the Imperial Presidency (most notably Presid-
ents Johnson and Nixon). Ironically, the rise of the Imperial
Presidency coincides with historians’ rejection of the ‘great
man’ view of historical causation; while the popular view
that Ronald Reagan was a great president suggests we should
seriously reconsider the position traditionally ascribed to
others. The regular polls of American historians on the
greatness (or otherwise) of US presidents have shown inter-
esting changes as the liberal consensus of the 1960s gave
way to the New Right in the 1980s. Meanwhile the rise
of the United Nations and the emphasis on the right to
self-determination in Asia and Africa raise some awkward
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questions. What, if anything, did Woodrow Wilson mean by
the right to self-determination?4 How far has the US sup-
ported self-determination in practice as opposed to theory?
How does it fit with the history of the protectorates the US
established in Central America after 1911 and was to revive
in the period of the Cold War? Why is US foreign policy so
intolerant of Iraq and so tolerant of Israel?
The Gladstonian view of British history
A second model of democratization, which I shall call the
Gladstonian view, is rooted in the so-called ‘Whig view of
history’ as ‘the story of our liberty’, and continues to underlie
the story of what Huntington (1991) was later to call the
‘First Wave’ democracies.
According to this view, all Englishmen [sic] were beneficiaries of
the centuries-long evolution of constitutional liberties, achieved
for the most part by gradualist methods which respected the
past. Though usually known as the ‘Whig interpretation of
history’ it was in fact bipartisan and effectively reinforced the
legitimacy of the country’s political institutions. In its foremost
champions it inspired an almost mystical reverence for the
English [sic] way in politics. (Tosh 1991: 7)
This Whig view of history received its last and certainly its
most effective popular statement in Lord Macaulay’s famous
4-volume History of England (1848–55). Deliberately written
to achieve popular literary success, it achieved this objective
triumphantly, becoming required reading for the educated
in both Britain and the United States. It is also, as Tosh
(1991: 33) argues, ‘a significant primary source’ in its own
right ‘for anyone studying the political and social assump-
tions of the early Victorian elite’.
The Whig view (shared by the American colonists) that
the reign of King George III posed a challenge to this orderly
process of development was later to be decisively challenged
by Lewis Namier (1929). Setting aside the assertions and
counter-assertions of politicians, and basing his case on
the immense archive of the Duke of Newcastle and the
correspondence of other leading politicians of the period,
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he demonstrated that party structure in the nineteenth-
century sense had yet to develop. Furthermore, the power
of the Court to influence electoral outcomes was much less
than had previously been assumed. Above all, Namier made
clear that both George I and George II were much more
active rulers than had long been thought, so that in taking
a similar role George III was acting fully within the Consti-
tution as it was understood at the time. Still, each genera-
tion rewrites history in the light of contemporary debates.
History is distilled by education into the common know-
ledge of the public; but the process is slow, and it takes a
long time for revisionist views to find their way into com-
mon currency.
The public were happy to accept the view of Gladstone,
who contrasted the US Founders’ act of creativity with the
slow development of the British Constitution, which to him
had had an equally successful outcome; the full quotation
is indeed: ‘As the British Constitution is the most subtle
organism which has proceeded from the womb and long
gestation of progressive history, so the American Constitu-
tion is, so far as I can see, the most wonderful work ever
struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.’5
But did Britain have a Constitution then, and does it today?
There are, it is true, a number of written documents that
establish constitutional principles, so that today the Con-
stitution is regarded as uncodified rather than unwritten.
But the perception of the British Constitution in its mod-
ern form is largely the creation not of historians but of the
lawyer Walter Bagehot, in his The English Constitution
(1871), with a new edition containing an additional chapter
published the following year. It is now commonplace that
Bagehot did not so much describe the Constitution as it
was, but argue how it could and should develop. It is also
true that many of its main features were either challenged
or modified in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
So too have been our views of earlier stages in the evolu-
tion of representative government and popular participa-
tion. In the seventeenth century the theory of the Norman
Yoke held that the natural liberties of Anglo-Saxon society
had been subverted by the imposition of an alien French-
speaking monarchy. Stubbs’s (1866) compilation of charters
began to lay bare the raw material for the actual study of
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the period, and to show how very different were the assump-
tions of the period from those of later generations. With
time the harsher views of the seventeenth century have been
modified. Clarendon (unexpectedly) was the first to try to
give a balanced view of Oliver Cromwell, in his The His-
tory of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England (1702–4).
Carlyle, in Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches (1857),
established Cromwell as a ‘great man’, if not necessarily a
very congenial one, and not always on the soundest of evid-
ence. Whatever he was, Cromwell was not a dictator; the
history of the protectorate is a lesson in the limits of con-
stitutionalism. However despite the work of historians, the
traditional view dies hard. Lord Rosebery failed to convince
the House of Commons that it should commemorate with
a statue someone who with all his faults had been a great
Parliamentarian. The statue that now actually stands and
that he unveiled he paid for himself. Churchill’s imaginative
proposal to name a battleship after the Lord Protector was
vetoed by George V (see Davis 2001: 50, 54–6, 59, 64).
Victorian histories now seem particularly dated be-
cause they associate the success of British representative
government with the expansion of the Empire, and in the
post-Imperial age these two objectives are seen as being
incompatible. Yet for over a hundred years a belief in pro-
gress and Imperial expansion went hand in hand. J. R. Seeley,
who was appointed Regius Professor of History at Cambridge
in 1869, was an active politician, given a political appoint-
ment, and the effective founder of the Cambridge historical
school. As author of The Expansion of England (1883) he
was a pioneer of Imperial history; he is best known today
for his remark that the British Empire had been acquired
‘in a fit of absence of mind’. For Seeley the main concern of
history was with politics: ‘History is past politics: politics
is present history’ (cited in Burke 1991: 3). In fact, in his
inaugural lecture he rather surprisingly called for Cambridge
to teach political science – an excellent idea that was not
to be heeded for nearly a century.
The multi-volume A Short History of the English People
by J. R. Green (1893) is important because in it he turned
away from what he termed derisively ‘drum and trumpet his-
tory’. His early emphasis on social history was very popular,
but it had the limitation that it relied almost exclusively
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on literary sources. It was to be left to the twentieth century
to try to find other sources that would give a better idea as
to what the public actually thought, an essential precondi-
tion of understanding. In Britain it was only on the eve of
the Second World War that the Mass Observation project,
a pioneering effort by a sociologist and an anthropologist
to find out what the people in general really thought, was
organized on a sufficiently large scale not only to be valid
social science, but also to offer a reliable source for future
historians.6 Reasonably accurate public opinion polling only
came into general use after 1945.
Long before that, Social Darwinism, which assumed that
a democratic Britain had the right to rule over many millions
who did not have any say in Imperial policy, was explicitly
challenged by the early socialist H. G. Wells, as for instance
in his novel The War in the Air (1908). Wells was not a
trained historian, but when he came to write his history of
the world he was the first to set the history of humankind
in the setting of the natural world. His book was concise,
clear and immensely popular. Yet the impact of his ideas
came rather through asides in his many popular novels (such
titles as The History of Mr Polly and Tono Bungay), and his
vision of the future in A Modern Utopia, of a world ruled
by an educated Samurai elite, is far from democratic. In
the 1990s the term ‘meritocracy’, originally intended to be
critical, was converted into a New Labour ideal.
With the post-1945 end of Empire British politicians came
to assume a ‘special relationship’ with the US, embodied by
Winston Churchill the politician in the notion of the ‘three
spheres’ of British interests. As an author and (less probably)
a Nobel prizewinner for literature Churchill (1956) spelt out
his belief in the common historical heritage of the English-
speaking peoples in A History of the English-speaking
Peoples (1956). In political battles post-1953 the dominant
myth is one of decline (it is not always clear whether rel-
ative or absolute). In the 1980s ‘heritage’, with all that that
means for the simplification and popularization of history,
emerges as the basis for nostalgia. The Constitution becomes
a bulwark of ‘little Englandism’ against the ‘European federal
superstate’. Logically, former imperialists should have wel-
comed a European superstate as an alternative; in practice
the myth of the Anglo-Saxon mission to be different was
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too strong. And the political notion of the Anglo-Saxon,
whether in France or the UK, has had little or nothing to do
with the scholarly research on the Anglo-Saxon period, any
more than the Scots followers of Celtic Football Club are
likely to know that some scholars now have doubts whether
there ever really were any such people as Celts!
One thing is clear: historians did not (and do not) have a
common view on what constitutes democratization. Con-
versely, little historical work on the micro-management of
political systems finds its way into the common discourse.
A striking example was the way in which the debate on
devolution in the UK was dominated by the Tory argument
that any compromising of the rigid formalistic structure of
the UK would inevitably lead to its disintegration. Yet this
argument was comprehensively refuted a century ago. In
Ireland, where they might be expected to know, hardly any-
one disputes that the failure to grant Home Rule in time
discredited the moderate nationalists and opened the way
to Sínn Féin. Similarly, George Dangerfield in 1936 dram-
atized The Strange Death of Liberal England, helping to
consolidate the view that the decline of liberalism and the
rise of Labour was in some sense inevitable. Yet the pattern
in other Commonwealth countries was very different, and
it can be argued that the Liberal Party rather than Labour
was the real victim of the 1931 political coup and the
so-called National Government. Until devolution rendered
it inevitable, the post-1931 Labour Party as a matter of
consistent policy blocked any attempt at any level to enter
into coalition with other parties, helping to ensure that the
UK could not develop its own distinctive form of consocia-
tional democracy.
The popular picture of the democratization of Britain,
in fact, still focuses on the mid-to-late nineteenth century.
It is perhaps irretrievably distorted for most of the British
public by the facts (a) that the account of far-away parlia-
mentary battles is not intrinsically very interesting and
(b) that, perhaps inevitably, democratization proceeds more
easily in that absence of charismatic figures. Despite (or per-
haps because of) an unhealthy interest in his relationships
with ‘fallen women’, Gladstone means little to the modern
televsion audience. Disraeli has been more fortunate, for
obvious reasons.
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The French Revolutionary tradition
A third model, which dominated romantic thought in the
nineteenth century but is currently less fashionable to demo-
cratizers, is that of the French Revolution. Here we see even
more clearly the impact of the Enlightenment and of neo-
classicism. The Revolution, however, is Republican rather
than democratic, and it has a dual legacy: the Republic and
Bonapartism. To complicate matters, French perceptions
of the Revolution have inevitably been conditioned by the
emergence in France of the ‘New History’. French historians
influenced by Fernand Braudel and Lucien Febvre regard
events as only significant as key to currents underneath.
Yet it should come as no surprise that despite the influence
of the Annales school, leading French historians such as
Georges Duby and Le Roy Ladurie do not in practice reject
narrative. Furthermore, Soboul (1965) makes it clear in his
brief introduction to the French Revolution not only that
for him it is the product of struggle between social classes
and groups, and that its outcome was the overthrow of the
aristocracy, the rise of the bourgeoisie and the disintegra-
tion of the popular movement, but that no other interpreta-
tion is possible. Hence he himself situates his work squarely
within ‘the classical historiography of the French Revolu-
tion’, making clear the continuity of his interpretation with
that of Alexis de Tocqueville by quoting the latter’s com-
ment that the Revolution’s ‘real purpose was to do away
everywhere with what remained of the institutions of the
Middle Ages’ (Soboul 1965: 1).
It may be that every strand in French politics has its own
view of the Revolution. But the sources are abundant, the
narrative follows established lines, and only the analysis
is open to question. The French Revolution, however, is
not just a major historical event (or sequence of events). For
later writers, notably for Marx and Engels, it was the type
example of revolution. Hence its role in opening up access
to political power for new social groups and classes has
not only been disputed for its own sake. It has also been
caught up through the use of comparative history in the
wider debate about the nature of revolution and its capa-
city to further democratization (see Brinton 1952). Here too
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disagreements are much less profound than appears at first
sight. The thesis of the US historian of the French Revolu-
tion, R. R. Palmer (1959, 1964), that events in France formed
only part (if a major part) of an Atlantic Revolution, a demo-
cratic revolution not only in the larger states on both sides
of the Atlantic but also in the smaller ones, has long since
come to be generally accepted (a similar thesis was put
forward independently by Jacques Godechot at around the
same time in Paris). This has obvious significance for the
evolution of popular government. Yet even this is open to
reinterpretation – for example, in his short study of the
Revolution Roberts (1997) places his emphasis not on its
ambiguous role as an opening to democracy, but on the
way in which the collapse of old institutions opened the
way to social and economic modernization. It is significant
also, perhaps, and certainly surprising, that Huntington
himself dates his ‘first wave’ not from 1776, but from
1828.
A serious weaknesses of method of comparative history,
however, lies in the superabundance of data and the vast
number of variables involved, which creates a pressure to
simplify that can easily eliminate obvious contrasts. There
can be no denying the impact on nineteenth-century Eur-
ope and Latin America of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen. They served as an inspiration for
the constitutional revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and con-
tinued to exert some influence at least as late as the Mexican
Revolution of 1910. Three more specific contributions were
the abolition of slavery (France, the first country to decree
the abolition of slavery was, however, also the first country
to restore it), republicanism, and the principle of universal
male suffrage (often modified). Starting with Louis de
Bourrienne’s Memoirs of Napoleon (1836) we can also see
the rival effect of the Bonapartist myth of the Great Man
whose liberating armies cleared the way for freedom in the
Low Countries, Italy and Germany. And at the bicentenary
of the French Revolution, the conservative view that the
Revolution was above all messy and bloodthirsty had clearly
gained ground. It was even questionable whether it had
anything to do with democratization (Schama 2000 [1989] ).
In this Margaret Thatcher evidently concurred: reading
between the lines it is clear that nothing that had happened
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in France appeared to her of any significance, but anything
that was significant had happened in England first.
Conclusion
The Enlightenment ideals that fuelled the Revolution,
though, still survive to show how far sometimes the reality
fell short of the initial bright hopes, not just in France, but
in the transitions from autocracy to democracy in the ‘Third
Wave’ since 1989. It is, after all, equally true that neither
Gladstonian democracy nor American exceptionalism are
as convincing now as they were in their day. Yet the com-
mon ideal of democracy lives on, and perhaps the main
lesson of history is not to expect too much, too soon. If, as
the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai is supposed to have said,
when asked what he thought of the French Revolution, it
was ‘too early to tell’,7 then there must be plenty of work
for historians before they will reach agreement on what has
happened since 1989.
Notes
1 Leopold von Ranke, Histories of the Latin and German Nations from
1494 to 1514 (first publ. 1824), quoted in Gooch (1952: 74).
2 It is, after all, the only technique available to the philosopher.
3 Bemis (1937) and Bailey (1940) represent the East Coast and West Coast
views respectively.
4 Seaman (1966: 80) sees Wilson’s failure to define self-determination as
‘one of the great disasters of modern history’.
5 Famous Quotes, www.constitutionfacts.com/qbody.shtml.
6 See Madge and Harisson (1939).
7 Cited in Asiaweek, 26, No. 46, 24 November 2000.
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International Political Economy
philip cerny
International Political Economy, domestic politics
and democracy
International Political Economy (IPE) had already achieved
prominence as a field of study by the start of the 21st
century, but its role has changed dramatically, with issues
of democratic governance and policy-making moving to the
forefront. Originally, however, the roots of IPE lay in eco-
nomic aspects of relations among nation-states in the inter-
national system – foreign economic policy, trade, the spread
of production systems and firms across borders, and the
international monetary system, as well as a range of inter-
national economic institutions and regimes and the inter-
action between domestic and international policy issues –
but not with domestic politics within states. In mainstream
International Relations theory, states are seen as sovereign
‘unit actors’, independent decision-makers of last resort,
whose domestic structures are hierarchical but whose
bottom line is their very survival in an anarchical world of
external danger and threat. Domestic politics, in contrast,
has the luxury of being able to rise above considerations
of survival and power, and can paradoxically pursue ‘higher’
values such as the common good, welfare, liberty, equality
and democracy.
However, unlike most traditional analyses of foreign pol-
icy and security studies, IPE has always had the potential
to cut across this levels-of-analysis distinction. As the world
has become a smaller place (the idea of the ‘global village’),
analysts increasingly focus on issues involving the interac-
tion, linkages and common features of both international
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and domestic politics at the same time. It is not merely
boundaries between the international and the domestic that
are crossed, moreover, but also those between politics on
the one hand and other dimensions of globalization as well
– economic, social, geographical, environmental and cultural.
Observers have thus come to focus on more complex pro-
cesses, primarily globalization.
Most analyses of globalization today see the international
political economy as relatively unregulated and increasingly
integrated across borders, mixing the anarchical and the
hierarchical in new ways. The political conclusion drawn
from this is that existing domestic structures, including
democratic policy-making, must be adapted to deal with
the imperatives of such a world. Broadly speaking, when
nation-states could still be insulated to some extent from
international and transnational economic trends during the
period of the Long Boom after the Second World War through
to the late 1960s, liberal democratic national governments
could trade off a certain amount of economic inefficiency
for a bit more social justice. Social policy, in particular,
was seen as a relatively autonomous, inherently domestic
issue area that could be debated and dealt with through a
combination of ethics and voter choices. The domestic left–
right spectrum, rooted in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies and focused on the redistribution of resources among
social groups, constituted the fundamental parameters of
democratic policy choice.
Globalization has undermined these economic conditions.
As international trade has increased and tariffs have been
drastically reduced, much of manufacturing industry and
even small businesses have had to become more import-
sensitive, export-oriented, multinational and dependent
on global financial markets for investment. Multinational
capital looks increasingly to trade off capital-intensive,
high-value-added processes in the advanced industrial (or
post-industrial) countries for cheap-labour production in
labour-intensive industries located in China and less
developed countries. Meanwhile technological change –
especially information and communications technology, the
lowering of transport costs and the increasing flexibility of
production methods – and the growth of service industries
undermine trade unions’ ability to pressurize employers and
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governments to protect their members. The result is frag-
mentation of traditional class identities and political loyal-
ties too. The globalization of financial markets and firms has
caused interest rates to converge across borders, rewarded
the purveyors of ‘hot money’, and made anti-inflationary
policies and a new embedded financial orthodoxy the touch-
stones of governments’ monetary policy.
In addition to these more direct effects – imposing a new
embedded financial orthodoxy on the state and emulating
business models of organization – globalization has two
indirect political effects. In the first place, it fosters a wider
ideology of the marketization of public policy and of the
state apparatus itself. This is supplanting what social his-
torians call ‘status’ by ‘contract’ as the dominant mode of
social relations – the replacement of customary entitlement
to goods and services, based on a priori social position,
class or standing, with contracts negotiated on the basis of
price and/or reciprocal rights and obligations. In the second
place, globalization has led political actors across the
party spectrum to alter their policy prescriptions to adapt
to what they see as the ‘realities’ of a more open and
globalizing world. That means not only making policy more
economically ‘efficient’ but also reshaping their underly-
ing political coalitions as various social groups fragment,
shrink or expand in response to new global constraints and
opportunities.
These changes alter some of the most fundamental ele-
ments of the way democracy works in the contemporary
world. At one level, liberal democracy as we know it did
not become a major mode of governance in modern times
simply because of the abstract progression of ideas about
the best way to achieve a better society or polity. On the
contrary, its origins and dynamics sprang from the process
of consolidating the nation-state and, indirectly, the inter-
national system of states. Those groups, whether elite or
more popularly-based, that came to see themselves as hav-
ing a stake in the emerging nation-state order consequently
wished to stabilize and control the manifest and latent con-
flicts inherent in that order, especially with the coming of
industrialization and mass politicization. They increasingly
found it useful to do so through the uneven but widening
inclusion into the system of individuals and groups who
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might otherwise threaten that stability and control rather
than continuing with the increasingly knotty and counter-
productive strategy of bypassing and repressing them (Laslett
1970). Thus modern liberal democracy has from the start
been inextricably intertwined with the development of the
modern nation-state.
Today, however, cross-cutting and overlapping governance
structures and processes increasingly take quasi-private,
oligarchic forms. At the same time many of the more inter-
ventionist and redistributive instruments of public and
social policy that had developed over decades in response
to democratic demands are being undermined in a world
of marketization and commodification. The result is the
emergence of a range of often ad hoc public and private
governance structures that constrain the democratic state
from above and below, leaving an untidy jumble of overlap-
ping and competing institutions, often only semi-formed,
and increasingly lacking in democratic accountability. This
uneven dispersal of authority and ‘governmentality’ – the
effective capacity to exercise power – goes hand in hand
with a fragmentation of identities, the alienation of a grow-
ing number of individuals and groups from democratic
political processes and an erosion of commitment to ideas
of the public interest.
Thus globalization constrains both the state’s capacity
to act upon traditional collectivist – interventionist and
redistributive – demands and actors’ ability to build coali-
tions around those demands. Increased structural complexity
is altering the range of public goods the state can effectively
supply, moving away from those that take activities out
of the marketplace to those that actually reinforce and
promote marketization. The former include such policies
as nationalization of industry or the provision of monopoly
public and social services, the latter being exemplified by
privatization and regulatory reforms that include both
deregulation and pro-market re-regulation. Another example
is the agenda of so-called ‘new public management’ or ‘rein-
venting government’ (including the welfare state) along busi-
ness lines.
Furthermore, however, globalization is also generating
new and more complex forms of social, economic and
political pluralism – not merely the benign pluralism of
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mid-twentieth-century democratic theory, but rather the
more unequal and disequilibrating kind called ‘neo-
pluralism’ (Lindblom 1977). In neo-pluralism, those social,
economic and political actors with the greatest access to
material and social resources predominate, but are not neces-
sarily in control. And even powerful actors are unlikely to
agree with each other on every issue, even where they may
have common priorities, such as the promotion of some
particular version of capitalism. Moreover, there may be
other distinct groups that have resources they can mobilize,
and rules to appeal to, especially in liberal democratic
political systems; they are able to exert leverage and punch
above their weight in crucial situations. So outcomes tend
to be determined not simply by coercion and/or structural
power but by how coalitions and networks are built among
a plurality of actors in real-time circumstances. In a glob-
alizing world, the changing distribution of resources and
balance of power between old and new actors are producing
new inequalities and disparities of power and the fragmenta-
tion of traditional social classes (Murphy 2002).
Therefore individuals and groups are less drawn to pro-
mote their causes or make their demands through the
formally institutionalized democratic processes. Instead,
they seek out specialized niches for exercising influence,
in what has become a more heterogeneous but unequal
or asymmetrical transnational opportunity structure (for
elaboration see Cerny 2000a) – what Hülsemeyer (2003)
characterizes rather grandly as a kind of quasi-corporatism
at meso and micro levels. Nevertheless globalization,
although fostering this uneven pluralization of politics,
does not provide effective systemic outlets, regulated by
democratic processes equivalent to those found within
nation-states, for those groups’ demands and goals. On the
contrary, it creates a world of special interests, domestic
and transnational quangos (quasi non-governmental organ-
izations), private regimes and inter- (and intra-) institutional
conflict and competition, thereby frustrating any aspira-
tions to develop a genuinely transnational or cosmopolitan
democracy. It is too late to insulate and recreate the kind
of nation-state that characterized Polanyi’s ‘Great Trans-
formation’ (Polanyi 1944). But the world order has yet to
see a coherent successor structure; instead, there is more a
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quasi-medieval combination of competing and overlapping
institutions, authorities, jurisdictions, interests, pressures
and demands.
Democracy, globalization and the nation-state
Both democracy and globalization are deeply contested
concepts. Democracy has several theoretical fault lines, but
there are two sets of intertwined questions that dominate
traditional debates about democratic theory. The first con-
cerns the concept of ‘rule by the people’ (the etymological
meaning of the word ‘democracy’). What or who are ‘the
people’? And what institutional form might (can? should?)
a democratic superstructure take in pursuing what the
people want, whether holistic or fragmented, centralized or
decentralized? The second concerns the generic functions
of states or governments. The potential range is vast, from
a minimalist concern with the rule of law to the larger
ambition to pursue a revolutionary restructuring of society.
Possibilities for direct or indirect participation, popular
sovereignty, sense of common purpose, freedom, equality
and the like have all faced quite different sets of real-world
opportunities and constraints, depending on whether they
were applied in small groups, city-states, feudal societies,
empires, nation-states, or international (inter-state) institu-
tions or whatever.
In the last analysis, however, some form of effective cen-
tripetal sovereign authority rooted in distinct territories was
arrived at by historical trial and error as being necessary
(if not sufficient) for the democratic resolution of deep-
seated conflicts among competing interests and values. Some
minimal overall level of endogenous structural coherence
and exogenous structural autonomy has been required for
stability and effective governmentality. Thus what we in-
stinctively think of as ‘modern democracy’ has been built
on the presumption that the underlying ‘society’ that is to
be democratically governed is a coherent national society,
and that the democratic state by its very nature is (or should
be) an expression of that society if it is to be stable, effect-
ive and legitimate.
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Furthermore, the state in a globalizing context, while
increasingly constrained in pursuing certain kinds of col-
lective goods (macroeconomic management, social welfare,
fiscal policy, control of the money supply and exchange
rate policy, trade and industrial policy are just some possible
examples) also possesses a range of roles that contribute
to globalization’s growth. This is partly a matter of trading
new functions for old, as states search for different ways of
securing national economic and political advantage. Indeed,
in their search for global competitiveness states may adopt
practices that actually undermine their own autonomy
and policy capacity, and irretrievably so (see Cerny 2000b),
especially when promoting market sectors characterized
by relatively non-specific asset-based structures (Cerny
1995). And paradoxically the state may even expand certain
of its roles and functions, such as that of monitoring and
enforcing market-based regulatory structures – for example,
strengthened policing of insider trading rules, accounting
standards, corporate governance and the like – as an inher-
ent part of the globalization process. Indeed, formal sover-
eignty and the rule of law at the level of the state are
increasingly taking on this global ‘enforcement function’
(Streeck 1996).
If democracy is seen as primarily about pluralism and
individual or group autonomy, then of course the complex-
ities of globalization are such that it may foster increased
diversity and possibilities for autonomy. This is the argu-
ment for ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ as developed most not-
ably by Held (1995), and it may be appealing to some social
movements like the feminist movement, or for transnational
interest and cause associations, or for certain ethnic groups.
However, the more democracy is seen to involve some
collective values such as social justice achieved through
redistribution, and to require the provision of those collect-
ive goods the market will not provide, then the greater the
challenge that globalization with all its diversification and
differentiation poses. Put differently, democratic governance
must possess a significant element of collective account-
ability and authoritative (but not merely repressive) policy
capacity (governmentality) if it is to be genuinely demo-
cratic. Globalization threatens this democratic chain of
accountability.
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Western nation-states only managed to achieve genuine
structural cohesion after several centuries of uneven con-
solidation, trial-and-error and solidarizing international con-
flict/competition. This was done by adopting systems of
election and representation and the transformation of hier-
archical repressive structures into quasi-‘rational’ public
bureaucracies subordinated to political officials and agreed
rules of the game. Despite being ‘sub-optimal’ structures in
all sorts of ways, modern states resembling Max Weber’s
bureaucratic model emerged as being the least relatively
inefficient institutional framework for long-term contract-
ing domestically and entering into credible commitments
externally in a world of rapid and uneven economic, social
and political change (Spruyt 1994). In an increasingly
stalemated power balance in post-feudal Europe, proto-
nation-states took on an ever-wider set of tasks, roles and
activities. Standing armies, taxation systems, the promo-
tion of economic development where it was necessary for
war or brought more wealth into the coffers of the state,
the search for financial backing from holders of private or
quasi-private capital, and the administrative (bureaucratic
and regulatory) structures necessary for overseeing and co-
ordinating such activities all increasingly became part of the
state apparatus. The apparatus may have revolved around a
revered monarchy; but it became a growing imperative for
states to survive the threat and often the reality of inter-
national war. The feudal system of entrenched privileges,
status-based castes, fluid territorial frontiers, entailed pro-
perty, competing institutions, overlapping jurisdictions and
multiple loyalties was eroded, overwhelmed and co-opted
into nation-state political structures and allegiances.
Such centripetal state structures also reached deeper and
deeper into society, and fostered economic developments
that uprooted sections of society, ranging from noble to serf,
from their status-bound situations and pushed and pulled
them into contractual relations with each other as well as
with other individuals and groups. In contrast to feudal
society, overlapping webs of negotiated (and renegotiated)
contractual relationships were drawn into the orbit of the
state and its legal, regulatory and developmental framework.
The state claimed overall authority and responsibility for
the well-being of the ‘whole’, while that whole became
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increasingly pluralistic. Indeed, as more mass groups became
uprooted from their subsumed, generally rural status and
were involved in more contractual labour processes and
given the promise of political citizenship, they had to be
included too. Because of the international expansion of the
modern capitalist world-system, expectations of growing
inclusion became entrenched in both popular and elite
culture (Anderson 1991). If monarchs (or their ministers)
claimed to be pursuing the common good of the people and
wanted the people to pay taxes and even to follow the
Crown to their deaths in its name, then they faced a grow-
ing need to elicit some sort of quasi-voluntary acquiescence
or consent. People had to be both inspired and bought off.
To grant some sort of symbolic participatory privileges in
the state itself, along with meeting growing claims for civil
rights and welfare – paid for by taxes levied on capitalist
economic growth – became an increasingly efficient means
of controlling free-riding. Liberal democracy is thus pro-
foundly ‘locked-in’ to the development of the nation-state –
and the states system.
Globalization and corrosive pressures on the nation-state
Several factors and trends are usually seen to characterize
the globalization process. First, there is the international-
ization of markets. There are, of course, as many different
kinds of market structures as there are industrial sectors, and
some markets are more globalized than others (McMillan
2002; Fligstein 2001). Globalized markets are markets where,
broadly speaking, products are substitutable and widely
traded across borders. Capital is increasingly mobile, not
particularly site-specific, and will move to different loca-
tions if profits there are higher (and secure). Consumption
patterns in different countries are not mutually exclusive,
or at least can be catered to by extending the product range;
and prices are sensitive across borders and predominantly
set in world (cross-border) markets. Economic globalization
is also driven by new flexible, ‘post-Fordist’ production tech-
niques, superseding the workplace organizational innova-
tions pioneered by the Ford Motor Company in the 1920s
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(Amin 1994). Recent electronics-based developments in in-
formation and communications technology are also crucial
for co-ordinating these changes, transforming industrial
sectors from within, shifting the balance of economic act-
ivities from manufacturing to services, and multiplying
the productivity of capital. Financial services, finally, form
the backbone of any international market economy by set-
ting the price of capital and by establishing the framework
within which prices for other products are determined;
they too increasingly involve pure information products and
processes.
In public policy terms, whereas a Keynesian approach
to macroeconomic management was once the norm, any
attempt to revive or return to its essentials would be
extremely difficult, because of increasing vulnerability to
the mobility of capital, both at home and across borders.
Mesoeconomic and microeconomic interventions by gov-
ernments are increasingly shaped by the perceived need to
maintain or regain international competitiveness, not by
objectives of domestic welfare goals. The regulatory power
and effectiveness of the state in a range of sectors is seen
as eroding through ‘regulatory arbitrage’ – firms choosing
to locate where regulation is most favourable and/or using
such a possibility to pressure governments to deregulate.
And the growing complex cross-border linkages between
firms, domestic socio-economic groups (and indeed between
individuals as both producers and consumers) and trans-
national and transgovernmental interest groups and policy
networks are widely seen to undermine the sense of over-
arching national identity and loyalty cherished by political
thinkers, leaders and movements of various ideological com-
plexions in the modern era.
Social and cultural changes are also challenging the dis-
course and social reality of the nation-state. The pace of
information flows and the attention to image-building that
characterize the modern media, along with the fragmentation
of post-modern culture and the growing salience of multi-
cultural identity-formation, create a disorienting disarticula-
tion of previously embedded cultures both from above (the
‘global village’ combined with the ‘clash of civilizations’)
and below (such as ethnic sub-and-cross-nationalism and
alienation of ghettoized minorities). These interacting forms
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of social and cultural fragmentation are undermining over-
arching national identities based on the reconciliation of
conflict and competition among contending groups that have
underpinned the widespread acceptance of the democratic
rules of the game.
Finally, states themselves are deeply involved in the glob-
alization process. State actors, in seeking to placate those
domestic constituencies that can eject governments in
democratically organized elections, are finding that sources
of side-payments can only be expanded (or their shrinkage
avoided) by promoting international competitiveness. Policy
instruments are dismantled and disarmed, strategic compet-
ences broken up through liberalization and privatization,
state agencies either hived off or made more independent
of central control, transgovernmental policy networks ex-
panded, and institutional gatekeepers (such as central banks)
set to enforce international market discipline on their own
state apparatuses. These developments are pluralizing,
unbundling and disarticulating state tasks, roles and activ-
ities. The confluence of these variables creates splintered
states and fragmented authority. It blurs the boundaries
between both state and private sector responsibilities and
capacities, on the one hand, and domestic and international
decision-making networks, on the other. And it is not just
the effectiveness of democratic governance that it under-
mines. It erodes the very confidence and trust – legitimacy
or ‘system affect’ (Almond and Verba 1965) – essential for
democratic systems to convince people of the value and
utility of democracy, engage them in participatory processes
like elections, and make them feel secure in the belief that
their voices are being heard.
The impact of globalization on democratic governance
This process has knock-on effects at several levels. The first
has been the ‘fiscal crisis of the state’ (O’Connor 1973), or
what has recently been termed ‘fiscal degradation’. The
costs not only of expanding but even of just maintaining
state functions and structures began to outstrip sources of
taxation and other income after only two decades of the
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Long Boom itself. On both left and right, growing social and
economic functions of the state were blamed. The Phillips
Curve (which posits an inverse relationship between rates
of inflation and of unemployment) was replaced in the
public (or at least the elite) imagination by the Laffer Curve
(which states a close relationship between tax rates, revenue
and productivity). The second effect was that the Long Boom
involved an expansion of international trade and financial
flows. That at first reinforced domestic economic manage-
ment and the social democratic functions of the industrial
and welfare state (through ‘embedded liberalism’: Ruggie
1983). But it also quickly built up both political and market
pressures for financial liberalization, which rendered states
increasingly vulnerable to international capital mobility. In
this context, the question of allotting specific rights and
obligations to particular individuals (and legal ‘persons’ such
as firms) becomes more complicated. The explicit associa-
tion of democratic rights with a specific geographical entity
is greatly weakened, as those rights cannot be so easily
located in spatial terms. Some individuals and groups (but
not others) can ‘arbitrage’ rights between different locations,
searching out the best conditions for their own requirements,
while avoiding obligations. The ability of governments
equitably to provide welfare and public goods in general
becomes less geographically controllable.
At another level, whereas at the beginning of the 1960s
private international capital markets were highly restricted
and the great majority of international capital flows were
public flows, by the mid-1970s, following the breakdown of
Bretton Woods, such private capital markets mushroomed.
They overwhelmed both public reserves and publicly-
sanctioned international capital flows. In the money and
finance issue-area, for example, for governments to have
both monetary policy autonomy and effective exchange rate
control, capital controls must be introduced and enforced
(B. J. Cohen 1996; Goodman and Pauly 1993). With the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, states abandoned con-
tinuous control of exchange rates in the name of domestic
monetarism. Indeed, it increasingly seems that without cap-
ital controls neither exchange rate control nor autonomous
monetary policy can be maintained, leading to increased
emphasis on anti-inflationary policy in general, attempting
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where possible to balance budgets at lower levels of taxa-
tion and expenditure. In this context the last few years have
witnessed growing instability in global financial markets,
creating a vicious circle. Given the increased weight and
autonomy of private international financial markets, future
decisions on monetary as well as fiscal policy are likely
to lie beyond the effective scope of national democratic
control. At the same time, international financial markets
possess few autonomous enforcement mechanisms with
which to punish or deter free-riders. The liberalization of
market rules (often misleadingly called ‘deregulation’) cre-
ates knock-on effects beyond borders and impacts on not
merely short-term international capital flows but longer-
term investment patterns too. Consequently, a process of
regulatory arbitrage has developed in which market actors
pressure governments to open their markets and liberalize
their regulatory systems.
Even state legal systems – the core framework of national
sovereignty – are increasingly being bypassed, especially by
the most internationally-linked firms and market actors.
The changing nature of public–private relationships, acceler-
ated and deepened by the crystallization of private sector
interconnections across borders, is leading to the develop-
ment of new legal approaches and procedures that are
replacing what Held (1995) has called ‘democratic public
law’ with negotiated private law. At the level of the nation-
state, this is leading to the emergence of a ‘new admin-
istrative law’ embodying and embedding transnational and
global dynamics at the heart of the state (Aman 1999). And
at the transnational level, private arbitration procedures
involving multinational corporations and other private mar-
ket actors are not simply shoring up but often substituting
for national-level dispute resolution and, indirectly, regulat-
ory rulemaking processes (Cutler, forthcoming 2003).
A further impact of globalization on states involves a
host of ad hoc international and transnational institutions
and regimes that have been appearing for some time now.
While these regimes have traditionally been set up and/or
backed by the authority of states, analysts in recent years
have noticed a trend towards the emergence of an increasing
number of private regimes, or regimes where the balance of
authority and decision-making influence is shifting towards
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private actors. These developments are sometimes presented
as a quasi-democratization of the international system, by
international and transnational co-operative mechanisms
that are supposedly replacing realist anarchy with multi-
lateral co-operation. However, they can also be seen as
the extension at international level of a kind of oligarchic
societal corporatism. Although in the past ‘private interest
governments’ have usually been seen to derive their effect-
iveness and authority from direct or indirect delegation of
state authority (Streeck and Schmitter 1985), now there is
an increasingly dense web of transnational private interest
governments crystallizing.
Finally, globalization erodes the capacity of the state to
provide physical security. The end of the Cold War, far from
ushering in a more stable peaceful world, has instead seen
an increase in new theatres and forms of violent conflict.
Violence today is less and less the province of national
governments and more and more the domain of ethnic
groups, drugs cartels and mafias, mercenaries and paramil-
itaries linked to firms and other sub-state or cross-national
organizations. This is true not only in the Second and Third
Worlds, but in the First World too, as private security firms
increasingly supplement or replace public police forces,
prisons, and so on. Anarchy in the international system is
no longer confined to conflicts between states, and at home
the state no longer holds an effective monopoly of legitim-
ate violence. There are strong grounds for arguing that
the fundamental bond of physical security and protection,
which has legitimated nation-state structures in general and
provided a bottom line for democratic legitimacy too, is
continually eroding (Cerny 2000c).
Concluding thoughts: what next for democratic
governance?
States today are increasingly bad at certain key tasks that
are important for democratic responsiveness, accountability
and effectiveness. These underperformed tasks include re-
distribution, regulation and the delivery of public services.
Social neoliberals, for example the ‘reinventing government’
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school, try to make a virtue out of this: ‘Governments should
steer but not row’, say Osborne and Gaebler (1992). How-
ever, the power and capacity of the state is being eroded
most rapidly and most thoroughly where more mobile fac-
tors of capital can most easily ‘exit’ state jurisdiction in one
way or another.
Nevertheless, states still remain relatively good at cer-
tain tasks, and some of those tasks may indeed be expanded
and reinforced. Governmentality remains strongest or is
being most effectively reconstituted where more immobile
factors of capital are concerned. Labour, particularly low
skilled labour, is one of these; such people have fewer of the
resources necessary for exercising the ‘exit’ option. Minimal
welfare states will therefore have to be maintained and
restructured (Clayton and Pontusson 1998), unless societies
are prepared to risk the unrest and political destabilization
that could arise where there is no public safety net. Further-
more, the state is still relatively good at prudential regula-
tion and ex post facto enforcement of contracts, as well as
the promotion of certain forms of competitive advantage
in a more open world through limited industrial and trade
policy measures.
In fact, however, what the state is best at – indeed, some
would say, what the state has always been best at – is
enforcing the norms generated and decisions made at the
international and transnational levels. As long as market
outcomes, the transformation of production processes,
technological innovation, socio-cultural globalization, and
the marketization of the competition state combine to trans-
form nation-state structures and processes, state capacity
in terms of enforcement will continue to grow and state
functions expand along pro-market lines. This of course
presumes the continuing absence of effective direct inter-
national ‘police powers’ and judicial/legal systems. How-
ever, the processes of enforcement will increasingly involve
norms, rules and decisions that will not in the first place
have been arrived at by democratic procedures. Indeed, in
structural terms the world may come to look somewhat
more like the Middle Ages again. The relevant character-
istics can be summarized as: (a) competing institutions with
overlapping jurisdictions (states, regimes, transgovernmen-
tal networks, private interest governments); (b) more fluid
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territorial boundaries, both within and across states; (c) con-
tested property rights and legal boundaries; (d) a growing
alienation between global innovation, communication and
resource nodes (global cities) and disfavoured, fragmented
hinterlands; (e) increased inequalities and isolation of per-
manent sub-castes (the underclass); (f) multiple and/or frag-
mented loyalties (ethnic conflict and multiculturalism); and
(g) the spread of what Alain Minc (1993) has called ‘zones
grises’, or geographical areas and social contexts where the
rule of law does not run (both localized ghettoes and inter-
national criminal activities) (Cerny 1998).
We now live in an era of increasing expectations, events
that assume global dimensions, and extremely rapid diffu-
sion of information, together with relentless technological
innovation. Against this background further changes may
either accentuate post-modernistic fragmentation, produc-
ing the breakdown of nations and states, or alternatively
lead towards the imposition of increasingly hierarchical
‘global governance’. Contemporary debates on democracy and
democratization in International Political Economy tend to
pit the kind of neomedievalist, fragmentation-of-governance
thesis presented above against what is often seen to be the
more idealist ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ thesis (Archibugi
and Held 1995). There is also a third position – that the
ability of states to reconstruct governmentality is still strong
and that social democracy can be reconstituted along more
familiar statist lines by incorporating some neoliberal fea-
tures (Hirst and Thompson 1999; Giddens 1998). Neverthe-
less, the task of globalizing the democratic chain – recreating
effective governmentality and establishing the capacity of
authoritative international agents to make the kind of side-
payments and engage in the kind of monitoring necessary
to control free-riding and assimilate a huge range of alienated
groups into such a society – is daunting. ‘Really existing
democracy’ as we have known it during the evolution of
the nation-state and the states system is likely to function
much less effectively in this emerging world of fragmented
globalization.
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Law
john mceldowney
This chapter offers a legal perspective on democratization
by focusing on a tightly linked set of issues straddling the
border between political and judicial power as they have
arisen in, first, the United Kingdom, second, Britain’s rela-
tionship with the European Union, and third, the wider
international system. The discussion illustrates the claim
that no analysis of democratization can be complete with-
out taking into account the dimension of judicial power
and its implications for democratic accountability even,
perhaps especially, in countries considered as exemplars for
new and emerging democracies. The development of strat-
egies under the umbrella of legal technical assistance that
seek to enhance the standing of political decision-makers
while remaining compatible with the principle of judicial
oversight poses perhaps one of the most important chal-
lenges for democratization in the present century.
Countries in the process of devising new institutions
for a democratic political regime aiming to give enhanced
legitimacy to the exercise of power have much to learn from
the experience of their mentors in those Western democra-
cies that have already undergone a significant incremental
growth in judicial power (Sweet 2000). How far is judicial
power compatible with democratic government? That key
question will be addressed in the following way. First, the
source and growth of judicial power in the Anglo-American
tradition of jurisprudence will be outlined. Second, the
United Kingdom’s experience of adopting the Human Rights
Act 1998 is discussed as an example of a potential shift
from political decision-making to judge-made decisions,
and this potential is assessed.1 Third, the growth of judicial
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decision-making within the European Union is considered
as a further example of how judicial power is incrementally
increasing. Fourth, the development of the international
criminal court is noted as an example of how judicial power
is increasingly seen as the means to ensure global standards
for justice and the rule of law. Finally, following Loughlin
(2001: 41), it is argued that over-reliance on the judicial
element at the expense of democratic institutions sets a
dangerous precedent as to who legitimates the legal order
in society, and may undermine political and economic
sovereignty. The lessons of Western democracies should
not be lost on developing countries undergoing institutional
reform.
The judicial power in the Anglo-American tradition
There is an active debate in the United States between
those who consider that the role of the judges is to act as
independent principals and those who see the judges as
faithful agents interpreting the law according to the plain
words in front of them (Eskridge 1994). The former adopt a
purposive approach in which the courts are expected to
carry forward into practice the aims and objectives of stat-
utes and the interpretation of parliamentary intent. Judges
are free to exercise an independent role in their decision-
making. The latter see the judges as having a more restricted
role defined by textual analysis, requiring judges to be duti-
fully bound to act within the limits of the statute. Judges
are expected to undertake the task prescribed by law and
within the narrow confines of decision-making to take
account of the limits on judicial power and the constitution.
There appears to be common ground between these per-
spectives: the role of the judicial power and how it is inter-
preted is called into question. In reviewing some of the
historical evidence it is clear that judges from the earliest
beginnings were prepared to go beyond the plain meaning
of words and take account of extraneous material. In many
instances this was a practical response to the problems of
interpretation, and rarely did it seem to challenge the inter-
ests of the state. In the English common law this may have
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been because of the absence of any formal doctrine of the
separation of powers; but it is more likely to have reflected
a period before the development of a strong tradition of par-
liamentary sovereignty.
The history of the English common law is instructive
as to how judicial power emerged through the centuries
of royal power. Judges possessed widely drawn powers. The
early commentators noted how the rules of statutory inter-
pretation were developed on an eclectic basis. A common
approach was to consider the canons of statutory construc-
tion around principles of ‘equitable’ construction. Textual
analysis was accompanied by various techniques and
methods of statutory construction. In the eighteenth cen-
tury Blackstone’s monumental Commentaries on the Laws
of England demonstrated the wide range and diversity
inherent in judicial discretion. The pragmatic qualities of
the common law allowed the creativity of the judges to
develop its own methodology of statutory construction.
Various approaches to statutory interpretation developed in
order to give effect to ‘the natural’ meaning of the words,
and the ‘will and intention of the legislator’. The fiction of
the ‘reasonable man’ was frequently employed to set stand-
ards and direct outcomes. And in some instances the courts
attempted to discover ‘the mischief’ that was behind the
legislative enactment in order that the common law should
provide a remedy. The early case law is rich in the adoption
of modes of interpretation to fit the circumstances of the
case. The revolution culminating in Parliament’s victory
over the Crown in the ‘Glorious Revolution’ (1688) came
as the courts recognized the authority of parliament and
its ultimate law-making authority. This provided the judges
with the dominant paradigm of interpretation, which for
centuries has been used to expound and explain Parliament’s
will and by so doing to give effect to judicial discretion. On
the boundaries of law-making and judicial interpretation
rests the key distinction between parliamentary and judicial
power. The paradox was that, while the judges recognized
Parliament’s ultimate law-making authority, it was on their
own authority that they articulated the nature of the par-
liamentary sovereignty that they recognized. In truth it was
finely balanced as to whether ultimate judicial or Parlia-
mentary authority might prevail. In the famous Dr Bonham’s
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case (1609) Sir Edward Coke somewhat ambiguously sug-
gested that the common law might ‘controul Acts of Parlia-
ment and some times adjudge them to be utterly void: for
when an Act of Parliament is against common right and
reason or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the com-
mon law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void’.2
The idea of judges being capable of testing statutes to
destruction if they were found to be against a fundamental
principle of law raises the possibility for judicial power
rather than parliamentary to sit at the apex of the constitu-
tion. However plausible this interpretation might appear, a
more realistic assumption is that Sir Edward Coke believed
that as far as it is practical it is necessary for the courts to
try to give effect to the meaning of the statute that is con-
sistent with parliamentary intention. This is the meaning
accorded to Coke’s verdict by Blackstone. Some observers
might think that the ascendancy of Parliamentary author-
ity is commensurate with a demise in judges closing loop-
holes and developing their own equitable solution beyond
the true intention of Parliament. But this is barely plausible
once the scale of judicial creativity is recognized. Keeping
in mind that judges developed legal tests for the purposes
of instructing and controlling the jury, it is by no means
clear that the judiciary adopted a more limited role for their
own authority. A far more compelling preoccupation for
the judiciary throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies was to develop contract law, through the insistence
of the doctrine of freedom of contract and settling land
disputes through the development of land law and equity.
The judges have continued to think of the common law
as equivalent to a fundamental law capable of wide-scale
judicial interpretation. Instances where the courts settled
fundamental constitutional issues include the Case of
Proclamations (1611), which claimed the common law as
providing the courts with overarching powers of review. In
1839 the privileges of Parliament were settled in Stockdale
v. Hansard (1839) where the courts articulated the jurisdic-
tion of the courts to define parliamentary immunities and
privileges.
The tradition of judicial innovation and creativity sur-
vives today. Scattered throughout the law reports are some
glimpses of how proactive judges have become in an era of
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increasing judicial self-confidence. All the law relating to
administrative law is judicially created and self-executed in
terms of legal tests and criteria for the grounds for judicial
review, the rules of standing and the remedies available to
the claimant, culminating for the first time in the creation
of an administrative court. The articulation of common
law fundamentals may take a number of forms. The rule of
law, a rhetorical term (much cited in political discussions
of recent attempts at democratization around the world)
has in the hands of the senior judiciary become a principle
of legality. In the case of Entick v. Carrington (1765) it was
held that the Secretary of State had no powers to issue a
general warrant on the basis of state necessity. The absence
of legal authority provided the opportunity for the courts to
consider whether there had been a trespass that was a viola-
tion of property rights. More recently, Lord Nolan referred
to the rule of law in M v. Home Office (1992) – a case
involving deportation – as ‘the submission of the executive
to orders of the court’.3 The courts have traditionally sought
to uphold the rule of law and due process. Lord Bridge
explained the importance of the rule of law in the context
of the constitution as a whole: ‘The maintenance of the
rule of law is in every way as important in a free society
as the democratic principle. In our society the rule of law
rests upon twin functions: the sovereignty of the Queen in
Parliament in making the law and the sovereignty of the
Queen’s courts in interpreting and applying the law.’4
The creation of an enlarged administrative jurisdiction
of the courts has been largely undertaken by the judges
on their own as an attempt to keep pace with the desire
of successive governments to change and modernize. Past
practices and older legal interpretations are frequently re-
visited and re-interpreted in the light of modern experience.
The rule of crown immunity, drawn from the idea that the
‘king can do no wrong’, has been replaced by the courts
claiming inherent jurisdiction over government powers,
including the use of the prerogative. The rule that no injunc-
tion may lie against the Crown has also been reconsidered
in the light of current practice.
In terms of judicial powers and their relationship to the
democratic principle, then, there is a dialogue between the
courts, the legislature and the government of the day. In
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practical terms this has set the boundaries between judges
and politicians. There is a similar dialogue in the United
States as to how far judicial power should be self-executing
and how far it is confined to textual analysis. In the United
States in the landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison
(1803) Chief Justice John Marshall applied a pragmatic
approach by re-interpreting the statute, re-wrote the text
and gave a new meaning to the law that departed from
what was included by the original draftsman. Many of the
early decisions of the United States Supreme Court follow
the pattern of thinking evidenced in the development of
the English common law. It is clear that rules or canons
of statutory interpretation leave judges considerably em-
powered with the discretion as to how to develop and extend
legal principles to do justice in the case in question. Many
commentators see this as resting on liberal foundations that
declare the courts independent from the state as guardians
against oppression. Yet there appears to be little consist-
ency or predictability. At times the US courts adopt a strict
interpretation and appear highly restrictive. At other times
the courts become more libertarian, and appear to fulfil the
role of protecting the individual. In adopting either inter-
pretation the courts have seen their authority continue with
the boundaries between judicial and political power often
ragged and unclear.
The Human Rights Act 1998: a case study
The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in Britain on
2 October 2000. The Act provides a useful case study of
how incorporation of the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law of the United Kingdom may pro-
vide judges with greater discretion than hitherto. This has
the obvious danger of shifting political decision-making to
come within judicial power. The Act has provided opportun-
ities for litigation and greater legal complexity in decision-
making. There are ongoing lessons to be gained from this
experience, and it is instructive for countries developing
reforms through legal technical assistance from countries
like Britain.
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The Human Rights Act 1998 significantly changed how
rights are enjoyed in England and Wales, by incorporating
for the first time into domestic law the main substance of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) signed
in 1950. This Convention provides rights such as freedom
of expression and association; rights to privacy and informa-
tion; and procedural protections for the individual in the
areas of criminal, civil and administrative law. Under the
ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights was set up
to hear cases alleging breaches of Convention obligations.
Owing to the high reputation of this court, the Convention
is well known internationally for guaranteeing the citizen
positive rights.
Uniquely amongst countries that ratified the ECHR in
1950, the United Kingdom failed to incorporate it into
domestic law – even though the United Kingdom was the
first country to sign it and British lawyers carried out most
of the drafting. As the United Kingdom is a dualist state,
it needed to incorporate the ECHR into domestic law to
allow British citizens direct access to enforceable rights
under the Convention in the British courts. From 1966 to
the end of 1995 the United Kingdom found itself before the
European Court of Human Rights on no less than sixty
occasions (Gearty 1997: 84). In at least half the cases, the
Court found some form of breach of the ECHR. United
Kingdom legislation was found wanting, and in many cases
the citizen was left with no redress. The political demand
for incorporation of the Convention grew steadily, at first
through pressure groups, and then, in the 1980s, through
prominent lawyers, notably Lord Scarman, a serving Law
Lord at the time, who argued for incorporation of the ECHR
in a modern Bill of Rights. In the past five years, senior
serving members of the judiciary have added their voices
in approval.
The resulting Human Rights Act for the first time
allows British citizens to use domestic courts to enforce
Convention rights. British law is entering a period of co-
nsiderable uncertainty as the transition to a rights-based
culture is undertaken through cases decided by the judges.
Intensive preparations were made for the Act’s coming
into force in England and Wales and an extra £60 million
allocated for legal aid and court costs. The judiciary at all
LAW 107
levels, from magistrates’ courts to the appeals courts, were
given intensive education and training programmes. A
central issue is the extent of the application of Convention
rights and the implications of a rights-based culture in Eng-
lish law. The courts have the difficult task of interpreting
the proper procedures and merits of administrative decisions.
So now is an opportune moment to take stock of the direc-
tion a more rights-orientated public law will lead to. There
are some words of caution. While conceding, as everyone
must, that human rights are intrinsic to a democratic sys-
tem, there is room for consideration of the boundaries of
judicial power as a custodian of rights. What degree of
self-regulation should be exercised by judges when they are
granted such overarching powers? How should decision-
makers be advised to achieve good decisions when indi-
vidual rights may serve to inhibit risk-taking and the
development of sound long-term strategies?
The substance of the rights under the Convention is nar-
rowly confined to legal rights written in the broad language
of negative liberty or ‘freedom from unjustified interfer-
ence’. Rights included are to liberty and security (Article 5),
to a fair trial (Article 6) and to no punishment without law
(Article 7). There is a right to life (Article 2) and to freedom
from torture (Article 3), and a prohibition against slavery
and forced labour (Article 4). There are also freedoms
associated with the individual in terms of religion, the right
to privacy and the freedom of assembly (Articles 8–12). Such
rights have been narrowly interpreted without any formal
consideration of their potential impact on issues of eco-
nomic, social or political significance. The 1998 Act came
about through sustained pressure from the judiciary and
academic writers. Despite the existence of many draft Bills
of Rights (most notably those of Lord Lester), the Govern-
ment delegated the drafting of the Human Rights bill to the
official parliamentary draftsman. Its form was influenced
by the requirements of drafting an official government bill
rather than a Private Member’s Bill. The latter might have
resulted in a different formulation from the one favoured
by the Government.
The Act is seen as a model of its kind, but distinctive in
the approach taken in the incorporation of Treaty obligations
when compared to the European Communities Act 1972.
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Primacy is given to the sovereignty of Parliament, as the
1998 Act falls short of allowing the courts to hold that an
Act of Parliament is unconstitutional or illegal. The most
the courts may do is rule on incompatibility between the
1998 Act and the legislation under review. Since the Act
came into force there have been three declarations of
incompatibility. It is then for Parliament, not the courts, to
resolve any incompatibility. The courts are not bound by
the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights,
but may give effect to those decisions.
However, it is important to recognize that legal rights
developed under the Human Rights Act have the potential
to shift Britain’s constitutional arrangements in a new
direction. In October 2001 the Court of Appeal in a series
of significant judgments outlined the significance of the
Human Rights Act in terms of the powers of the courts to
issue injunctions in matters of planning disputes. Issues of
proportionality must be considered by the courts before an
injunction may be exercised under the discretionary powers
of the courts to issue injunctions for threatened breaches of
the law. This is but one example of the importance of the
rights culture’s becoming an integral part of the judicial pro-
cess. It makes Ewing’s remark on the danger of the unelected
(judges) making important decisions over the elected
(ministers) the more pertinent, even if the danger he alludes
to has been addressed, in part, by the self-limitations on
judicial powers that the House of Lords set out in its ruling
on Alconbury (2001):5 ‘We now have a constitutional system
in which the output of the democratic process can avoid
successful challenge and possible censure only if it can pass
a test of democracy developed by a group of public officials
who have escaped all forms of democratic scrutiny and
accountability’ (Ewing 2001: 116–17).
Finally, it is clear that there is an important extra-judicial
role facilitated by judges. Judges are called upon to provide
the means of independently assessing facts or inquiring into
accidents, government mistakes or maladministration. In
Northern Ireland at the time of writing the inquiry into the
events in Londonderry in 1972 (‘Bloody Sunday’), under Lord
Saville, a serving Law Lord, is concerned with re-examining
the work of a previous inquiry held by Lord Widgery. In
total it is estimated that at least a fifth of judicial time in
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the United Kingdom is involved in carrying out an inquiry
function. Valuable though this may be, it brings judges into
the front line of major political controversies and, in many
instances, the full glare of publicity. This may be unearthing
facts and attributing fault at the expense of eroding judicial
independence. Society might or might not regard this as a
risk worth taking if it provides an independent review of
government decisions (Loughlin 2001: 41).
The European dimension
The development of the European Union (EU) is another
example of how judges now appear to be at the apex of
power. The European Court of Justice provides member
states with a valuable means of resolving disputes resting
on the ultimate decision-maker, the courts. The Court of
Justice has had a considerable influence over the develop-
ment of judicial thinking in the United Kingdom and also
over the authority of Parliament. Parliamentary sovereignty,
long held by the courts to be the bedrock of constitutional
principles, appears considerably weakened in the context of
what is now the EU. More significant is the realization that
the English common law is now part of a shared inheritance
with the civil law tradition. The two traditions have long
been contrasted as ‘codified’ and ‘uncodified’, but their dif-
ferences are more profound and far-reaching in terms of the
cultural adjustment needed to understand both of them.
Membership of the EU creates a possible challenge to
the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. Traditionalists
insist that the doctrine asserting that an Act of Parliament
is free from being struck down by the courts would prevail
in spite of Britain’s membership of the EU. The traditionalist
view is compelling when it is remembered that Parliament
is led by the wishes of the majority of the electorate, through
a government that endeavours to carry out its election
manifesto. In this way parliamentary sovereignty translates
into the wishes of the people, as opposed to the decisions of
unelected judges. However, the issue that arises is whether
the traditional view can be reconciled with EU membership.
Tensions between UK and EU law inevitably lead to the
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question of which might prevail in the event of a conflict
that is not resolved by Parliament or the political system,
but is left to the courts to decide. One example of the need
for judicial decision-making arose from a series of cases
beginning in 1991 that centred around a dispute involving
Spanish fishing boats operating within the United Kingdom’s
fishing quota. The Spanish boats formed companies and
registered in the United Kingdom. The UK Merchant
Shipping Act 1988 introduced various requirements such as
nationality and domicile in an attempt to restrict the use of
UK fishing quotas to the UK-based fishing fleet alone. The
Spanish fishermen went to court in the United Kingdom
and sought interim relief from the English courts restraining
the application of the 1988 Act as a first step in challenging
its compatibility with Community law. The supremacy
of Community law, long acknowledged in the case law of
the Community, appeared at odds with the doctrine of the
supremacy of United Kingdom legislation. The House of
Lords in a number of key decisions arising out of the dispute
resolved that:
• the United Kingdom courts must give way to European
Community law even if this means acknowledging that
part of an Act of Parliament is incompatible with com-
munity law;
• in general the United Kingdom courts must not apply
United Kingdom statutes whenever there is a potential
conflict with Community law;
• the courts are required to ensure that United Kingdom
law is consistent with Community law; and
• national courts are required to ensure that the govern-
ment complies with the requirements of Community law,
and may provide compensation in the event of any failure
to do so.
It is possible to see these rulings as evolutionary as well
as revolutionary. In terms of evolving principles it is clear
that United Kingdom law must be held to be compatible
with Community law. More revolutionary is the idea that
integrating common law and civil law approaches requires
the courts of the United Kingdom to be seen as part of a
single unified court system. The European Court of Justice
stands at the apex of judicial powers, while the House
of Lords, as part of the domestic judiciary, is there to
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implement changes. There is much food for thought in the
idea that, in developing the jurisprudence of the EU, the
Court of Justice has taken on powers to constrain member
states, and the member states are being led by the court
rather than taking the lead. On that analysis, the United
Kingdom has unwittingly developed a Supreme Court sys-
tem, composed of the House of Lords and the European
Court of Justice, with inherent jurisdiction over community
law in the United Kingdom. In a pragmatic and case-by-
case approach it is possible to see the beginnings of a
common law shared throughout the Community (Craig
2000: 211). The impact of the Court of Justice is currently
difficult to calculate in full. But it is clear that the scope of
the jurisdiction of the court is sufficient to provide a coher-
ent convergence of common law and civil law systems.
This is a trend that is likely to continue and intensify as
the appropriate balance between the Court of Justice and
the other Community institutions is worked out as the EU
evolves while it continues to expand.
The wider international dimension
At the global level the development of ad hoc international
tribunals and the International Criminal Court (ICC) is part
of the ongoing expansion in judicial power. The beginnings
of the trend to confront war criminals through a judicial
process began with the international military tribunal at
Nuremberg and the Tokyo tribunal at the end of the Sec-
ond World War. More recently, there has been the estab-
lishment of the international criminal tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. In July 1998 the UN confer-
ence adopted the Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court and agreed to found a permanent International
Criminal Court. The creation of a war crimes jurisdiction
has some way to go before it is universally accepted by all
countries in the world; but it is indicative of a developing
role for judges.
In developing a criminal law jurisdiction the judicial
approach draws on the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity and the crime of aggression. Article 23 of part 3
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of the Statute covering the ICC incorporates the basic fun-
damental principles of the criminal law. A person is not
criminally liable unless his conduct constitutes a crime
under an existing law. This principle builds on the general
principles to be found in international criminal law, which
in turn reflects the Anglo-common law approach in defin-
ing judge-made law. The developing jurisprudence of the
international court will undoubtedly draw on the contribu-
tion of the Anglo-American tradition, with its pragmatic
and eclectic qualities of judge-made law. The extent of its
jurisprudence may impact on national sovereignty and
autonomy. The Pinochet case is illustrative of the problem.
In the Pinochet case (2000), the panel in the House of Lords
included Lord Hoffman, in a case involving the claim for
sovereign immunity against extradition made by Senator
Pinochet, a former Head of State (Chile). In reaching its
decision, the House of Lords allowed a variety of human
rights interest groups to give evidence, including Amnesty
International. Lord Hoffman was chair of a Trust set up to
administer funds in connection with Amnesty International.
This link was sufficient to establish that Lord Hoffman fell
within the category of having an interest in the case. As a
result it was considered that Lord Hoffman should have
been automatically disqualified from membership of the
panel. The earlier decision of the House of Lords had to be
set aside and a second hearing had to take place. The case
is illustrative of the potential for judges to become auto-
matically disqualified from hearing cases in which they
may have an interest. There is thus a real possibility that
alongside the accumulation of judicial power questions will
increasingly be raised about judges and their politics (Griffith
2000: 159).
Conclusions
The foregoing analysis provides an explanation of how
judicial powers have become central in many instances to
the resolution of disputes involving the implementation of
legal reforms in Western countries. In many instances judges
command a powerful influence, offering independence,
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public acceptance and legitimacy to the decision-making
process. In countries such as the United Kingdom the incre-
mental increase in the powers of the judiciary has brought
attention to the mode of judicial appointment. The increase
in judicial powers has not always been commensurate with
an increase in the status or protections afforded to judges.
In fact judges are easily susceptible to accusations of political
bias or prejudice when asked to confront policy matters or
resolve the merits of a dispute involving the government
of the day and the courts. The central question is how to
provide the most appropriate balance between judicial and
political power, especially when in many instance the judges
are appointed while politicians are elected.
The judicialization of government decision-making in
an attempt to ‘judge-proof’ decisions may have important
effects on the way the legal system works. Access to legal
advice is not uniformly or universally available. The more
impoverished sectors of society may become excluded.
Lawyers and legal solutions are often expensive, and pro-
vide greater degrees of complexity than informal systems of
decision-making. The hierarchical nature of judicial power,
with a focus at the senior levels of the judiciary, often
distracts attention from the lower courts, which are often
underfunded, poorly resourced and susceptible to problems
of inefficiency or at worst corruption. This is especially the
case in a number of the newer democracies and in poor
countries. But great care should be taken in considering the
role of judges when legal technical assistance to such coun-
tries is being formulated. Much of the politics literature on
democratization views the judiciary as an essential check
on executive power and crucial to the rule of law that is
central to the workings of liberal democracy. However, there
are alternatives to judicial decision-making: informal mech-
anisms for dispute resolution, the use of administrative
tribunals, and the ombudsman can all provide contributions
that should be specifically tailored to the needs of individual
countries. As Sweet (2000: 204) so rightly concluded, ‘in
the end, governing with judges also means governing the
judges’. The advance of judicial power is probably unpre-
cedented, and it becomes more essential than ever to reflect
closely on where the actualité of the boundaries of political
and judicial power might be set.
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8Sociology
geoffrey wood
In his classic work on The Sociological Imagination, C.
Wright Mills argued that it ‘enables the possessor to under-
stand the historical scene in terms of its meaning for the
inner life and external career of individuals’ (Mills 1959: 5).
In other words, sociology seeks to explain the experience
and life chances of the individual in terms of the wider his-
torical and institutional context. Sociological accounts of
the nature of democracy and democratization are thus less
concerned with the formal constitution of governmental
structures than with the effect they might have on the
individuals that constitute society in terms of promoting or
inhibiting social equality and better life chances, and vice
versa. In this chapter, classic and contemporary sociological
approaches to understanding democracy and democratiza-
tion are highlighted, with particular attention being accorded
to the post-1989 period.
Classical sociological perspectives on democratization
Given the central concerns of the sociologist towards demo-
cratization, it is inevitable that key practical issues that
have concerned sociologists include questions of social strat-
ification, progress and development. The development of
classical social theories of democracy can be broadly sum-
marized as in Table 8.1. These categories are not totally
watertight; some theorists straddle more than one tradition.
All three traditions are centrally rooted in the Enlighten-
ment, with its emphasis on rationality and social progress.
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Table 8.1 Classical (pre-1940) sociological perspectives on
democratization
Political science/
rational actor
perspective
Key Theorists
North American
economics/
political science
Perspective on
the state
Theories of
polyarchy
Interactionist
and consensus
sociological theories
Durkheim, Weber
Democratic state
represents the outcome
of the increased
rationalization
of society and/or the
development of the
collective consciousness/
social organization to a
specific level
Political
Economy
tradition
Marx, Engels,
Lenin, Frankfurt
School
Marxist theories
of the state:
state is an
instrument of
class dominance
However, what distinguishes the classical interactionist and
consensus social theories is their close focus on the process
of rationalization and the consequences for modes of social
organization; the former would, however, place greater
importance on the role of human actions, and the latter on
objective social structures.
While what is sometimes referred to as the ‘political sci-
ence tradition’ emerged from outside sociology, it has had
a strong influence on a range of sociologists from North
America, most notably in articles published in leading jour-
nals such as the American Sociological Review. In recent
years, this perspective has become increasingly theoretically
sterile, amounting to little more than a commitment to
certain methodological assumptions that are central to neo-
classical economics, namely that society is made up rational
profit-seeking individuals whose behavioural patterns can
be readily quantified.
The classic political science explanation for democratiza-
tion is that, in many respects, it represents ‘an accident of
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history that leaves a balance of power or a stalemate – a
dispersion of forces and resources that makes it impossible
for any one leader or group to overpower all the others’
(Olson 2000a: 134). In other words, if the division of society
into small autocracies between rival groups and individuals
contending for resources is not possible or feasible, then the
alternative is to ‘work out a framework for mutual tolera-
tion’ (Olson 2000a: 134). While a fair number of democracies
have not resulted from such spontaneous and autonomous
transitions, that is because democratization has been im-
posed from the outside (for example, the democratization
of Italy and Germany after the Second World War), and/or
because of the influence of an already-democratic state.
In contrast, Marxist theories of the state centred on
the view that political life under capitalism is inherently
repressive, ‘crushing the everyday life, economic life, the
real life of individuals’ (Lefebvre 1966: 130). In other words,
under capitalism, the state is simply there to ensure that
favourable conditions for capital accumulation are created.
Democratization is not something that is achieved, but an
ongoing struggle that can be carried forwards or forced into
retreat. The struggle is about going beyond a democratic
state to building a society without state power, Marx’s com-
munist utopia. Working for democratization is about finding
out the truth of politics under capitalism, and seeking to
eliminate formal politics altogether (Lefebvre 1966: 138).
Thus, while Marx saw the modern capitalist state as more
advanced than any previous form of state, it remained
imperfect and must be done away with. To Marx, as long
as the fundamentals of capitalism remained in place, any
apparent element of pluralism in the capitalist state was of
little worth.
Finally, classical social theorists such as Max Weber and
Emile Durkheim locate democratization in terms of the
gradual rationalization of society, and the consequences of
this for economic organization. Two main strands can be
distinguished here: interactionist and consensus theories.
Interactionism is a broad school of thought that is deeply
influenced by the writings of Weber. He explored the manner
in which individuals interact, and the relationship between
changes in belief systems and social behaviour. Weber be-
lieved the rise of Protestantism created the conditions for the
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emergence of rational capitalism. In turn, capitalism could
not survive without the rational legal administration of the
modern bureaucratic state (Giddens 1971: 179). Democrat-
ization is closely related to the rise of the latter; there can
be no demands for equality before the law, unless the law
is a rational and formal code governing behaviour. Yet there
is a central tension between democratization and the bureau-
cratization process; for democratic rights to be exercised,
additional bureaucratic regulations are needed. Democracy
requires the impersonal selection of individuals in key
government posts, a process that will necessarily result in
reduced accountability. Yet for Weber, unlike Marx, demo-
cratization along multi-party lines was no sham. Democratic
societies were characterized by higher levels of equity than
those encountered under any other state form. Direct demo-
cracy is not possible in mass societies; representational
democracy is thus the only option. Under universal suf-
frage, leaders must have a degree of charisma, encouraging
‘Caesarist’ tendencies in political leaders. However, that
can be checked through vigorous parliamentarianism, which
provides the means by which leaders who overstep the mark
can be brought to book (Giddens 1971: 181).
Sociologists in the consensus tradition accord somewhat
more attention to the evolution of social structures, and
the role they play in moulding social behaviour, in building
a broad consensus. In many respects, the father of consensus
sociology was Emile Durkheim. Durkheim believed that
‘as societies become more complex, a major trend is to the
emancipation of the individual from the collective con-
science’, that is from the accumulated bodies of attitudes,
norms and values that govern human behaviour (Giddens
1971: 101). In other words, individuals become freer from
the straitjacket of tradition and its associated social taboos.
Durkheim (1933) maintained that the increase in the divi-
sion of labour as societies evolve necessarily involves an
increase in government. However, associated with the pro-
cess of development is the emergence of moral ideas that
stress the rights and dignities of individuals. These pressures
result in the state in most modern societies becoming more
democratic, an institution ‘primarily responsible for the
provision and protection of these individual rights’ (Giddens
1971: 101). However, the process of democratization is not
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inevitable or irreversible. It is possible that the activities of
the state will expand to a level where they become a repres-
sive agency, a situation that will emerge if the ‘secondary
groupings’ (civil society actors) that intervene between
individual and the state, and that serve to counter-balance
state power, are not fully developed. Thus, for democratiza-
tion to be secured, it is necessary that active attention be
accorded to developing civil society.
To Durkheim, a society is more or less democratic if
there is effective two-way communication between state and
society; in mature democracies accepted norms for the con-
duct of social life take on a conscious or directed character
through the actions of the state. In other words, the demo-
cratic state can be seen as the ‘ego’ of society; it is creative
and both leads and is led by society (Giddens 1971: 102).
Again, civil society groupings have a vital mediating role to
play to ensure that the state is not constantly buffeted by
day-to-day changes in the popular mood (Giddens 1971: 102).
Democratization secured?
In the early years of the century, formal democracy in many
of the advanced societies was extremely shaky, or even
non-existent. The rise of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s
led many to conclude that democracy might be little more
than a historical anomaly in visible decay, a perspective
epitomized in the works of German novelist and social
thinker, Erich Junger (1970). However, this was followed
by fascism’s equally rapid demise (outside the relatively
peripheral Iberian peninsula), the redemocratization of
much of Western and Central Europe, and the triumph of
Keynesian forms of economic management. Not only did
predictions of the death of democracy seem equally prem-
ature, but also the seemingly unbridgeable social divisions
that had led to the crises of the 1930s had apparently been
resolved; the bulk of citizens in the advanced societies now
enjoyed a standard of living unprecedented in history.
By the late 1960s, evidence of mass discontent, epitomized
by escalations in industrial action and student protests, and
the glaringly apparent deficiencies of neo-Stalinism led to a
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renewed debate among sociologists as to the most desirable
way forward. Among neo-liberal thinkers – a group generally
in the minority among sociologists, though not so much so
among economists – Nozick (1984) suggested that the only
viable way forward was the minimalist ‘night watchman
state’. However, while conservative politicians were quick
to endorse this viewpoint when it came to regulating eco-
nomic activity, they tended to match this with calls for a
greater regulation of social life.
The always richly diverse radical tradition became
further fragmented with the rise of a new school of sociolo-
gical thought, post-modernism. The similarly diverse ‘neo-
enlightenment approach’, drawing on the works of a range of
classical social thinkers, focused on issues such as the most
appropriate means of realizing the goals of the Enlighten-
ment – namely, the rationalization of social life – and the
value of classical constructs for social analysis. Some of
the principal theoretical strands and developments are sum-
marized in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 Social theories of democracy, 1968–89
Economic/
political
science
tradition
Minimalist
state is
desirable to
allow free
reign to
economic
activity and
innovation
Minimal
government
Nozick
Classical
Political
Economy
approach
The state
represents the
apex of the
superstructure
of the
capitalist
mode of
production
Socialism
Althusser,
Poulantzas
Neo-
Enlightenment-
based
approaches
The state
represents the
product of the
rationalization
of society
‘Realization of
Enlightenment
goals’; local
democracy
Giddens,
Habermas
Conception
of the
democratic
state
Way
forward
Principal
theorists
(1968–89)
Post-
modernism
The state
represents
a particular
concentration
of power
networks and
domination –
an ‘apparatus
of capture’
Localized
action;
‘micro-
tribalism’
Foucault,
Deleuze,
Guattari
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As Crouch (1979) notes, social theory in the 1970s ac-
corded increasing attention to the role of the state. Within
Europe, much of this centred on the Marxist tradition
(Table 8.2, column 1). However, within the United States,
while political science accorded little attention to develop-
ing a systematic social theory of the state, a few scholars
such as Robert Dahl explored the issue of community power.
Other leading political scientists argued that democratic
pressures from below could overload government with excess
demands. Huntington (1968), for example, argued this in
respect of interest groups and governments. These arguments
were followed on by neo-liberal ‘political science’ writers
in the 1980s, who suggested that the easiest way to disarm
the insatiable demands of the masses was, quite simply, to
do away with the state as a site of patronage.
The relative strength of Marxist contributions in the
1970s reflected Marxism’s capacity to draw clear links be-
tween political and economic happenings. At the same time,
it was seriously weakened by a reluctance to admit any
element of pluralism within the capitalist democracies;
‘real’ democratization was still to happen. The traditional
Marxist view was that capitalism was characterized by the
domination of a minority, the capitalist ruling class; any
democratic participation by the mass of society must thus
be little more than a fraud (Callinicos 1997). This insistence
seemed increasingly untenable, given that the 1950s and
1960s had seen material gains in the conditions of the work-
ing class within the advanced societies, and in the 1970s the
crisis of Keynesianism seemed to result in a genuine policy
contestation. Despite Marx’s claims of historical progress,
developments provided little in the way of signposts towards
a socialist future that would transcend multi-party demo-
cracy (Crouch 1979). Moreover, the ostensibly Marxist states
of Eastern Europe presented a most unappealing alternative
to Western democracy, and were increasingly running out of
economic momentum. To Giddens, the experience of the
post-war years revealed capitalism’s inherent capacity to
reform itself and the space created by the general franchise
for a wide range of social issues to be placed on the table,
debated, and partially resolved.
To some writers in the Althusserian/French structuralist
Marxist tradition, the matter could best be explained by
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highlighting the relative autonomy of the capitalist state.
Capitalism is characterized by competition between different
fractions or segments, whose interests may conflict, account-
ing for the significant policy shifts and social compromises
(Strinati 1982). However, this perspective provides little
room for short-term mass action aimed at expediting social
redress and broadening the base of democracy (Crouch 1979),
a perspective that would prove politically debilitating to its
proponents.
More pragmatically, the British social theorist Ralph
Miliband (1972) drew a clear distinction between author-
itarianism and liberal democracy – a distinction that was
dismissed by most orthodox Marxists at the time. To
Miliband, a liberal democratic state is a relatively autonom-
ous actor. The stability of capitalism can best be explained
by its flexibility. The system does indeed impart significant
power to the working class, enabling real gains to be made,
even if the overall capitalist framework remains in place.
The apparent weakness and pliability of the capitalist state
underscores the need to break with structuralist Marxism,
and develop a more dynamic state theory that reflects the
realities of liberal democracy. Multi-party democracy thus
represents an area of contestation, whose boundaries need
to be advanced; democratization is an ongoing and contested
process.
Other writers in the radical tradition began moving away
from Marxism to alternative Enlightenment approaches,
most notably Jürgen Habermas (1989, 1990) of the Frank-
furt school. Many aspects of Habermas’s work had much
in common with earlier thinkers, such as Weber, with his
emphasis on the relationship between rational discourse
and social progress. Provided there is room for the former,
social progress is possible on incremental lines, a good
example being the growth of the welfare state in Europe in
the 1950s and 1960s. Formal democracies generally provide
the space for continuous improvement in the way they
operate, and enable progress towards a more equitable and
inclusive future; again, democratization is an ongoing pro-
ject, not a process that has been completed.
Limitations with the Marxist model also stimulated a
different breakaway, as a number of French writers in the
broad Althusserian/structuralist Marxist tradition began to
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experiment with a range of theoretical alternatives. The
brief flirtation of many with café Maoism soon gave way
to an increasingly influential theoretical paradigm, post-
modernism. In contrast to the Marxist preoccupation with
class inequality, early post-modernists such as Michel
Foucault focused on the workings of power and domination
within contemporary society. To Foucault complex power/
knowledge networks underpinned social order, a long-term
historical tendency being towards more subtle methods of
social control, but social control nonetheless. This would,
for example, explain why the formal democratization of
Western societies was permitted (Poster 1984). Real demo-
cracy – free from hidden control and domination – is only
possible through localized activism, creating space for the
most marginalized in society ‘to speak for themselves’. What
makes post-modernist views of democracy so different
from the bulk of social thought is that democratization on
liberal-pluralist lines is seen as neither inevitable nor desir-
able. Classical social theorists such as Marx, Weber and
Durkheim all saw the democratization of political institu-
tions as the inevitable outcome of social and technological
progress (although for Marx this would entail their destruc-
tion). This viewpoint is shared by most modernist sociolo-
gists. In contrast, for post-modernists formal democratization
is a process devoid of meaning, given the persistence of
power networks and imbalances. Similarly, there is no reason
why societies will necessarily be democratic once they have
evolved to a certain stage.
The triumph and decay of democratization
The resurgence of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, followed by
the collapse of Soviet rule in eastern Europe (and of the
Soviet Union itself), and the reinstitution of democratic
rule in many parts of the ‘Third World’ sparked renewed
debate amongst sociologists as to the relationship between
the state and society and the inevitability of democratiza-
tion. Writing outside the mainstream sociological tradition,
Francis Fukuyama (2000: 319), in an influential essay first
published in 1989, argued that there was a ‘remarkable
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consensus concerning liberal democracy as a system of gov-
ernment’, conquering rival ideologies ranging from fascism
to communism. Deploying Hegelian theory, Fukuyama
argued that, while there may be temporary setbacks, liberal
democracy was an idea that ‘could not be improved on’; in
this sense, history had ended, with the triumph of the most
effective and just state form. Fukuyama’s arguments were
soon seized upon by a range of conservative thinkers, who
argued that it was desirable to practice liberal democracy
in its purest form – a democratically accountable state that
would leave citizens as much room as possible to get on
with their lives unimpeded (Table 8.3).
Table 8.3 After 1989 – democracy and current social theory
Minimalism
Tradition(s)
Political
science/Neo-
liberalism
Conception of desirable state
Ultra-
minimalist
state
Principal theorists
Nozick,
Friedman
Local
democracy/
theories of
community
action
Classical
Enlightenment/
Political
Economy/
Theories
of social
movements
Local
democracy and
participation;
‘Third Way’;
mediation
between local
and global
Giddens,
Habermas,
Castells
Ultra-
leftism
Political
Economy
Realize
goals of
Marx and
Lenin/
Vanguardist
party
Callinicos,
Cliff
Post-
modernism
Post-
modernism
Dissolution
of state;
power in
the hands
of localized
groupings
Deleuze
Institutionalist
approaches
Political
Economy
Institutional
mediation
between
individuals
and
corporations
Regulation
theorists
(Boyer,
Lipietz);
theorists
of neo-
corporatism
(Streeck)
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The adoption of neo-liberal macro-economic policies (and,
in the US, the distorted ‘war Keynesianism’ that followed
it) in the 1980s led to rising social inequality, primarily
due to a widening of the wage gap, rather than increasing
unemployment. In other words, while mass political enfran-
chisement was (at least on the surface) secure, it seemed
that the economic disenfranchisement of a significant com-
ponent of society had returned. Similarly, in many of the
emerging ‘Third World’ democracies, mass participation in
the electoral process appeared to do little to correct mas-
sive increases in social inequality. In any event it could be
argued that the growing political clout of large corporations
was increasingly divesting the formal political processes of
any real meaning.
Such arguments were bolstered by evidence of a decline
in the number of citizens who bothered to vote in most of
the mature democracies, the triumph of the ‘politics of
spin’ in the 1990s, and an exponential increase in political
campaign spending funded by corporations seeking political
access and influence. It can be argued that given the powers
of large firms – some with turnovers greater than that of
entire nations – some form of institutional mediation is
necessary to offset the imbalance vis-à-vis the mass of
society. To Matzner and Streeck (1991), a partial solution
comprises a series of social accords (a situation sometimes
referred to as ‘neo-corporatism’) entailing centralized bar-
gaining between governments, unions and firms on matters
relating to macro-economic policy, successful examples
being in countries like Denmark and the Netherlands.
Regulation theory
A leading paradigm in the revival of institutional approaches
has been regulation theory. Regulationists like Jessop see
nothing automatic about the periods of stability in capital-
ist development; rather, this is a product of social agency
(Jessop 2001a: ix). Given this, it is possible for institutions
to ameliorate the worst excesses of capitalism, and to pro-
vide the basis for emancipatory alternatives, inspired by the
socialist, ecological, feminist and other social movements.
Although originally in the Marxist tradition, regulationism’s
links with classical Marxism have become increasingly
tenuous; nonetheless, regulationism does provide steps to
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resolving the shortfalls of Marxist theory in explaining both
the implications of social embeddedness and why Western
capitalist states are formally democratic. It should be noted
that, to regulationists, stability is not simply underpinned
by a series of compromises between capital and labour;
the relationship between state and society is also one of
contestation and struggle between competing groupings in
society.
But what would a regulationist political programme look
like? On the one hand, there is the cautious approach. The
need to develop a ‘post-liberal’ – and post-Stalinist – demo-
cratic strand fuelled debates within the British theoretical
journal, Marxism Today. To writers associated with this
journal, such as Martin Jacques, changes in the nature of
capitalism (and most notably the shift away from tradi-
tional forms of mass production) required ‘new politics’. This
was a critique that ‘contributed powerfully to New Labour
and Blairism’, with its emphasis on a third way (Jessop
2001b: xxii). Others, more within orthodox regulation theory,
argued that more vigorous forms of institutional mediation
are necessary.
Other writers associated with the regulationist school of
thought, such as Lipietz, have argued for a new ‘ecological
politics’, stressing the importance of sustaining the biosphere
as a whole. Lipietz places great emphasis on grass-roots
alliances between broad social movements as the basis
for the cultivation of civic virtues, given the seeming lack
of responsiveness of formal democratic institutions (Jessop
2001b: xxii). What both these strands have in common is
the recognition that a large component of traditional left
politics incorporated an authoritarian streak (Lipietz 2001:
502). Many progressive writers during 1920–1989 forfeited
the moral high ground by acting as apologists for Soviet
repression, and, in some cases, for the lunacies of Maoism
as well. Lipietz (2001: 502) argues that the modern citizen
is confronted with ‘two leviathans’, the market, which is
dominated by the wealthiest, and the state, which is exterior
to the community and can easily be appropriated by a min-
ority, formal democratization notwithstanding. So again,
politics and democratic participation are not simply about
the state but involve contestation and compromise between
interest groupings at local and national levels.
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Neo-enlightenmentism and post-modernism
The focus on the rediscovery of civic virtues and the revival
of local democracy has been taken even further by a diverse
collection of writers from theoretical traditions ranging from
neo-enlightenmentism to post-modernism. To Habermas,
democratization is about securing social and political pro-
gress through rational discourse. Habermas argues that class
struggle has only one aim – to create situations where the
other side is forced to listen. Human beings are inherently
rational, and within the advanced societies there is little
alternative to rationality and its inevitably beneficial social
outcomes. In his later works, Habermas argued that a par-
ticularly fertile ground for rational discourse between dif-
ferent interest groupings is at local level, highlighting the
importance of a devolution of powers (Habermas 1990). A
contrast is provided by such writers on social movements
as Manuel Castells (1998), who writes:
So there is democracy, which is a very important thing, but
once we elect our representatives, they have very little capacity
to really influence the events along the lines of what they
promised to do. The relationship between whom I vote for and
what he or she is able to do for me becomes very indirect . . . we
are seeing a growing voiding of representative democracy in the
sense of the ability to make a difference in our lives. It’s not
that democracy is finished, it’s only that relationship between
political representation and what happens in my life is more
and more remote and indirect.
Castells argues that the inevitable response to this is the rise
of new social movements, grass-roots organizations uniting
people around issues of common concern when formal struc-
tures of democratic participation are seen as unresponsive.
Whilst arguing that movements have a vital role to play in
society, Castells cautions that they might degenerate into
narrow and intolerant sectionalist organizations.
A very much more extreme version of this vision is
provided by certain post-modern writers, most notably Giles
Deleuze. To Deleuze, all states, even formal democracies,
are inherently repressive; real progress would involve a
deformalization of social relationships, with interactions
being purpose-orientated, and not regulated or bound by
the complexities of social norms, routines, and underlying
power networks (see Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 380). Once
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minorities break free from the ‘plane of capital’, from see-
ing themselves in terms of other groupings in society, it
is possible to escape existing power networks completely.
The reality, however, is that petty nationalist movements
have proliferated, in Europe and the developing areas. On
the one hand, these movements do constitute attempts to
break away from domination by what is perceived to be an
alien majority. On the other hand, few of these movements
have demonstrated greater tolerance or accountability even
towards the minority rights of other groups. Fragmentation
of multi-ethnic states has often gone hand-in-hand with
ethnic cleansing.
A very different way forward is proposed by the propon-
ents of the ‘third way’, most closely associated with Giddens.
Again, the ‘third way’ stresses the importance of local par-
ticipation. However, for Giddens, this should be on very
much more formal lines, with the positive feature of central
government being retained, and, in some cases, strengthened.
‘Third Way’
Giddens (2000: 4) argues that, in first half of the twentieth
century, the major social questions revolved around the
consequences of industrialization and accommodating the
rise of unions. This led to the rise of tripartism and social
accords, solutions that are no longer workable. Instead, given
that big institutions can no longer deliver, there is a need
to move away from ‘bureaucratic top down approaches’
favoured by the left. Individuals have to take responsibility
for their own fate: this underscores the need to create a
favourable climate for wealth creation, not simply emphas-
izing distribution. To Giddens, this points the way to a
‘third way’ distinct from statist social democracy and neo-
liberalism, a new path most closely associated with the
Democratic Party in the US and Britain’s New Labour. He
argues that the ‘third way’ is not just about a concern with
economic development, but also with community issues,
and stresses the vital importance of social solidarity and
basic social institutions like the family. Right-wing critics
of the third way claim it is purely amorphous and avoids
hard choices that are necessary if the market is to function
with minimal interference. Writers on the left claim that
it acquiesces in the failure of governments to stand up to
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the excesses of the market and is silent on rising social
inequality.
However, despite the influence of ‘third way’ thinking
neither the Clinton administration in America nor New
Labour succeeded in redressing the large-scale social in-
equality that had re-emerged under previous governments.
Moreover, in the desire to attract and retain corporate
support there seems little taste for restraining the market
(or even for limiting an expansion of its role), even in areas
where its failings have become glaringly obvious. Thus,
while democratic institutions remain in place, the range of
areas where voter preferences can have a significant impact
has narrowed.
Varieties of Marxism
Finally, although their ranks are greatly depleted, there per-
sists a grouping of scholars who remain committed to their
interpretation of traditional Marxism, most notably those
within the Trotskyist or ultra-left camp. To Callinicos (1997:
206), the Western pluralist state
is not a neutral institution which somehow rises above and
regulates society. Ultimately it represents the concentrated and
organised force of the capitalist class. This class uses many
devices to ensure that the state acts in its interests . . . and at
the core of the state apparatus are the repressive agencies –
army, police, and intelligence services – which again and again
have shown their loyalty to the status quo.
Trotskyists were always outspoken in their condemna-
tion of Stalinism, and so escaped the crisis of confidence
that beset other many other strands of Marxism following
the collapse of the Soviet Union. To ultra-leftists, full demo-
cracy is only possible under socialism. To expedite socialism,
it is necessary to have a vanguard party on Leninist lines;
the status quo is likely to respond to any challenges in a
‘centralized’ manner, necessitating clear, coherent and uni-
fied strategic responses (Harman 1998). ‘Democratic central-
ism’ provides the unity and discipline needed to pursue a
democratic struggle, absolute unity and order being neces-
sary to implement decisions that have been democratically
discussed – a viewpoint based on a rosy interpretation of
the internal life of the Bolshevik party in the pre-Stalin era.
Ultra-leftists remain unable or unwilling to accord any worth
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to the formal democratization of political institutions in
the advanced societies, despite multi-partyism’s superior
track record to any other system of government to date.
They remain mired in the controversies of the past. To
Trotskyists, a vital problem remains to identify the reasons
why the Russian revolution degenerated into Stalinism, and
how revolutions elsewhere can be more successful, despite
the fact that very few revolutions to their liking have taken
place since.
A rather different account of the nature and consequences
of elite domination is provided in the recent work of
Charles Tilly, influenced by both the Marxist tradition and
consensus-derived elite theories. Persistent or ‘durable’ in-
equality reflects clear social divisions, themselves generated
through the operation of social organizations, exploitation
being the ‘pivotal mechanism’ through which inequality is
generated (Wright 1999: 7). The deep social embeddedness
of social inequality and its constant reconstitution by
established organizations will result in the continued mar-
ginalization of key segments of society, the mass franchise
notwithstanding.
The de-democratization of society?
In a recent popular volume Noreena Hertz (2001) argues
that the power of large corporations has led to the ‘death of
democracy’; the democratic process has become meaning-
less, given the unwillingness and inability of governments
to restrain the worst excesses of the market. This develop-
ment has become increasingly apparent to ordinary voters,
many of whom seem inclined to withdraw from normal
political processes.
Hertz’s account is problematic in many ways, not least
because it lacks a certain scholarly rigour. It is also prob-
lematic in that the experience of democracies continues to
be diverse. Electoral participation in many emerging demo-
cracies is very high, even where the governments palpably
lack the power to regulate adverse market forces. More-
over, despite the crisis of neo-corporatism, countries such
as Ireland and the Netherlands continue to operate social
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accords in defiance of neo-liberal conventional wisdom, in
opposition to the antipathy of the International Monetary
Fund, for instance.
At the same time, Hertz’s account does point to a very
real crisis in the advanced democracies. Politics in many
cases has been divested of meaning. Even where there seems
to be overwhelming popular support for non-market solu-
tions – for example in Britain, for the provision of mass
transport and health care – governments have been extraor-
dinarily reluctant to embrace them. Political parties appear
reluctant to entrust voters with the right to choose between
coherent policy proposals, seeking refuge instead in the pol-
itics of slogans and soundbites. At the same time the decline
of participation in formal politics is matched by the rise of
new social movements, most notably the anti-globalization
movement and associated campaigns.
The ‘compartamentalized’ and essentially neo-liberal eco-
nomic system that the US and Britain exemplify has been
foisted on many newly democratized countries in the ‘Third
World’. And more regulated systems such as those in contin-
ental Europe and Japan have come under great pressure to
be more ‘flexible’, curtailing the market’s accountability to
political institutions. At one time proponents of the Anglo-
American model could point to the apparently more robust
performance of the US in comparison to more regulated
alternatives. This illusion was shattered with the bursting
of the internet stocks bubble and global economic slowdown
in the early years of the new millennium. That revealed
some of the central contradictions of the compartamental-
ized economy, with the boom of the late 1990s being driven
by consumer spending, itself funded by unprecedented levels
of household borrowing, at a time of stagnant real wages
for all but those in the highest salary bands. This stands
in sharp contrast to the Keynesian era, where consumer
spending was made possible through redistributive policies.
Again, this underscores the nature of the relationship be-
tween politics, economy and society in the early 2000s, and
the increasing divorce of economic and political elites from
the bulk of society. Thus the democratic project remains
incomplete. MacEwan, in the aptly titled Neoliberalism or
Democracy? (1999: 16) agrees, and furthermore repeats the
claim that in the advanced societies democracy is contested.
132 DISCIPLINES
To bridge the gap between political elites and society-at-
large, democratic initiatives must make a real difference
in people’s lives. Existing relations of power and authority
must be challenged; greater accountability is essential. More
democratic economic development would revitalize polit-
ical democracy and vice versa.
MacEwan’s contribution is a good place to bring this
review to a close, for he highlights a central question that
has run throughout the chapter: does multi-partyism and
the associated institutions familiar in the West constitute
a mature or completed process of democratization? Is
democratization a journey with a final destination that all
societies can eventually reach, or an ongoing process that is
unlikely ever to be fully completed? To conservative expon-
ents of politics formal democracy is a completed project in
the West – perhaps a manifestation of the ‘end of history’ –
so long as the existence of free markets continues. To most
current sociologists (post-modernists being the exception)
the democratization of the West helped provide and at
the same time reflected an unprecedented improvement
in the human condition, an improvement that should be
emulated worldwide. However, they would hasten to add
that democratization is not a one-off ‘historical accident’;
rather it is an ongoing process. The boundaries of democracy
are contested, and need to be further advanced to ensure
that a range of social and economic questions of immediate
concern to the bulk of society are debated and addressed
satisfactorily.
The contested nature of democratization is particularly
apparent in those nations where it is a relatively recent
phenomenon. To developing states and in large parts of
eastern Europe the introduction of political pluralism has
coincided with a requirement to implement structural
adjustment policies and privatize state assets. Hence voters
have very little say as to the manner in which the economy
is managed, and the sale of state assets has invariably
strengthened the hands of existing elites. This coincidence
of formal political empowerment and economic disempower-
ment leads Perry Anderson (2000) to an ambivalent con-
clusion. A real process of democratization is taking place
on a global scale, even in hitherto unexpected locales such
as South Africa and East Timor. But at the same time
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democracy has been ‘hollowed out at its core’ – in the
advanced societies – where debate is ‘asphyxiated’ by the
interests of the political and economic status quo, a trend
heightened after the terrorist events of 11 September 2001.
There is little doubt that contemporary sociological theory
continues to devote much attention to the nature of demo-
cratization and the extent to which political institutions
can ever represent the interests of all society. However, not
only has there been a tendency for suggested remedies to
become more timid and reformist, but also for social theory
to become somehow less theoretical. While regulationism
and social movement theories continue to locate current
debates within a broad political-economy theoretical frame-
work, the latter has become increasingly over-stretched, given
the continual modifications to cope with the actual course
of events. Much current writing tends to be very issue-
orientated, eschewing grand theoretical questions that could
become mired in the controversies of the past, even in the
case of writers such as Giddens, whose earlier works em-
bodied explicit metaphysical pretensions. Finally, although
there has traditionally been considerable cross-fertilization
between sociology and the disciplines of politics and eco-
nomics, in recent years this has diminished owing to the
growing hegemony of rational choice models within both
economics and politics. Rather, sociological perspectives
regarding democratization have had greater influence in the
emerging trans-disciplines of socio-economics and political
economy, which have attempted to break free from the
rational choice straitjacket.
Conclusion
What all these sociological theories have in common is
that they seek to understand the nature and desirability of
linkages between formal political institutions and the make-
up of wider society. In the early years of the twenty-first
century there is little doubt that democracy in the advanced
societies is at a crossroads. This reflects the re-emergence
of the central social question – are current levels of social
inequality and uneven political accountability desirable, and
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what is the most acceptable way forward? These questions
are posed even more starkly in the newer democracies of
Africa, Latin America and eastern Europe. Can democrat-
ization be considered to be complete, given that ordinary
people have little effective say on a range of central issues
concerning economy and society? For the time being,
however, there is insufficient pressure for such issues to be
fully addressed, unless confidence in the status quo comes
to be shaken severely by economic downturn and greater
popular pressure emerges within and without the formal
political processes.
Part II
Areas

9Africa
roger southall
It remains fashionable to refer to the contemporary impetus
for democracy in Africa as the ‘second wave of independ-
ence’ or as a major aspect of ‘African renaissance’. Such
terms embody two major meanings: the disastrous failure
of democratization efforts following political independence
in the 1960s; and the umbilical relationship between social
and economic development and democratization, if the lat-
ter is ever to take root in an Africa that is mired in poverty.
The view that Africa is ‘trying again’ points not only to
how a paradigm of democratization has assumed primacy
in analysis of the continent’s condition since the early 1990s,
but how that paradigm has become inextricably entangled
with political and intellectual activism. Indeed, the urgency
of democratization debates flows both from the desperate
condition of the mass of Africa’s people and from the fact
that, while on the one hand ‘democratization’ has in essence
replaced Marxism as both explanatory device and panacea,
it has on the other been appropriated as goal and tool by
Western policy agendas.
Democratization in Africa: the first wave
Early approaches to democratization in Africa were largely
subsumed under the closely interrelated perspectives of
modernization and nationalism. The study of democratiza-
tion arrived in the 1950s and 1960s as an accompaniment
of decolonization, and in its most systematic and coherent
form drew heavily on American political science. The study
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of politics in Africa was discouraged during the colonial era.
African peoples were regarded as backward, if not barbaric,
and hence unsuited to the pursuit of ‘politics’ – conceived
in terms of a civilized liberal ideal. Moreover ‘politics’ was
presumed to entail the prior existence of ‘the state’, which
at most, was taken to exist only in potential terms under
colonial tutelage. When, belatedly political science did
arrive, in response to the decolonizing formation of ‘new
states’, it did so largely with all the baggage of American
liberal commitment, with its diverse mix of idealism,
universalism and (paradoxically) blinkered ethnocentrism
(Omoruyi 1983).
Africa’s ‘new states’ were assumed to be in the throes of
a process of political modernization, whose end-state had
an uncanny resemblance to political life in the industrialized
West. In part, modernization theory was a response to the
failures of orthodox economics, which was criticized as
failing to comprehend the complex interactions between
social change and economic development. Modernization
was viewed as taking place via the diffusion of ‘modern
values’, through education and technology transfer, amongst
the new African elites who were at the head of the struggle
against colonialism. A central preoccupation of political
scientists consisted of the difficulties of ‘political institu-
tional transfer’, which ran up against the embeddedness of
traditional authority, especially as represented by the chiefs,
who symbolized local particularities and the communal
values of tribal life. Indeed, modernization was viewed by
political scientists and nationalists alike as above all Africa’s
transition away from an inhibiting tribalism towards a
modern nationhood which, buoyed up by rapid economic
development, would represent sovereign if not actual equal-
ity with the former imperial powers.
If the process of ‘nation-building’ or ‘national integration’
was the primary responsibility of Africa’s modernizing elites,
the principal instrument was the political party, whose
function was not only to ‘articulate’ and ‘aggregate’ public
opinion but to engage in the promethean task of ‘political
mobilization’, of forging links between tribe and nation.
It was in the study of parties that the supposed ‘value-
freedom’ of Western political science most easily cohabited
with political idealism. Their formation and development
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represented not only the most explicit embodiment of
political modernization but also the condensation of heroic
nationalist struggles for the achievement of the classic liberal
goals of liberty, equality and fraternity. The very classifica-
tion of parties symbolized the implacable advance of pro-
gress. For whereas cadre or elite parties were customarily
formed as defensive reactions by traditional elites to the
threats posed by modernization, mass nationalist parties
were the creations of the forward-looking elites, who had
appropriated the language of liberalism imported by coloni-
alism, exposed colonial tutelage as self-serving, and honed
the demand for African self-determination, sovereignty and
racial equality. Significantly, however, whereas Western
liberal-democratic thought was founded principally upon
rational individualism as found in the political theories of
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704),
African nationalism, emphasizing the putative solidarity
of rapidly-forming, self-conscious, African national collect-
ivities, had much greater affinity to the romanticism of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). Consequently ‘African
democracy’ soon came to resemble more the ‘people’s demo-
cracies’ of the communist world than Western liberal-
democracies. This was to have grave consequences in later
decades, when the hollowness of Africa’s first attempt at
democracy was to be laid bare by appalling widespread
violations of human rights by regimes claiming to possess
popular legitimacy.
The fairly rapid political atrophy of the first wave of
nationalist democracy in Africa, as first one-party regimes
and then military rule took hold in an increasing number
of states, was greeted in two ways. First, authoritarian trends
were often conceived as a not irrational response by the
modernizing elites to ‘the dramatic danger of disorder and
perhaps even of regression’ (Zolberg 1966: 6). Thus Africa
appeared to have too little, not too much, authority, although
the most astute observers recognized that the conditions
for authoritarian rule to bring about modernization were
not yet present, and that the costs could be very great. The
alternative therefore lay in the pursuit of a more limited
version of democracy, one that would deal with societal
stresses and strains by the sort of machine politics that
characterized Western countries before they became fully
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industrialized and modernized. Developing institutions like
the civil service and military that could contain the urban
masses would also help, for rising expectations were reckoned
to constitute a serious threat to the political stability
upon which industrialization and modernization (and hence
democratization) ultimately depended (Huntington 1968).
However, in contrast to such conservative responses, the
second major response to the rising tide of authoritarian-
ism was a reaction against modernization theory and an
embrace of radical or Marxist political economy.
Part of the problem for modernization theory was that
its intellectual armoury was closely aligned with American
foreign policy, preoccupied as it was with containing com-
munism. There was, as Leys (1996: 11) claims, a silence
about the social side of development that was cloaked by
the doctrine of ‘value-freedom’. The capitalist character of
the development that modernization anticipated was not
openly acknowledged. Yet by the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the outlines of an emerging African crisis were already mani-
fest in the form of economic stagnation, political instability,
authoritarian rule, militarism and not least, the rapid and
highly visible formation of African privileged classes whose
typically kleptocratic behaviour challenged their character-
ization as a ‘modernizing elite’. Not surprisingly, African
scholars were increasingly drawn to the theories of the
(metropolitan) ‘new left’ (which was simultaneously engaged
in a critique of mainstream political science) and more
particularly to a tradition of ‘expository radicalism’ in
African studies – building on early works by such writers
as W. E. B. Dubois and George Padmore, who argued how
European colonialism had destroyed African civilizations
and social and economic formations.
Rodney (1972), for instance, drew not only upon ‘expos-
itory radicalism’ but also Frantz Fanon’s (1970) thesis that
colonialism underdeveloped the personality of the colonized.
He owed even more to Andre Gunder Frank and theorists
of Latin American dependency, whose analyses and insights
were now systematically applied to Africa. They built upon
Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965),
where Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, argued
that the fruits of African political independence had been
denied by continuing economic dependence on the former
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colonial powers. Dependency writers stressed not only the
external orientation of African economies, which constrained
the prospects for internal growth, but also how such ‘under-
development’ underlay the political power of the emergent
African bourgeoisies – the principal beneficiaries of ‘neo-
colonialism’. Even where, as in Nyerere’s Tanzania, there
were attempts to ‘de-link’ from metropolitan capitalism by
pursuit of socialist strategies, state control of the economy
translated into the development of a ‘bureaucratic bour-
geoisie’ whose interests contradicted those of workers and
peasants, who were accordingly exhorted to engage in class
struggle (Shivji 1976). Elsewhere, the lack of an indigenous
entrepreneurial class with access to investment capital still
required that development be directed by the state, as in
Kenya for example.
While dependency theory and Marxism contributed much
to the understanding of the patterns of African development
and ‘periphery capitalism’, they posed as many questions as
they solved, not least because of their inability to delineate
realistic alternative paths to development. Although there
was an implied socialist alternative, it was difficult to
demonstrate the existence in Africa of the indigenous social
and economic forces that would carry such a revolution
through. Instead, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, African
countries were more typically dominated by ruling classes
whose material interests were determined primarily by pre-
ferential access to the state. By the mid-1980s the population
of sub-Saharan Africa was, on average, considerably poorer
than it had been a decade earlier. Twenty-five of the world’s
severely indebted low-income countries were in Africa, the
continent was unable to feed itself, and AIDs was spreading
rapidly, possibly affecting up to a third of the population in
middle Africa. The bane of African national development
was, then, not the emergence of a dominant class as such,
but its parasitic character, supported by a ‘swollen state’.
This swollen (or ‘overdeveloped’) state was also, by its
nature, inherently authoritarian. On the one hand, colonial
experience and post-colonial contestations had left African
countries bereft of institutions (effective political opposi-
tions, a free media, functioning constitutions) capable of
countering abuse of power and ensuring administrative
accountability. On the other, the centrality of the state to
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resource allocation had encouraged a concentration of polit-
ical power that typically saw personalized regimes ruling
by a mix of coercion and clientelism – the granting of
rewards and favours to particular supporters irrespective of
the laws and regulations concerning public conduct.
Democratization in Africa: the second wave
The early 1990s witnessed a dramatic return of multi-party
democracy to Africa. Whereas ‘in 1989 29 African countries
were governed under some kind of single-party constitu-
tion, and one-party rule seemed entrenched as the modal
form of governance’, by 1994 ‘not a single de jure one-party
rule remained’ (Bratton and de Walle 1997: 8). This was
widely perceived as the local manifestation of Huntington’s
(1991) third wave of democracy globally. Many authors have
stressed the increasing importance of political conditionality
attached to foreign assistance and the emergence of West-
ern demands for ‘good governance’ in contributing (with
more or less effect) towards this democratic momentum.
Yet although the surge of popular power in eastern Europe
probably did much to undermine the legitimacy of one-
party and authoritarian African regimes, there is a consensus
of radical and mainstream opinion that internal forces in
the form of the rise of pro-democracy movements, not
external pressures, were most fundamental.
Study of ‘watershed elections’ demonstrates how protest
movements incorporated key segments of African popula-
tions (students, trade unionists, professionals, intellectuals,
some business interests, the media, women, the urban poor,
small farmers and the churches) and how their demands for
democracy were resisted by the ruling group, their business
associates and often, their external allies (on France see, for
example, Renou 2002). In apartheid South Africa especially,
the combination of mass protest, declining regime legitim-
acy, and economic failure was widely seen as creating divi-
sions between so-called ‘hard-liner’ and ‘soft-liner’ elites,
propelling them towards multi-partyism and democratic
transition. Yet political transformation in Africa at this time
was both widespread and extremely uneven. A residual group
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of states were largely untouched by the process, either
because multi-partyism was well-established (Botswana) or
because demands for reform were too weak (Zimbabwe and
Swaziland). In a third group of states armed rebellions en-
gineered the overthrow of repressive regimes with the hope
of representative government to come (Uganda, Eritrea and
Ethiopia). And in a fourth group, state collapse saw central
institutions disintegrate under the weight of looting, com-
munal violence and civil war (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire/
Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville) or fall
victim to the predations of rival warlords (Chad, Somalia).
Despite this unevenness, democratization was rapidly
to become the central preoccupation of academic observers
and engaged activists during the 1990s, spanning the
ideological divide between mainstream liberal and radical/
Marxist analyses, because for both it offered significant hope
of a better future for Africa. Yet there were, inevitably,
important differences of interpretation and emphasis with
regard to, in particular: first, elections, electoral systems
and constitutionalism; and second, the relationship between
democratization and development.
Elections, electoral systems and constitutionalism
Very considerable attention has been devoted to the study
of elections, and not least in the period 1950–65 when elec-
toral procedures were used to determine, or at least to
legitimate, ‘the form, rate and direction of the decolonization
process’ (Cohen 1983: 73). Later, as Cohen (1983) notes, the
tendency for military regimes to create ruling parties and
then to stage façade elections (Zaire, Togo, Benin, Sudan)
testifies to rulers’ recognition of the legitimation function
of elections. And the re-establishment of constitutions pro-
viding for elections in post-military Ghana (1969 and 1979),
Nigeria (1979), Uganda (1980), Upper Volta (1978–80) and
the Central African Republic (1980–81), as well as multi-
partyisms’s re-introduction in Senegal (1976) indicated the
continuing faith of some elites in the utility of elections.
But the unevenness of Africa’s electoral experience created
a valuable distinction between categories of elections (com-
petitive, semi-competitive and non-competitive) (Chazan
1979). Even so, overall, the shift to one-partyism and militar-
ism led to a declining academic emphasis upon electoralism;
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most scholars transferred their attentions to the state, class,
imperialism and underdevelopment.
Africa’s second wave of democracy re-ignited enthusiasm
for the study of individual elections (see for example Daniel,
Southall and Szeftel 1999). Cohen (1983) illustrated how,
during Africa’s first wave, analysts’ theoretical concerns dealt
principally with voter choice (overwhelmingly, the extent
to which choice was based upon ethnicity), voter turnout
(notably whether regime restrictions on political competi-
tion increased voter dissatisfaction or political alienation),
and political participation (the role of elections in legitim-
ating regimes and/or entrenching their domestic political
control). These issues still retained some prominence, but
in the 1990s analysts became more concerned to locate
elections in the context of contemporary ‘transition theory’
– in turn heavily influenced by O’Donnell, Schmitter and
Whitehead (1986). Apart from seeking to understand the
causes of transitions and the variable rates of progress,
major emphasis was also now placed upon the conditions
for making successful transitions sustainable. Akin to the
‘new institutionalism’ interest in similar issues elsewhere,
this resulted in renewed interest in both electoral systems
and constitutionalism.
Africa’s electoral systems were in large measure inherited
from the colonial powers. Traditionally, Francophone coun-
tries have elected their rulers by systems of proportional rep-
resentation (PR), Anglophone countries by plurality systems.
Whereas for Francophone countries this usually involved
parallel elections for parliaments and presidents, most
Anglophone countries started with borrowed Westminster-
style parliamentary systems before subsequently (in moves
that reflected a growing centralization of power and a weak-
ening of legislative checks upon executives) introducing
separate presidential elections. This historical divide remains
largely intact. Even so, significant debate has taken place
concerning the qualities of different electoral systems, for
two reasons. The first is that scholars, democratic activists
and international agencies are seriously interested in how
to prevent the abuse of elections by politicians, by means
such as electoral monitoring (see Daniel and Southall 1999).
A second spur has been the specific electoral requirements
of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy.
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On South Africa, a seminal contribution concerning an
appropriate electoral system to best overcome the legacy of
apartheid in an ideologically and ethnically divided society
was Horowitz (1991), which argued for the adoption of an
Alternative Vote (AV) system. A plurality system would
lead to overrepresentation of a winning party, and national
list PR would disconnect individual representatives from
voters and effectively exclude ethnic groups not represented
in a putative majority coalition (Horowitz 1991: 200). In
contrast, AV would produce majority rather than coalition
governments, by encouraging vote pooling and ethnic accom-
modation – parties would be forced to attract the second or
third (party) preferences of voters. ‘AV does not stand in the
way of majoritarianism, but makes majorities responsive to
the interests of others as well. This is an important concili-
atory feature – and one that builds legitimacy – in a divided
society’ (Horowitz 1991: 202). In the event, South Africa
opted for national list PR on the grounds of simplicity,
inclusivity and the fact that no votes would be ‘wasted’.
(The adoption of PR as a way of easing the transition to
democracy in Namibia in 1989 was also influential here.)
This was of major significance, in that it represented a move
away from Westminster-style, ‘winner–takes–all’ majoritar-
ianism in favour of an electoral system that provides for
the inclusion of minorities, which in South Africa’s case
are based primarily on ethnicity and race. Furthermore, it
fuelled important comparative work by Reynolds (1999),
who, after studying elections under plurality and PR sys-
tems in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and in Namibia
and South Africa respectively came out strongly for PR as
more likely to foster power-sharing and inter-ethnic accom-
modation. In contrast, plurality systems were more likely
to foster majoritarianism and ethnic polarization. The
drawbacks of the plurality system were to be demonstrated
in Lesotho’s elections of 1993 and 1998, which led to the
exclusion of opposition parties from the parliament despite
their gaining a sizeable share of the vote. Lesotho moved to
adopt a mixed member proportional system in consequence.
And South Africa is now considering the merits of the re-
introduction of constituency elections for at least a number
of its MPs, so as to establish a firmer connection between
voters and their representatives.
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As much as the debate about electoral systems has tran-
scended academe to become an increasingly significant
issue in contemporary African politics, there is widespread
recognition of the need to locate any electoral system in
a wider historical and institutional context. For instance,
both theoretical and empirical work has concluded that the
combination of a PR electoral system with a parliamentary,
rather than a presidential, form of government is most likely
to enhance the prospects for democracy in Africa (Southall
1999). Meanwhile Darnolf (1997) ascribes the presence
of a democratic culture in Botswana and its absence in
Zimbabwe to the sharply contrasting nature of their decolon-
ization experiences – Botswana’s peaceful negotiations with
the departing colonial authority providing a basis for accept-
ance of diversity and opposition, versus Zimbabwe’s bloody
liberation struggle, which fostered political intolerance and
distrust of opposition.
Such an appreciation of the historical legacies charac-
terizes the revived interest in constitutions, central to the
shaping and study of Africa’s multiple transitions. These
transitions have varied considerably, but one of the most
influential models was the national conference, pioneered
in Benin in 1990 and later adopted in Cameroon, Togo, and
Niger, where reluctant rulers were forced to concede the
re-drawing of constitutions and the formulation of new rules
for multi-party elections (Joseph 1991). Although equival-
ent processes have been variously waylaid or avoided by
authoritarian leaders elsewhere, the idea that rulers should
forge a contract with the ruled and craft a new beginning
has become widespread. Indeed, because prominent African
political scientists and other intellectuals have been intim-
ately engaged in democratization struggles they have had
to confront the democratic potential offered by different
institutional arrangements and consider if there is a sound
basis for rendering constitutions viable. For many, this has
been difficult, for the previously predominant Marxian per-
spective saw Africa’s constitutions having fallen foul of what
Okoth-Ogendo (1991) terms ‘the power map’ (whereby state
elites appropriated themselves unfettered discretion over
public affairs). In contrast, the new constitution-making
tended to be dominated by a liberal paradigm that rested
upon the twin pillars of limited government and individual
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rights and freedoms. As Shivji (1991: 258) wryly observed,
that paradigm required Marxists and Leninists to direct their
analytical skills to upholding the positions of the liberal
thinkers Montesquieu and Locke! An important outcome
of the resulting debate has been a critique of liberalism
and ‘good governance’ discourse as legitimating the right
of Western powers to intervene in Africa whilst shielding
the ‘democratic’ West from scrutiny. In turn, that has been
linked to an insistence that for constitutionalism to take
root in Africa it must recognize not only socio-economic
rights but also collective rights, notably those of internally
oppressed peoples (Shivji 1991: 256). This provides some-
thing of a linkage to the important debate, in the South
African context, of the potential of consociationalism.
Democratization and development
The concern to render constitutionalism viable has been
closely linked to debates around the complex interrelation-
ships between democratization and development.
Demands for democratization arrived later in Africa than
the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs), introduced by the Bretton Woods institutions in the
1980s in a bid to restructure economies, by reducing the
‘swollen state’. By the early 1990s SAPs had been joined by
a democratization agenda that called for the replacement
of one-party and military regimes by multipartyism and
freely elected governments. This linkage between externally-
induced economic and political reform was explicit, the core
of the argument being that democracy was not, in practice,
to be found in the absence of capitalism. Such a position
has proved immensely troubling for radical Africanists, many
of whom are still having to come to terms with the collapse
of the socialist model internationally.
The standard response has been twofold. First, the
orthodox western-institutional position has been regularly
taken to task for defining democracy in minimalist terms,
that is, in terms of the existence of free elections and multi-
partyism. This is routinely condemned as an extremely
impoverished version of democracy. The importance of
fundamental liberal freedoms cannot be denied; but they are
not likely to mean much to the mass of African populations
who live in dire poverty. This critique has been greatly
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strengthened by examples such as Moi’s Kenya, where multi-
partyism failed to curb rampant corruption and the contin-
ued gross abuse of human rights, and Musuveni’s Uganda,
where a ban on political parties is tolerated by Western
‘donors’ because of the proclaimed successful implementa-
tion of structural adjustment. Such cases merely indicate
what many observers are convinced has become more
obvious – the severe limitations of liberal democracy ‘in
crisis-ridden, dislocated, marginalized, and impoverished
economies’ (Ihonvbere 2000: 187). The solution, regularly
proposed, is for African societies to become yet more demo-
cratic, for pro-democracy movements to base themselves
more thoroughly upon civil society, trade unions, and human
rights groups and so on to force through a more thorough-
going reformulation of the state. ‘This will include a restruc-
turing of the military, a transformation of the bureaucracy,
a revitalization of the judiciary, constitutional engineering,
the guarantee of basic rights and liberties, and the protec-
tion of minority rights’ (Ihonvbere 2000: 188).
Romantically, perhaps, ‘democratization’ has come to
replace ‘revolution’ as the radical panacea. However, ana-
lytically the debate may be said to have bifurcated into a
struggle between the two poles of ‘liberal democracy’ and
‘popular democracy’ (Saul 1997). On the one hand, the ‘polit-
ical science of democratization’, typified by the work of
American political scientists like Larry Diamond and Samuel
Huntington, is based ultimately upon the political elitism
of Joseph Schumpeter and the American theorists of ‘poly-
archy’ such as Robert Dahl. Market economies develop,
while state-socialist economies fall behind. For democratic
reforms to proceed without provoking crisis, the costs to
privileged economic interests must not exceed the benefits.
Competing elites therefore have a formative role to play in
crafting ‘pacts’, whilst disruptive popular pressures need to
be contained. In contrast, the ‘political economy of demo-
cratization’ argues that such a focus on ‘low-intensity demo-
cracy’ abandons the pursuit of public purpose and fetishizes
the market. In Africa, market reforms have undermined the
capacity of states to manage economies in accordance with
social, ethical and political priorities. By destroying indigen-
ous industries and domestic employment they have accen-
tuated social tensions. Ironically, therefore, globalization
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and structural adjustment undermine rather than develop a
basis for democratic peace and state-building.
Saul’s (1997) very influential article argues that the pro-
ponents of the ‘political science of democratization’, along
with the World Bank and fellow donors, have increasingly
come to appreciate this paradox, and have accordingly re-
sorted to a ‘political science of development’ which stresses
‘good governance’. This recognizes the need for viable state-
like structures to maintain a minimum of order and legit-
imacy, and in effect to balance the contradictory pressures
of political opening and economic reform, of managing dual
transitions. Yet such approaches tend to downplay the socio-
economic policy content that such models are designed to
ensure: ‘governance’ is presented as ‘performance-oriented’,
akin to business management, designed in effect to contain
disruptive popular pressures that might inhibit economic
‘progress’. The emphasis that such an approach places on
holding the state to account and constructing democratic
institutions capable of containing communal differences
(‘statecraft’) are clearly vital (as is demonstrated by the
collapse of social cohesion in countries like Rwanda and
Somalia). But they can only go so far in humanizing Africa’s
contradictions, so long as the economic landscape remains
so ‘fertile’ for throwing up ‘pathological deformations’. In
these circumstances it remains impossible to disentangle the
twin issues of ‘capitalism and socialism’ and ‘liberty and
dictatorship’. While the possibility of realizing socialism
looks remote, demands for democracy and equality whose
realization will require progressive social and economic
reorganization are rising in country after country, and in
the long term have to hold out hope for Africa.
Africanists are understandably less concerned with explor-
ing the general relationships between economic develop-
ment and democratization that attract much interest in
contemporary comparative politics and, even, among some
economists (see Chapter 3 of this book, by Addison). As the
literature tends to associate democracy with national wealth
(albeit with important qualifications), it makes depressing
reading for anyone concerned with the poorest continent
and invites pessimistic long-term prognoses of individual
cases like South Africa, widely touted as Africa’s best hope
for progress (see Lane and Ersson 1997). Saul’s visionary
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perspective therefore articulates a radical optimism that for
many engaged scholars constitutes an intellectual and polit-
ical necessity. The broader consensus, however, argues that,
given limited prospects for successful developmental states
in Africa, liberal democracy currently constitutes the only
attractive option, notwithstanding its obvious limitations.
Conclusion: the way forward
Wiseman (1999) advances the grounds for ‘demo-optimism’
in Africa. Obstacles to democracy in Africa remain legion,
and democratic progress is highly uneven, yet the continent’s
political systems are, overall, more pluralistic and more
open than they were before 1990. And democracy remains
on the agenda because there is no plausible alternative. The
debates outlined above will carry on. But alongside that,
‘demo-optimism’ might be reinforced by taking the analysis
further forward in the following three directions.
First, there is need for more extensive concern with demo-
cratic accountability. At one level, this will require greater
attention to the concept and practice of political opposi-
tion, a dimension of democratization that has been largely
subsumed under studies of political transition. However,
establishment of the idea of opposition as legitimate, of
oppositions as alternative governments, and of opposition
as a vehicle for movement away from a politics of com-
munalism towards a politics of ideas is central to continued
momentum towards democracy in Africa (Southall 2001).
At another level, there is growing urgency for the quality of
democracy, and how it can be measured, to be investigated.
Baker (2000) has argued for the expansion of conventional
notions of accountability (revolving around popular judge-
ments of politicians at the poll) to embrace rendering all
those who make significant societal decisions (private or
public) accountable to their relevant communities. All
public power-wielding bodies, legal authorities and security
forces, private power-wielding bodies (from corporations
to churches), individual citizens (such as large investors),
international legal and political bodies like the Organization
of African Unity, and international financial institutions
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should be scrutinized more closely. Measures for assessing
the accountability of all such bodies are either available or
can be developed, even though they will have to be supple-
mented by qualitative judgements. Their results will both
allow for systematic cross-country comparison and more
importantly can be utilized to strengthen and reinforce the
accountability of power-holders who affect the lives of ord-
inary citizens.
A second, related effort should be upon expansion of
the study of participatory democracy in Africa. Both the
cross-national study of political transitions and individual
case-studies have often been divorced from examination of
grass-roots level political participation. Focus upon demo-
cratization at national level has neglected the implications
for local government, even though in many countries this
is where ‘delivery’, whether by national government, ‘donors’
or non-governmental organizations, has to be implemented.
In contrast to voluminous writing and theorizing about ‘civil
society’ and its centrality to democratization, there have
been relatively few systematic studies of what ordinary, poor,
African people understand by ‘democracy’ and how they
view their rulers. In this regard, Cherry’s work on African
political participation in Kwazakele township in Port Eliza-
beth (1999), carried out over nearly ten years and spanning
the transition from the apartheid struggle to the present
day remains seminal. Significantly, she demonstrates the
co-existence within popular consciousness of a joyous em-
brace of liberal democracy and confusion when it comes to
people’s experience of the institutions of direct democracy
(both party and municipal). Unrealized hopes of participat-
ory democracy have led to growing cynicism and political
demobilization, posing long-term dangers to the rooting of
democracy in South Africa.
Finally, there is greater need for elucidation of the inter-
connection between democratization and globalization in
Africa. Far too often the response of African intellectuals
to the impact of globalization has simply been one of rage.
Hyslop (1999) protests that this is a product of a simplistic
(and fashionable) notion of globalization as merely the
latest stage of the expansion of capitalist production. Yet
the expansion of communications and information systems,
changing experiences of time and space, and massive cultural
152 AREAS
changes towards new social forms that collapse any dis-
tinction between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ compete as con-
tenders with the economic for the title of being the driving
forces of globalization. African rhetoric, looking back to the
autarkic logic of dependency theory, only intensifies the
continent’s marginalization. Instead, the way forward must
be for African struggles against external economic domina-
tion, militarism, state repression and cultural imperialisms
to link up with similar struggles elsewhere. Cheru (1996)
admits that in the African context there is much hard
work to be undertaken by social movements in developing
a counter-project to current oppressions, yet this is vital if
Africa is to participate in international moves towards shap-
ing ‘a just, democratic and sustainable new world order’.
Africa’s internal politics clearly need to be democratized,
yet there is a growing consensus that this goal goes hand
in hand with growing demands for the transformation of a
global distribution of power and wealth that is fundament-
ally undemocratic.
10
Central and eastern Europe
paul g. lewis
The passage of over ten years since the first fully competitive
elections should have succeeded in putting the progress
of democratization in post-communist Europe into clear
perspective. By now we might expect to have a reasonably
firm comprehension of how far democratization has pro-
ceeded, why – if its achievements are differentiated – it has
gone further in some countries than others, and which
events and processes have driven democratic change. The
looking-glass of democratization studies should in this sense
have been ground sufficiently finely to develop a clear
image of developments in the area and uncover their main
dynamics. One might also expect some theoretical insight
to have been distilled from the copious information that
has already been garnered, if not the formulation of a fully-
fledged theory of post-communist democratization. By and
large, however, the prevalent view is that achievement in
these areas has been limited. Although comparative pol-
itics was largely dominated throughout the 1990s by issues
of democracy and the study of democratization, to date it
has issued in extensive empirical accounts and rather dis-
jointed conceptual discussion more than a comprehensive
body of theory that contributes to a deeper understanding
of democratization in general. How well the studies of cen-
tral and eastern Europe (CEE) compare with other regions
is debatable, but the perspectives developed so far tend to
identify loose associations and broad problem areas rather
than more precise relations of dependence and causality.
The looking-glass in this sense offers rather a blurred image
– although some part of this weakness may also lie in the
eye of the observer.
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Taking CEE1 as a whole the progress of democratization
can be outlined in basic terms fairly precisely. Competitive
elections on a universal suffrage have been held, and their
conduct and results broadly validated by international
observers in the majority of the nineteen countries, although
they have not proceeded without reservation in Russia,
Ukraine and Albania (see Karatnycky 2001). Only Belarus
is generally deemed to have remained authoritarian and
generally unfree as a whole – it is one of the few countries to
have seen such a steady decline in its freedom ratings that
it has clearly moved out of the democratic, free category
altogether. On this basis, employing Freedom House ratings
in 2001, eleven states have clearly democratized success-
fully, while seven remain in the intermediate area of partial
democracy. Virtually all have also passed Huntington’s
(1991: 266–7) ‘two-turnover test’, whereby not only do
authoritarian rulers have to lose power for democracy to be
installed, but so have their potentially democratic succes-
sors on at least one occasion too (Milosˇevic´’s loss of power
in the rump Yugoslavia being too recent for the test to
apply there yet).
But in other respects the area of study remains little
more than ‘a conceptual mess’: the issues of democratic
transition and consolidation have been confused and the
precise line between democracy and non-democracy not
drawn with sufficient clarity (Kopecky´ and Mudde 2000).
Bunce (2000a:) is somewhat less negative, identifying five
broad conclusions about democratization and three further
‘bounded generalizations’, in the light of specific regional
experience. Pacting between authoritarian elites and leaders
of opposition forces was found to be more effective as a path
to democratization in Latin America and southern Europe
than it was in CEE, where a ‘thoroughgoing political rejec-
tion of the Socialist past and Socialist elite’ was found
to provide a more solid basis for democratic governance.
Whereas economic reform in the Third World is a hazardous
project that could undermine democracy, the opposite was
true in CEE, where the progress of reform and democratiza-
tion were strongly interdependent. However, Bunce also con-
curs with Kopecky´ and Mudde about the conceptual and
methodological weaknesses, and directs attention in par-
ticular to problems of concepts, case selection and causality.
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Kubicek’s (2000) overview suggests that post-communist
studies have so far contributed rather little to the field of
comparative politics, and perhaps – with the exception of
studies in political economy – may not generally be expected
to do so in the future. The importance of social context for
processes of ‘transitology’ (as democratization is termed here)
is such that comparative study within the post-communist
world is likely to be more fruitful than comparison across
regions. Taken all together then, the substantial attention
given to the CEE and abundant publications can only be
seen as producing a disappointing outcome – but not one
that differs greatly from democratization studies in other
areas (Geddes 1999). Of course academic appraisals are rarely
very approbatory anyway; moreover, the status of demo-
cracy in CEE (and, indeed, in regions with more established
regimes) is itself still rather confused.
This chapter reviews how far democratization has pro-
gressed in CEE in concrete terms, discusses some major
points of contention that have arisen, and identifies the
main conclusions from the debate so far. It will show how
democratization has been viewed in the CEE context and
the nature of the conceptual lens (or lenses) that have been
deployed to chart developments in this area. Little attention
will be given to the early stages of democratization and the
question of why the movement towards democracy began
in the first place. Instead, the focus is on contemporary
aspects of democratization and the most salient features
of the regional pattern as it has developed over the past ten
years.
The progress of democratization
An approximate guide to the level of democracy achieved in
the region can be gained from the annual Survey of Freedom
Country Scores compiled by Freedom House. The passage
of time since the fall of the communist regimes gives us
the opportunity to trace distinctive patterns of democratic
development across the region. The country scores com-
bine ratings for political liberties and civil freedoms that, if
not an uncontentious index of democratic development, at
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least provide a reasonable guide. The scores have been
criticized for being partial and too highly aggregated, but
they do not diverge greatly from other prominent measures
of democratic performance. Table 10.1 ranks CEE countries
according to their Freedom Country Scores (FCS: low scores
are more free) and, for those that share the same rating,
by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. All ‘free’
countries on this basis count as ‘electoral democracies’, as
do some of the ‘partly free’ countries (italicized figures)
(Karatnycky 2001: 649). In 2000 Moldova, Macedonia,
Yugoslavia, Albania, Ukraine and Russia all qualified as
‘electoral democracies’ in this category, but not Bosnia.
The states with a score higher than 5.5 are categorized
‘not free’ (only Belarus in 2000) and are not defined as
democratic.
Several features stand out. Eleven of the countries in
CEE, rather more than half, were rated free in 2000 (scoring
ratings of 2.5 or less), seven were partially free (from 3 to
5.5, the cut-off point between partially free and not free
countries running through the 5.5 score), and just Belarus
was rated not free. This was better than 1991, when only
nine countries (more accurately, eight before the dissolu-
tion of the Czechoslovak republic) were judged free. All
of those categorized as democratic in 1992, moreover, had
maintained or improved on their score by 2000 – suggesting
a general extension or deepening of the democratization
process. This democratization tendency, however, did not
exclude temporary backsliding in some cases. Slovakia was
ranked as partly free for three years under Prime Minister
Mecˇiar, when civil liberties were less fully observed.
Estonia and Latvia also fell into this category soon after
independence owing to problems in extending full demo-
cratic rights to the sizeable Russian minorities. Some
observers defined the two Baltic states as authoritarian at
the outset.
Of the eight partially free states in 1991, then, three
had improved on their score by 2000 and five either stayed
the same or regressed – three of these being the major
post-Soviet republics of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The
two countries rated not free in 1991–92 were the rump
Yugoslavia and Bosnia, both involved in bitter conflict for
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the first half of the 1990s. The score of both improved
when the hostilities ceased and the Milosˇevic´ leadership
in Yugoslavia was finally removed. Only Belarus remained
on a resolutely ‘unfree’ course, as President Lukashenka
consolidated his increasingly authoritarian rule. The pic-
ture overall, then, is of a certain progress in democratiza-
tion through the decade accompanied, nevertheless, by a
quite striking stability between the different groups of
countries. Those already more democratically advanced
in 1991 stayed that way and generally improved on their
position. Those less favoured at the beginning of the
decade often stayed at roughly the same level or actually
regressed. Only Romania and Croatia moved out of the
partially free into the free category. Belarus steadily moved
towards the not free and fully authoritarian category. CEE
developments seem to show a less uniform regional pattern
of democratization than Latin America or southern Europe
(Table 10.1).
However some significant associations at least can be
identified, in addition to the failure of the major post-
Soviet republics to improve on their limited initial stand-
ing, as shown by the comparison with trends in Gross
Domestic Product. The more democratic CEE states are
both physically located to the west of the CEE region and
closer to the West in political and economic terms as
well. The four richest countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
and the Czech Republic) were amongst the five initially
targeted for early accession by the European Union (EU) in
1997, while by 2000 ten of the eleven countries rated free
were engaged in accession negotiations. Most were con-
siderably wealthier than countries rated partly free or not
free. Only one partly free country, Macedonia, was as rich
as any of the ‘free’ countries – and it was wealthier than
just two of the ‘free’ countries. The correlation of political
and economic factors raises a number of questions about
the origins and pattern of democratization, both in general
and in the context of post-communist CEE. It points to the
possible existence of common underlying factors shaping
the process and relates directly to modernization theory –
one of the major paradigms claimed to provide an explana-
tion for democratization.
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Democratization and modernization
The association of democracy with wealth in CEE during
the early years of post-communism is hardly surprising in
itself and echoes a well-known association between demo-
cracy and modernization that has been widely mooted since
the 1950s. The precise nature of the association has, how-
ever, always been obscure, and there has been widespread
doubt about whether modernization – generally understood
to be based on economic growth and adequately reflected
in GDP indices – actually explains much about democrat-
ization or democracy in any precise sense. Democratization
in CEE has rekindled interest in this question; possibly,
this recent experience sheds new light on a rather well-
worn debate. Probably the most comprehensive statistical
examination of the relationship concludes quite emphat-
ically the ‘emergence of democracy is not a by-product of
economic development’. But it simultaneously endorses the
obvious association of the two phenomena, affirming that
‘while democracy is terribly fragile in poor countries, it is
impregnable in the rich ones’ (Przeworski and Limongi 1997:
166, 177). In short, modernization cannot be understood to
produce democracy, but once a reasonably wealthy country
has become democratic it is likely to remain so.
These global findings are hardly exhaustive; indeed the
relationship between modernization and democratization
becomes more complex once historical and geographical
differences are taken into account. Dictatorship in coun-
tries that became independent after 1950 was, for example,
just as stable in rich as in poor countries (Przeworski and
Limongi 1997: 176).2 Also, it is argued that a high level
of economic development has had stronger democratizing
effects in European countries than elsewhere, an observa-
tion that was particularly rooted in the relatively recent
south European cases. Both internal and external factors
were involved here, the latter primarily based on the power-
ful role of wealthy close trading partners and the strong
political influence they exerted through the promise of EU
membership. Economic development has been claimed to
increase the chance of a peaceful evolution towards demo-
cracy. Political and economic outcomes have also been
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closely linked in studies of post-communist development.
Economic reform seems to have promoted democratization
in post-communist countries more consistently than else-
where, and this may reflect some unique features of the CEE
context (Fish 1998: 238). A careful analysis of the conditions
for successful economic reform in the post-communist states
traces its immediate roots to the character and outcome of
the initial, ‘founding’ elections of 1990–91 that marked the
political break with communism. The more thoroughgoing
and clear-cut the break, the more likely that economic
reform would be successful.
This, of course, does not tell us much about democratiza-
tion itself, but some of the second-order effects of the main
correlation exercise do bear more closely on issues of demo-
cratic change. Greater political openness, as shown by the
data presented in Table 10.1, was closely correlated with the
outcome of the initial elections and produced better con-
ditions for economic reform, while macro-economic per-
formance was also strongly reform-dependent. While hardly
surprising, such linkages provide some basis for identifying
a ‘virtuous circle’ of economic reform and democratic change
in CEE, as well as directing attention to the conditions that
give rise to a ‘vicious’ one like that in Belarus. Lukashenka’s
personal dominance and growing authoritarianism were
based on the rejection of anything like price liberalization
that might threaten short-term economic pain. This par-
ticular analysis is interesting, too, for having prompted
further examination not just of the links between political
and economic variables but also of the geographical differ-
ences within the CEE region that seem to reflect and
amplify them. Why precisely should the more democratic
CEE states be both wealthier and more western? A recal-
culation of Fish’s data thus includes an extra variable for
the average reform score of each state’s contiguous neigh-
bours, which turns out to be significantly correlated with
the original economic reform measure. That is, the more
western CEE countries were more effective reformers –
and probably wealthier – precisely because they were more
western (Kopstein and Reilly 1999). In both an echo and
advance on earlier disagreements about how far existing
models of transition are able to ‘travel’ and furnish fruitful
comparison, Bunce (2000b: 86) continued to stress the
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importance of regional characteristics – but with, nota bene,
the proviso that ‘it is precisely in the strategic realm – in
needs, resources, possibilities, and outcomes – that regional
context plays a powerful role in democratic transitions’.
The spatial diffusion of culture, power and economic
variables may well, therefore, be an additional influence on
the success of economic reform and the extent of democrat-
ization during this phase of the ‘third wave’. Alongside a
focus on political economy, democratization studies in CEE
have placed considerable emphasis on the role of political
culture and the nature of civil society. That is something
that directs attention once more to the role in the European
context of regional interconnectedness and the likelihood
that, just as EU influence played a prominent role in south
European democratization, so it would play an equivalent
or even greater role in CEE developments. Thus ‘modern-
ization’, for all its apparent links with democratization,
may have little direct explanatory power in itself and offers
limited value to theory-construction. But within a more
closely defined historical and spatial context, its covariance
with democratization indicators points to hitherto neglected
ways in which regional factors and international influence
can be factored into the analysis of democratic change. The
implications of the analysis of CEE democratization and
post-communist change more generally for the moderniza-
tion perspective may thus be one part of the looking-glass
where the view has indeed been sharpened and theoretically
refined.
Democratization concepts – transition, consolidation
and stasis
The concept of democratization as applied to central and
eastern Europe has been unclear; moreover the subject has
often been introduced as if the question of definition did
not really arise: the process has become synonymous with
a broader category of post-communist political change. This
was signalled at the very outset, as the end of communist
rule was unthinkingly (but almost universally) identified
with initiation of the phase of democratic transition. Apart
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from its unhelpful teleological connotations, the ‘transition’
assumption embodied additional drawbacks in serving to
smuggle in by these means a ‘unifying and homogenizing
effect vis-à-vis the multiple processes designated by the
notion’ (Dobry 2000: 5). There has generally been a failure
to distinguish between the interlocking processes of demo-
cratic transition and consolidation; no stringent line between
democratic and non-democratic regimes has been estab-
lished; and the definition of democracy itself has not been
properly separated from identification of the process or pro-
cesses that produce it (Kopecky´ and Mudde 2000).
For example, transition can be understood to refer to a
process of change that starts with the progressive collapse
of an authoritarian regime, as the adoption of a new con-
stitution, as routinization of new democratic structures,
or as the adjustment by political elites of their behaviour
according to liberal democratic norms. Consolidation on
the other hand involves removal of the uncertainties that
surround transition and the institutionalization of the new
democracy, the internalization of its rules and procedures,
and the dissemination of democratic values. The extens-
ive remit of these definitions and the evident problems of
operationalizing the different variables they denote aptly
illustrate the problems involved and help explain why many
analysts have fought shy of confronting them. Precisely
when transition has ended and democracy is fully installed
raises a number of questions for which clear answers are
difficult to find: how routinized do democratic structures
have to be, and which are the critical ones? Precisely which
dimensions of their behaviour do political elites have to
adjust, and which particular democratic norms are most
important? How can we tell that lip-service to democratic
principles does not mask the persistence of less acceptable
patterns of behaviour that are not open to public scrutiny?
A further layer of questions emerges at the consolidation
phase that relate yet more closely to values and questions
of subjective commitment, which are equally difficult to
determine accurately.
In practice, making the distinction between democracies
and non-democracies has not been such a challenge, at least
in terms of identifying electoral or minimal democracies;
and Freedom House data offer a reasonably convincing basis
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for drawing such a line. The fact that ten of the eleven
countries identified as free in 2000 had been so for five or
more years also suggests that their transition period had
ended and they are now embarked on a subsequent phase of
democratic development. Of the six partially free states
classed as electoral democracies in 2000 just two had im-
proved on the Freedom Scores assigned to them in 1991/2
(one being Yugoslavia shortly after Milosˇevic´). Far from
being completed, transition in this group hardly seemed
to be under way at all in most cases, and the process was
largely stalled. Not all countries have been moving in a
democratic direction, and the barrier between states that
were free and democratic from the outset and those that
have hovered in a partially free, semi-democratic state has
barely shifted at all.
So, while transition and consolidation have been the main
concepts around which the discussion of democratization
has revolved, there is a further category – for countries that
have moved only very slowly towards installing a reason-
ably convincing form of liberal democracy or, even, its most
minimal electoral form. Kitschelt (2001) noted that post-
communist diversity as a whole emerged during a short
period – from 1990 to 1993; since then, ‘new regime struc-
tures have more or less “locked in” in almost all polities’.
From this point of view, in CEE they were in fact more or
less ‘locked in’ from the outset in 1991 and little change (in
terms of broad free/non-free categories) was evident by 1994.
A fuller pattern for the second half of the decade was actu-
ally apparent in 1996, after which only the former warring
countries of Yugoslavia and Croatia (Slovakia is a partial
exception) changed categories.
There has been in this sense an underlying condition
of stasis or arrested development that characterizes much
of CEE democratization. This is yet one further aspect of
political change – or the lack of it – that needs to be
accounted for. To do so raises further major problems and
directs attention to the underlying question of whether it is
just the quality of the post-communist democracy itself
that is partial and/or defective, or, instead, it is the con-
cepts that are applied to characterize it that are faulty. This
is not necessarily an issue that concerns all CEE countries
equally; and as an issue for post-communist democratization
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it does not figure strongly in studies of the subject. Rather,
much of the debate has moved on to issues of consolidation,
although difficulties have been encountered even there in
identifying what it means and how it might be empirically
assessed – and in many cases the problem has just not been
fully confronted at all. Both Bunce (2000a) and Kopecky´
and Mudde (2000) emphasize the critical failure to distin-
guish between the sustainability of democracy and its qual-
ity in any particular case.
One of the earliest major studies argued that demo-
cracies needed five ‘interacting arenas’ in place which had
to be mutually reinforcing for consolidation to exist (Linz
and Stepan 1996: 7). But whether the requirements in terms
of civil society, the rule of law, a usable state bureaucracy,
a relatively autonomous political society and an institu-
tionalized economic society were prerequisites or elements
of consolidation itself was not clear. Most analysts in fact
direct their attention to aspects of political culture and
lay great store on attitude surveys in providing evidence
of consolidation. One of the most wide-ranging analytical
studies concludes that the countries of east-central Europe
(Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) have
made considerable progress towards consolidation in the
light of trend patterns that ‘clearly indicate a rooting of
democratic convictions’ (Plasser et al. 1998: 188). These
countries plus Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania were also
described as heading toward democratic consolidation ‘albeit
with some caveats and concerns’, by Diamond (1999: 184–
5), largely on the basis of attitude clusters that showed
citizens endorsing the present regime over the previous one,
rejecting authoritarian alternatives, and broadly favouring
the activities of representative democrats. Other analysts
are more sceptical. To return to the point from which this
discussion began, then, the looking-glass through which
CEE democratization is viewed does not just help shape the
image that can be perceived but may also play a part in
creating the political reality that it reflects.
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Conclusions: Europeanization and the quality of
post-communist democracy
Different reasons have been identified to explain the defici-
encies of the post-communist democracies. One dwells on
the weak development of the rule of law and a consequent
failure to build an adequate constitutional order (Merkel
and Croissant 2000: 31–47). Another claims that basic
institutions are absent: the new regimes have been installed
in contexts that lack the framework of the modern state, the
precondition of most ‘first-wave’ democracies and a neces-
sary political basis that merits far greater attention. Thus,
according to Rose and Shin (2001), many post-communist
democracies (like others in the third wave) have ‘started
democratization backwards’; thereby failing to go much
beyond ‘electoral democracy’. The view that institutions
often determine, rather than are determined by, the events
of history is supported by a wide-ranging survey of CEE
democratization processes: ‘It is remarkable how the choice
of this or that institution . . . makes an important change in
the way that otherwise similar societies can develop at a
point of major transformation’ (Sadurski 2001: 455). What
is not always appreciated is that many post-communist
states face not just the double transition of political and
economic transformation, nor even a triple change that
adds state formation, but a yet more complex challenge of
quadruple transition involving distinct processes of nation-
building and state construction.
It is, therefore, increasingly realized that the process of
post-communist democratization (though perhaps not that
much less than any other) is a multifaceted and highly
complex one, where several critical factors are highly inter-
dependent. Constitutionalism is thus of great importance
for the development of post-communist democracy, not
just because of its association with the development of a
Rechtsstaat, accountable democratic processes and a legal
basis for the conduct of democratic politics, but also because
of the less directly instrumental functions it performs in
literally serving to constitute the body politic and form an
inclusive political identity (Sadurski 2001: 462–3). This
dimension is not far removed from the much discussed
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(but often loosely defined) issues of political culture that
are thought to be central to the process of post-communist
democratization. The character of this democratic culture
is often associated with the beliefs and practices already
well established in western Europe. Democratic develop-
ment is often identified with Europeanization in this sense
– the assumption of a consciously (west) European iden-
tity – and is in practice intimately associated with both
structures and processes that are designed to lead to formal
EU membership. A major problem here is that any contem-
porary European identity is remarkably difficult to define.
The supra-national principles promoted by the EU’s found-
ers have lost much of their meaning and force, after a
half-century of peace and material wealth. ‘Europe’ has
come to represent values that are largely instrumental and
has lost the capacity to strengthen or provide the demo-
cratic culture and democratic identity needed by the post-
communist countries. The close link between material
wealth and democratic achievement thus confirms a self-
reinforcing dynamic of European integration and general
westernization, but also a view of politics that is essentially
technocratic.
The democratic deficit much deplored in EU institutions
and processes is thus also reflected in the ambiguities of
CEE democratization and the sharp division drawn between
the more wealthy democratic countries close to EU mem-
bership and the second (or third) division of those slower or
even stalled in the democratization process. Democratiza-
tion has not always been advanced nor the cause of demo-
cracy necessarily well served by the strengthening of west
European links. The top-down approaches often adopted have
not been particularly effective in strengthening processes of
democratic consolidation or tackling the weaknesses of civil
society so often identified as major limitations. Democratic
conditionality has been a blunt instrument that is dispro-
portionately harsh on the states slowest to embark on eco-
nomic and political development. Zielonka (2001) confirms
that CEE democracy has been to a significant extent ‘foreign
made’ and that democratization has been externally facil-
itated and supported from outside. The major question that
concerns us in this context, though, is how far the actual
image of democratization has also been affected by the
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Western looking-glass and the interpretation of political
practice in contemporary CEE perhaps distorted by require-
ments of conditionality or the demands of EU accession
procedures. International pressures more generally have
imposed strict restraints on the exercise of self-rule by CEE
‘democratic’ government.
Globalization clearly limits the sovereignty of the
region’s new democracies. It encourages unpopular policies
and prompts governments to renege on election campaign
promises, presses (sometimes forces) leaders to act against
the preferences of the electorate, restructures the political
space in ways likely to endanger democratic stability, and
promotes state reorganization on more repressive lines
(Zielonka 2001: 519–20). These mark out major areas of con-
flict between the dominant conceptions of economic and
political change. Processes of democratization and capitalist
development are closely linked – after all, modernization
theory implies that political and economic change are in
some way part of the same package. And close analysis
of post-communist change indeed suggests that the eco-
nomic components of the package take precedence over
the political. Yet stronger arguments can also be made that
the political effects of economic liberalization and market
growth are often identified with democratization even
though there is little empirical or theoretical support for
such a conclusion.
It is the latter view that would support the case for the
looking-glass of democratization studies creating its own
image of post-communist political processes distinct from
a more ‘objective’ reality. There are certainly some grounds
for coming to such a conclusion, given that the idea of
democracy has been stretched globally to cover a wide
variety of politically unresponsive and relatively unaccount-
able regimes where the quality of democracy also often
appears to be remarkably thin. Analysis of CEE democrat-
ization processes is also, as we have seen, highly inconclu-
sive in the light of widespread conceptual confusion and
failure to distinguish between different levels of analysis.
What is more clear is that those countries that are attract-
ive candidates for European integration and have the re-
sources needed to participate in the process are regarded
as more viable partners and acceptable democratic models
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of post-communist development. If the criteria for demo-
cratization themselves remain vague, there is, paradoxically,
far more stability and clarity about which of the CEE states
are deemed to meet them.
Notes
1 Nineteen post-communist states including Russia (also a major Asian
power), but excluding the transcaucasian states and the former Soviet
territories in Asia.
2 Przeworski and Limongi (1997) nevertheless restore some explanatory
power to modernization by suggesting that socio-economic develop-
ment at least worked in the right direction in long-standing dictatorships
like those in CEE that did eventually fall. However, much of this can
be attributed to the removal of the Soviet veto; and it was precisely in
Poland, the leader and major catalyst of CEE democratization, that GDP
began to fall in 1979 and did not regain its former level until the 1990s.
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East Asia
shaun breslin
The task of writing about democratization in East Asia as a
whole is a hugely problematic one. It is a region that con-
tains massive diversity in political and economic systems
and one that remains in a state of considerable flux and
transition. A key element in this transition is the end of
the Cold War, and the resulting reduction in US tolerance
of authoritarianism so long as that authoritarianism was
overtly anti-communist. It is also a region where, as in East
and Central Europe, communist party states are struggling
with the transition from centrally planned socialist eco-
nomies – though, by contrast with the European examples,
and with the exception of Outer Mongolia, this is a transi-
tion that has not been accompanied by the end of communist
party rule and a parallel process of democratic transition.
And it is also a region where financial crises and economic
recession have dominated political activity and discourse
for half a decade. Perhaps more than in any other region
considered in this volume, the overarching framework for
political activity here is shaped by the transition from Cold
War strategic structures to globalized economic structures.
A cursory analysis of the Freedom House ratings for states
in the region gives some indication of the problems of
considering the region as a whole (see Table 11.1). At one
extreme we have the established democracy of Japan –
though even here, the transition from managed factionalism
within the structure of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) to conflictual factionalism and political fragmenta-
tion in the post-LDP coalition governments has created new
challenges to democratic politics. There is then a second
set of states that have seen considerable moves towards
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Table 11.1 Freedom House ratings for East Asian countries,
2001–2
Political Civil Per capita GNP
Country rights liberties Rating (PPP US$)
Burma 7 7 NF 1,500
Cambodia 6 5 NF 1,500
China (PRC) 7 6 NF 4,300
Indonesia 3 4 PF 3,000
Japan 1 2 F 27,200
Korea (North) 7 7 NF 1,000
Korea (South) 2 2 F 18,000
Laos 7 6 NF 1,630
Malaysia 5 5 PF 9,000
Mongolia 2 3 F 1,770
Philippines 2 3 F 4,000
Singapore 5 5 PF 24,700
Taiwan 1 2 F 17,200
Thailand 2 3 F 6,600
Vietnam 7 6 NF 2,100
Notes: F = Free; PF = Partly Free; NF = Not Free. GNP = Gross National
Product; PPP = purchasing power parity. While PPP figures provide a
base for comparative analysis, they considerably inflate the exchange
rate GNP of non-market economies – the figure for China here is nearly
4 times the official Chinese figure.
Source: A. Karatnycky, ‘The 2001 Freedom House Survey’, Journal of
Democracy (2002), 13:1, 108–9; GNP estimates from CIA, The World
Factbook 2002, at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
democratization – in South Korea, where military rule has
given way to transfers of power via the ballot box as an
accepted feature of political life; in Outer Mongolia, which
has moved from authoritarian to ‘free’ as a result of the
end of communist party rule and the election of the Demo-
cratic Union Coalition in 1996; in Indonesia, which while
still only partially free and retaining considerable author-
itarianism has nevertheless moved to partially free; and
in the Philippines and Thailand, which have moved from
partially free to free; and perhaps most notably in Taiwan,
which saw the end of martial law and a transition from
Guomindang single-party rule to the presidency of the
Democratic Progressive Party’s Chen Shui-bian in little over
a decade.
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But before we proclaim the end of history and applaud the
transition to democracy, we should consider at least three
other sets of states in the region. At the other extreme from
Japan, the rigidly authoritarian states of Burma and North
Korea remain, perhaps more than any other states in the
world, as impervious to the international system as can
be today. A second set of authoritarian states is found in
the residual communist party states of Laos, Vietnam and
China, where political and social freedom remained strictly
restrained despite increased economic freedom as a result
of marketization and the retreat from socialism. A third
set, on its own, is Singapore, where the electoral system
should not be allowed to disguise a limited franchise, and
strict state controls over social freedom. Finally, there is a
set of regional states that have moved away from freedom
and democratization. For example, Cambodia, which has
tightened authoritarian rule despite partial freedom status
in the mid-1990s; and Malaysia, which has moved from
free in 1972 to partially free today. We should perhaps also
include here Hong Kong, which while never having had a
full and free franchise, has seen even limited democratiza-
tion circumscribed by the reversion to Chinese sovereignty
in 1997.
There has been no single wave of democratization in
Asia, then. Though it is possible to draw comparisons from
the similar processes in the transition from military rule in
South Korea and Taiwan (Wu 1998; Potter 1996) – which
have both occurred in the context of relations with the US
and relations with rival regimes to the north – discerning
region-wide patterns is not so much problematic as impos-
sible. It is possible, of course, to provide in a chapter of this
sort a short potted tour of democratization (and the lack of
it) in each state – but that would be unsatisfactory. Instead,
the chapter seeks to draw out conceptual and methodolo-
gical issues in considering democratization in Asia – issues
that will vary in importance and relevance in each regional
state. At its heart is a concern with avoiding concept stretch-
ing – with avoiding the pitfall of seeing something that is
familiar in the context of democratization and assuming that
it functions in the same way in Asia (and indeed in other
areas of the world) as it does in the West.
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Asian values and the politics of rejection: what Asia isn’t
A clear notion of what East Asia means in terms of studies
of democratization in large part emerges from the ‘Asian
values’ debate, which in itself has been spurred by
Huntington’s (1996) notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’. The
idea that there are a set of Asian values that are effectively
different from Western traditions has some attraction –
attraction in the West, as it makes Asia easier to bracket as
‘different’, and attraction in some parts of Asia at least, as
it provides a partial justification for the authoritarian nature
of many Asian regimes, and for infringements on human
rights in several of them.
The argument for a concept of Asian values can be sim-
plified in a very straightforward way. Asian societies, it is
argued, have developed on a very different trajectory from
those in the West, and have different philosophical and/or
historical cultural roots. In the West, the emergence of
democracy and notions of rights were largely devised to
provide a bulwark for the individual from the state. And
democracy, as practised in the West, now takes place in the
context of post-industrialized societies with well-established
procedures and norms for the conduct of political life.
In Asia, by contrast, the roots of the contemporary system
are very different. For example, the traditional Confucian
concept of society (which predominated in China, Korea
and, to a lesser extent, Japan) was one based on harmony
and unity between state and people – the idea of creating
a bulwark against the state was anathema, as state and
society should be one. Where a discourse on rights existed,
it was largely conducted in terms of collective rights, where
the interests of the collective – be that collective the family,
the state, or even socialism – were far more important than
those of any individual (Weatherley 1999).
In considering a truly comparative study of democratiza-
tion, there should be sympathy for the understanding that
democracy and democratization are culturally, historically
and politically embedded. But the idea that there is a single
set of ‘Asian values’ that provides a lens through which
we study democracy in East Asia should be treated with
considerable scepticism. In some respects, the concept helps
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our understanding by establishing a notion of the ‘other’ in
which Asian debates over democracy take place. The concept
of Asia that the Asian values debate promotes is a rejec-
tionist one – what is shared is a rejection of the imposition
of what is considered to be a ‘Western’ concept of politics
and polity that has developed and emerged in specific West-
ern contexts that are not applicable to Asia. This under-
standing is also reflected in other realms of politics – for
example, a rejection of the neo-liberal ‘Western’ economic
policies as embodied in the policies of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Word Trade Organization
(WTO), and a rejection by some of the post-industrialized
and seemingly unfair environmental strategies pursued by
many Western states.
This rejectionist stance is perhaps best embodied by at-
tempts to create a cognitive understanding of a region called
‘East Asia’. This understanding is largely predicated on a
rejection of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)
definition of a region that includes not only the Asian states
of Asia, but also the Australasian states, and those states
on the Pacific seaboard of the Americas. The proposals
of the then Malaysian premier Mohammed Mahathir to
establish an East Asian Economic grouping (now formally
the East Asian Economic Caucus within APEC) is a good
example of defining a region by what it is not (Higgott and
Stubbs 1995). So too was the impulse to decide on an Asian
entity that would negotiate with the European Union in
the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) process, which perhaps
for the first time forced ‘Asia’ to decide what it was – and
in the process, rejected both the Indian sub-continent and
Australasia as comprised in Asia.
So what the Asian values debate helps clarify is what
Asia is not – it is not the advanced industrialized and demo-
cratized West. It is also framed by a world-view in many
Asian governmental elites that is suspicious of the motives
of the West in trying to condition developments in the
region. And in many cases, the West is synonymous with
the United States; and for many regional critics of global-
ization, it is nothing more than Americanization. But while
it might help us understand what Asia is not – what it
rejects – it does not help us understand what Asia is. On one
level, the concept that there is a single set of Asian values
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that spans the entire region obfuscates more than it clarifies.
At worst, it leans towards an assessment of democratiza-
tion in the region that treats it as a single entity, rather than
reflecting the immense diversity that exists.
On another level, the search for explanations in tradi-
tional Asian values can be rather problematic. For example,
in searching for the roots of liberal thoughts in Confucian-
ism, Goldman (1994) concludes that the basic tenets of
Confucianism are not necessarily incongruent with concepts
of human rights. This may indeed be true, and Sen (1997)
has argued forcefully against the Asian values concept as
a justification for authoritarianism. But in some respects,
searching for the roots of contemporary authoritarianism or
contemporary democracy in The Analects is akin to search-
ing for the roots of democracy in Britain in the belief sys-
tems of the Druids. In the intervening years, the structure
of state power in China and in other states has done much
to shape the way in which traditional ideas have become
transformed into contemporary state systems. So rather than
emphasize too strongly the historical philosophical roots of
contemporary policy and intellectual discourse, it is worth
turning to other factors that should inform the way in which
we study contemporary democratization in East Asia, and
which, in turn, could help us understand some of the pre-
conditions upon which studies of democratization in the
West are constructed.
The comparative method and democratization
First, we should simply not ignore the fact that comparat-
ive analyses need to take care when they decide on the unit
of comparison. Taking democracy in the West as our bench-
mark could lead to a tendency to compare other parts of the
world now with democracy in the West now. I suggest that
this can lead to a false set of comparisons, and we should
rather consider the correct temporal comparison. The emer-
gence of democracy in the West was a slow and protracted
evolutionary process. So too was the Western industrial
revolution. Analyses of democratization and human rights
in, for example, the United Kingdom during the industrial
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revolution would not necessarily generate favourable com-
parisons with the situation in the UK today. Accordingly,
and in keeping with the general orientation of this book,
we should consider comparison between comparable pro-
cesses of democratization qua processes, accepting that the
experience in the West at similar phases of the national
and industrial revolutions might generate sounder founda-
tions for comparison than judging unlike with unlike within
an arbitrarily chosen common temporal framework.
We have noted above the disparities that exist within
Asia – ranging from the relatively liberal political and eco-
nomic system of Japan to the authoritarian (by any com-
parison) Burmese system. Leaving aside the most ‘advanced’
industrialized economies of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and
ignoring the rather strange anomalies of city states like
Singapore and Hong Kong, gives us a situation where three
key transitions have yet to take place in much of Asia –
economic revolution, national revolution and a Polanyiesque
great transformation (after Polanyi 1944).1
First, we need to recognize that economic underdevelop-
ment remains the major context for politics in much of the
region. We must not be too heavily influenced by the growth
rates recorded by many Asian states in the last two decades
– if you produce one tractor one year, and two the next, you
register a growth rate of 100 per cent, but still have only
three tractors. For example, despite near-double-digit growth
rates in China for two decades, and the fact that the sheer
size of the country generates an enormous Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), per capita GDP is still below Russia’s –
widely considered to be the stock negative comparison in
terms of economic fortunes in the transition from socialism.
And of course, in 1997, the Asian financial crises placed
a new dimension on this issue of economic development.
On one level, the crises promoted the importance of demo-
cratization, in terms of a reaction against the ‘crony capital-
ism’ that some argued had at least contributed to the crises
(Wei and Dievers 2000). Crises and economic recession
in many regional states impacted on the newly expanded
middle classes, who had been the beneficiaries of the pre-
crises boom. It is from within these groups that many of
the pressures for change now emanate in Thailand, Indonesia
and Malaysia. Similar pressures from the middle class can
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be observed in Hong Kong, where the educated middle
classes are feeling the impact of economic recession for the
first time in generations. Business elites too have been forced
to rethink their position and their relationship with the
state as a result of the crises – indeed, in Thailand a repres-
entative of the business elite was elected to lead the coun-
try. Rather than allow politicians to run the country on
their behalf, the Thai elites appear to have decided to run it
themselves!
There have also been uncertain or ambivalent conse-
quences of crisis. Hewison (2001) notes that in Thailand
there has been a turn towards local identities and localism
as a response to national crisis. Such localism could pro-
vide the basis for a more participatory democratization at
the grass-roots level. But it is also predicated on a concern
that Thai culture is under attack from the agencies of inter-
national capitalism in the shape of World Bank and IMF
recovery projects – projects that ‘impose’ alien Western val-
ues and practices. In this respect, nationalism as a response
to crises has been an important political change in three
main ways, as state elites have tried to turn the blame for
crises away from themselves and on to ‘outside’ groups.
First, the blame for the crises has been placed on foreign
banks and investors, who moved their portfolios out of the
region at speed, triggering financial chaos. Second, with the
support of state elites, it has reinforced the rejectionist stance
towards the West detailed above. Third, and again with
the support of state elites, most notably in Indonesia, it has
generated a wave of ethnic violence against minority groups
– particularly the overseas Chinese.
For observers it is easy to point to the role of the state
in attempting to deflect criticism for their own actions or
inactions – and to an extent this is a valid argument. But
we should not simply ignore the real concerns of many
within the region – real concerns on one level that the West
is imposing its values on countries with different historical,
philosophical, cultural and political roots. But also real con-
cerns that this thing called globalization is really impinging
on sovereignty, or political self-determination. What point
is there in voting for one party or another if the fundamental
economic strategy of whichever government is elected is
shaped by the IMF and the World Bank, or by the investment
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and disinvestment strategies of major external corporations
and investment brokers? In this respect, there is a real feel-
ing of disempowerment amongst many in the region, and a
concern that globalization has resulted in a ‘democratic
deficit’ – particularly amongst many in the intellectual com-
munity, as is perhaps best articulated by the work produced
in connection with the ‘Focus on the Global South’.2
Finally, the crises have impacted hardest on rural farmers
and the urban working classes – many of whom are now the
urban unemployed. These groups are the least represented
in democratic politics, both in terms of formal political
parties and organizations, and in terms of participation in
pressure groups and civil society organizations. While they
were perhaps never particularly well represented in many
regional states, their under-representation now at a time
when they need it more than ever is an important con-
sideration in democratic politics.
Of course, it is entirely right and justifiable to consider
the growth of civil society as an indicator of democratiza-
tion and progress. But in doing so, we should not ignore
the issue of the balance of representation and the extent
to which democratization permeates all sectors of society.
I suggest, then, that much of the activity of civil society in
the region represents the interests of the middle classes –
perhaps even over-represents those interests, while business
elites retain an even stronger access to the political process
and the representation of interest. A key challenge that
remains is to ensure that democracy becomes more inclu-
sive, more participatory, and more representative of the
interests of those who may not be formally disenfranchised,
but are often largely excluded from the political process.
We should remember that the national revolution in many
Asian states is incomplete. Or at the very least, the pro-
cesses of nation-building and state consolidation in many
Asian states are still ongoing. The concept of a Vietnamese
nation, for example, is still relatively new by historical
standards, and largely a consequence of the dual processes
of colonization and decolonization. Indonesia, as a political
entity, has been challenged by the secession of East Timor,
raising the fear in some (and hope in others) that the Indo-
nesian state may further fragment into ethnically defined
nation-states. And in Korea and China, there is the spectre
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of rival regimes claiming (though not always reciprocally)
jurisdiction over a disputed national entity. Without a clear
understanding of what constitutes the demos, constructing
democracy is inherently problematic.
This immature realization of nationhood and statehood
is often explained in terms of the end of the Cold War. And
indeed, the end of the Cold War has played a key role. But
in many respects, these issues are pre-Cold War in nature
and owe much to the incomplete process of decoloniza-
tion and nation-building that the onset of the Cold War
interrupted.
Ethnic tensions – often closely related to this incomplete
national revolution – also impinge on the evolution of demo-
cracy. The ethnic tensions that emerged during the financial
crises, most notably in Indonesia, have already been men-
tioned. But even in more peaceful ‘normal’ times, resentment
at the control of political power by dominant ethnic groups
in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, to name but three,
undermines the legitimacy of the democratic polity.
But perhaps most fundamentally, we need to revisit the
question of the way in which we study democratization and
the basic premises on which many analyses are made. Take
as a starting-point the classic text by Polanyi (1944). Almost
implicitly, many studies of democratization assume the
‘great transformation’ as a given. The separation of public
and private, of state and market, that occurred in Europe
and other industrialized democracies established the basis
of an understanding of the relationship between the state and
non-state in which conceptions of democratization largely
exist. In particular, when moving beyond an over-simple
equation of elections with democracy, this separation of
public and private becomes an essential component for
understanding the state–society relationship.
But in reality, it was the ‘great transformation’ of indus-
trialization in Europe in the nineteenth century that marked
the ‘singular departure’ from the dominant norm by creat-
ing the institutional separation of society into an economic
and a political sphere. For large parts of the world – not just
in Asia – this transformation has not taken place, or is at
best incomplete. The most obvious examples of this lack of
separation are found in the communist party states within
the region, where the socialist system all but demanded
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state control over society and economy. But it is also evid-
ent in other states – states that at first glance might appear
to be Western-type democracies.
Van Wolferen (1990), for example, has long argued that
analysts from the ‘West’ fail to understand Japan because
they start with false assumptions. The concept of a separa-
tion between ‘public’ and ‘private’ that lies at the heart of
some investigations of political economy is, according to
van Wolferen, absent in Japan. Some have argued that this
is a consequence both of the traditional understanding of
‘economy’ in East Asia and of the way in which market
economies were established there. In Taiwan, where the
residual authoritarian Guomindang government has been
replaced through democratic elections, the former holders
of a monopoly on state power retain strong control over
key economic functions, through their ownership of large
sections of the means of production.
Should this concern us as students of democratization,
or is it an issue that we should leave for the political eco-
nomists? Perhaps the details of state control and influence
over the economy are best discussed elsewhere. But the
important point is that analytical divisions between the
national and the international, and between the political
and the economic, obstruct a more nuanced understanding
of domestic political processes and their impact on demo-
cratization in the contemporary world. As Gamble et al.
(1996: 10) argue, ‘The separation between the global and the
local no longer holds, as the new hierarchies of the global
economy cut across regional and national boundaries.’ This
being so, we should accept that a key, and neglected area
of study in analyses of democratization is the ability of the
demos to influence, through political processes, economic
policy-making that impinges on the lives of national citizens
– either through the structure of domestic political eco-
nomies, or through the influence of external ‘international’
factors. In particular, a central concern here is the ability
of those outside a narrow section of state elites and their
allies to influence policy through democratic means, and
the related question of transparency.
Robison (1988), for example, takes issue with claims that
the Indonesian system does not work effectively. The point
Robison wants to drive home is that political systems are
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designed to serve specific political interests. The Indonesian
system might not have worked as external observers thought
it should, but was in fact very successful in delivering the
fruits of economic growth to members of the Indonesian
elite. In particular, the politico-economic system was con-
structed to ensure that former President Suharto’s family
utilized political power to advance their economic status
and control.
The Indonesian system, then, was deliberately opaque,
and constructed to ensure that an elite group of insiders
utilized a linkage between political power, economic policy-
making, and state or family control over major sectors of
the economy, to deliver rewards to themselves. The title of
Harold Lasswell’s Politics: Who Gets What, When and How?
(1936) still offers an insightful starting-point for considera-
tions of how political leaders make policies designed to
benefit specific interests.
Perhaps Indonesia is an extreme case, though one that is
remarkably similar in its deliberate opaqueness to the one
that is emerging in China, as the transition from socialism
creates a similar close relationship between elite policy-
makers and the beneficiaries of those policies (many of
whom emerge from within the party-state system itself).
However, even in the most ‘liberal’ – in that it looks like a
Western democratic system – democracy in the region, in
Japan, an understanding of the functioning of the domestic
political economy raises a number of questions over
the validity of deploying ‘traditional’ understandings of
democratization.
It is helpful here to consider the conception of a ‘capitalist
developmental state’ (CDS). The CDS system proved to be
remarkably successful in generating economic growth in
Japan and the newly industrialized countries (NICs) – pol-
icies that were partially emulated by later generations of
developing states in the region. For Chalmers Johnson, a key
component in this developmental strategy was the ‘relative
state autonomy’ of elite bureaucrats who planned economic
strategy (albeit in market-conforming manners) around per-
ceived national interests – politicians reign but bureaucrats
rule (Johnson 1987: 152). Irrespective of the result of demo-
cratic elections, an elite group of professional bureaucrats
made economic policy based on their conceptions of the
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national interest, unconstrained by considerations of elec-
toral popularity and insulated from the demands of societal
interest groups. The politicians could worry about getting
re-elected – in the Japanese case, by considering the inter-
ests of their local constituency rather than issues of wider
national importance – and the bureaucrats would get on
with running the economy. Thus, electors might be able to
influence local developmental issues through the democratic
process – to win a new train link with Tokyo, for example
– but the overall direction of national economic planning
continued unhindered by the inconvenience of democratic
politics.
This system was facilitated by the eradication of power-
ful interest groups at the end of the Second World War –
through, first, defeat and then the US occupation in Japan,
which resulted in the suppression of business and then
workers’ interests. The Japanese occupation in Korea resulted
in weak societal or interest groups in the new South Korea.
Meanwhile in Taiwan, similar groupings were eliminated
following the arrival of the Guomindang and with the
resulting party-state control of society and the economy. In
all three cases, the state was emboldened by proclaimed
strategies of national renewal and national mobilization to
defend the new statist entities in the face of possible com-
munist aggression in the region (Cumings 1987). And of
course, in this Cold War context, being authoritarian, but
anti-communist authoritarian, was often enough to qualify
for considerable US economic aid, and Western tolerance of
the lack of democratic forms.
In the case of Japan, the national interest was defined,
according to Johnson (1981), by a policy community that
encompassed a triad of bureaucrats, business interests and
leaders of the LDP – the hegemonic party until the 1990s.
A system of amakudari (descent from heaven) ensured
that retired bureaucrats enjoyed second careers either within
the business community or the LDP, while the industrial
bureaux of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) provided a formal framework within which business
interests could influence the conception of national inter-
est, and subsequently national economic planning.
What this means for students of democratization is
that the opaque decision-making process was difficult for
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outsiders to penetrate. Elections, pressure groups and wider
civil society had little chance to influence key economic
policy-making that obviously impinged on the lives of
national citizens. The system did not go unchallenged, as is
perhaps best exemplified by the sporadic and violent protests
in South Korea under military rule – perhaps most notably
the Kwangju Incident of May 1980. But while it delivered
significant economic growth, and as long as influential sec-
tors of the populations were rewarded in the process, then
the system was one that was at least tolerated by enough
people to ensure its continuity. Even after the initial transi-
tion to democracy – albeit ‘low intensity democracy’ (Gills,
Rocamora and Wilson 1993) in South Korea and Taiwan –
the decision-making process that created national economic
strategy remained largely not transparent, and continued to
be dominated by a relatively small group of insiders (though
not everyone agrees with this assessment).
To be sure, this system has been challenged by the finan-
cial crises that highlighted the failings of crony capitalism
– in states where transparency is not the norm, and the
relationship between state and economy remains strong.
Nevertheless, many Asian states do not have transparent
policy-making processes in the Western mould (where there
are limitations of transparency too). Thus of major import-
ance to anyone wishing to consider the real extent of
democratization in Asia should be those issues that often
would fall under the ambit of political economy perspect-
ives. It is there that, elections and the evolution of civil
society groups notwithstanding, forces affecting the ability
of the demos to influence the polis are most salient.
This also means that we should pay more attention to
the influence of external factors, and not simply to the way
that international human rights organizations, for instance,
try to press for domestic political change. Those pressures
are of course significant, not least because of the way in
which the end of the Cold War has removed a key impedi-
ment to pressures for democratic change – particularly from
the United States. But alongside those ‘traditional’ forms of
pressure we need to consider the democratic implications
of other external factors. For example, if transparency is
important in democracy, then the policy initiatives of the
IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO – all of whom call for
EAST ASIA 183
greater transparency from governments – potentially have
important implications. So too do the less overt pressures
to conform to international norms of economic activity that
largely reflect Western practices and interests. Their inten-
tion may not be explicitly to promote domestic democrat-
ization, but their consequences could have implications for
democratization.
Moreover, the hand of the state is not just evident in
the economy; judicial power – or more correctly, judicial
independence – is relatively weak in many East Asian states.
Furthermore, it can be, and is, used to prosecute political
opponents – a notable recent example being the trial of the
former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim,
for calling for reform to the authoritarian system. Accord-
ing to the likes of Human Rights Watch, the Anwar case
illustrates how, despite a prima facie legitimate judicial pro-
cess, four notable features undermine the real democratic
nature of the system: the lack of independence of judges
appointed by the government, and dependent on them for
promotion and advancement; the treatment of defence wit-
nesses and defendants; constraints on the defence’s chances
of preparing adequate responses to the frequently changing
charges; and the political atmosphere in which the trial
was taking place.
On this last issue, we should focus on the extent to
which democracy is constrained by a lack of free and plural
information. Or in other words, can democracy exist with-
out a fully informed demos? In the Malaysian case, Eng
(1999) notes that a media that was once supportive of Anwar
soon turned against him once the political atmosphere
from the national government signalled an anti-Anwar turn.
Only the relatively small Aliran Monthly, with an average
circulation of 8,000 (which doubled during the Anwar trials)
maintained a pro-Anwar stance during the trials, as other
journals responded to government pressure and mounted
a character assassination on Anwar (Eng 1999). Similarly,
in Singapore, journalistic and academic freedom are strictly
curtailed, with criticisms of the government and government
policy frequently leading to censure and the termination of
academic contracts (Rodan 2000).
Such limitations of information do not require state
ownership of media or state control of academia – though
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they clearly help. In many respects, self-censorship results
in an equally unfree and biased provision of information.
Indeed, the more successful authoritarian states probably
do not need to use heavy-handed tactics, as informal self-
censorship does the job of authoritarianism for them.
The China syndrome
At the risk of privileging the study of one regional state over
others, it is worth considering the process of, and prospects
for, democratization in China. This is partly because the
Chinese case allows us to consider what democratization is
for, and partly because it allows us to question some of the
more traditional assumptions about the relationship between
economic and political change.
First, then, we need to consider the purpose of democrat-
ization. Take as an example the introduction of competitive
elections at county levels of authority since 1998. It might
be the case that such elections allow Chinese voters to
choose representatives who are not simply the candidates
presented to them by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
And indeed, in some cases, officially sanctioned CCP can-
didates have been defeated in these elections. Of course,
critics can point to the fact that these county-level elections
have little impact on the overall distribution of power in
China – and it is a fair criticism. But even if such change
in the distribution of power does occur in the long run, my
concern here is with intentions rather than outcomes. In
inception, and like the previous experiments with local-
level elections in 1980, officially sanctioned processes of
democratization in China are not intended to pave the way
for a challenge to CCP rule, but rather to strengthen it
(Goodman 1997). For Kelliher (1997), they were based on an
understanding that the political legitimacy of the CCP in
the countryside had been eroding. Thus providing greater
degrees of self-government was a key means of rebuilding
legitimacy – not just in local governments in themselves,
but more importantly in a political system dominated by
one-party rule in general. Consequently, what might look
like a move away from single-party rule from the outside is
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conceived as a means of strengthening single-party rule by
its initiators.
A similar argument can be deployed for understanding
the growth of civil society groups in China (Howell 1998).
The original growth of civil society groups in China in the
1990s occurred because the CCP wanted to allow more
leeway for officially sanctioned groups to act as a buffer
between government and society. As with the introduction
of elections, the growth of civil society in the long run may
have unintended consequences for CCP rule. But again,
the intention was not to weaken single-party rule, but to
strengthen the legitimacy of single-party rule.
Second, the fact that China is in the process of a trans-
ition from a socialist economy and continues to enjoy im-
pressive rates of economic growth and modernization allows
us to test hypotheses formed to explain the relationship
between economic and political change (see the discus-
sion by Addison in Chapter 3). In contrast to the idea that
economic reform and material advancement will lead to
pressures for political reform from either an emerging
middle class or the increasingly abandoned working class
(or both), there are at least two possible alternative sce-
narios. For the time being, at least, rather than China’s
workers applying pressure for a more liberal political sys-
tem, much of the evidence suggests that they are a force
for conservatism. On one level, many workers, particularly
from the state-owned sector, resent the fact that market-
ization has resulted in loss of jobs and the concomitant
reduction of welfare provision. What many of them want
is the certainty and basic standards of welfare associated
with the old – not a return to the harsh days of the Cul-
tural Revolution, but instead to a time after Mao when
market reforms had been introduced, but their harsh
impact on unprofitable producers had yet to become
apparent. This seems far preferable to the uncertainty that
the new economic order now appears to offer, or the even
greater uncertainty that democratic political transforma-
tion could bring. Partly because of the example of former
communist party states elsewhere, most notably the former
Soviet Union, and partly as a result of official policy to
reinforce the message, a transition from authoritarianism
to democracy is often equated with economic decline and
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political chaos. It is not seen as a progressive and beneficial
process.
On another level, the emergence of a new entrepreneurial
class has also yet to translate into pressure for liberal demo-
cratic political reform. Indeed, many of the ‘new class’ have
emerged from within the party-state system – they have
used their positions within the political elite to create new
positions as economic elites. And for the time being, using
political power (or connections) to protect or enhance their
economic position results in, at the very least, a continued
acceptance of the established political system. At the same
time, the growth of CCP membership to around 66 million
is in large part due to emerging non-party economic elites
joining the party to protect their own positions. They want
to benefit from the connections and security offered by
being ‘part of the club’ and insure themselves against residual
suspicion directed at the role of private enterprise. As such,
there is a coalescing of new and old elites around mutually
beneficial political and economic orders.
Of course, not all new elites join the party. And ultim-
ately, the new economic elites may no longer need the
support of the party to guarantee their economic position.
It would be rash to say that pressures for political reform
and political pluralism will never emerge as a consequence
of economic growth and market reforms. However, for now
the relationship appears not to be clear-cut, and there is a
range of potential scenarios that could take precedence as
China evolves.
(Are there any) conclusions
The path of democratization has not moved smoothly in
Asia – indeed, it has not always moved in a single direc-
tion. Many regional states share similar challenges – not
least the challenge of economic recovery in the wake of the
financial crises. But the responses have been very diverse.
There is certainly no convincing evidence that a common
form of democracy is emerging across the region, nor that
democratic politics is necessarily the best or the only way
forward. As has been noted above, many people in China
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are at least prepared to tolerate political authoritarianism
if it continues to provide a context in which economic
advancement occurs.
Even in electoral systems in the region, the type of demo-
cracy that has evolved is often constrained by a lack of real
choice, a lack of real societal freedom, and state control
over sources of information and ideas. It is also constrained
by opaque decision-making systems that result from a lack
of a separation between public and private, between state
and non-state, and between state and market – distinctions
that are almost implicitly accepted as the basis for demo-
cratization in the West. Accordingly, studies of democrat-
ization in East Asia, while not ignoring ‘normal’ processes
of democratization, should also consider the importance
of political economy, and that marrying democratization
perspectives with those in international political economy
specifically offers a particularly appropriate and useful frame-
work for future analyses.
Notes
1 It is in some ways a great disservice to Polanyi (1944) to reduce the
‘Great Transformation’ to a single concept. But the key issue of relev-
ance here is his concept of how the industrial revolution fundamentally
changed the previous system, where economic relationships were em-
bedded within societal relationships. In particular, this transformation
resulted in the separation of economy activity from community-based
action, developing into a new institutional separation of politics and
economics.
2 The ‘Focus on the Global South’ can be found on www.focusweb.org.
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The European Union
alex warleigh
Democratization has suddenly become a fashionable theme
in both the practice and the study of European integration.1
Since the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1991, which
both raised the profile of the integration process and sub-
stantially extended the scope of powers enjoyed by the
European Union (EU; the Union), the Union has become far
more controversial. Received wisdom dictates that it suf-
fers from a (generally unspecified) ‘democratic deficit’, which
was scarcely noticed beforehand. Paradoxically, however,
in the last decade several attempts to render the EU more
democratic have actually been made, a good example being
the significant empowerment of the European Parliament
(EP). Moreover, the TEU made member-state nationals
EU citizens, an unprecedented step in world history, even
if EU citizenship remains rather limited. Indeed, the EU
is preparing for both further enlargement and the next
round of Treaty reform (due in 2004) by launching a process
of ‘civil dialogue’ and a quasi-constitutional convention.
These are supposed to provide suggestions about increas-
ing the legitimacy and democratic credentials of the Union
system.
This chapter explores the particularities and difficulties
of the EU’s democratization, and argues that the way for-
ward is to construct a set of democratic practices based
on deliberative democracy and active citizenship, cemented
in and reflected by institutional reform. The EU case indi-
cates much of interest to scholars of democratization in
general, as it points towards the need both for innovative
mixtures of experimentation and deliberative democracy
and to re-think the links between the ‘domestic’ and the
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‘international’. First, however, it is necessary to examine the
context in which EU democratization must be undertaken.
Framing the issue: EU democracy as a quadruple
balancing act
Democratization of the EU is a very complex and unusual
process. As a transnational system, the Union is unlikely
to be suited to the straightforward application of models
based on the nation-state, requiring instead innovations in
the theory and practice of democratic governance (Schmitter
2000). Additionally, reformers must recognize that the EU
is deeply coloured by a path dependency that affects both
the nature of the EU system and the attitudes of actors
within it about the possibilities for reform. Attempting to
make common policy in the absence of a hegemon, Union
decision-making has always been characterized by the search
for consensus between key actors in the elites at national
and EU levels, even though the elites’ composition has
changed as the inter-institutional balance of power has
evolved. Lord (1998) observes that this ‘extreme consensus
democracy’ has been at the expense of mass democracy,
which explains both how perceptions of a democratic
deficit have arisen and why the EU’s legitimacy crisis of
the last decade surprised many in positions of power. How-
ever, this culture of consensus usefully demonstrates that
the EU must in fact balance different kinds of legitimacy
and the demands of different groups of actors in order to be
democratic. Thus, although the equilibrium between these
different sources and types of legitimacy is clearly in need
of revision, it is necessary to acknowledge that the approach
itself – the instinct for balance – is both a reflection of the
EU’s own political culture and likely to remain necessary.
The first balancing act that the EU must perform is
between different competing national views of what a demo-
cratic Union would constitute. The member states con-
tinue to want different things from integration in terms of
both specific policy areas and its ultimate end-point, the
so-called finalité politique. Consequently they differ in the
degree of sovereignty they are prepared to exercise jointly
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with their partners, and also over the specific regime they
would consider legitimate to erect at EU level. Member
states may agree that a certain policy area should be an EU
competence, but differ enormously about the nature of the
legislation to be made and the constitution of the relevant
decision rules. Furthermore, there are differences in polit-
ical culture that often shape national elite responses to any
given issue, as is demonstrated most notoriously by the
diametrically opposed German and British understandings of
the term ‘federal’ (respectively a decentralized system based
on strict separation of powers and a strong rule of law,
versus a centralized superstate). Moreover, national elite
views about the desirable outcomes of the integration pro-
cess change over time. For example, Italy under Prime Min-
ister Berlusconi appears far less viscerally pro-integration
than formerly. Thus it is clear that this first balance must
be constantly revisited; no particular view has an inherently
superior legitimacy. Each state that joins the Union has
formal equality with all other member states, so there is no
a priori reason why, for example, Denmark’s reluctance to
sign up to the Schengen agreements on freedom of move-
ment is less legitimate than Belgium’s enthusiasm.2
The second balancing act is between the different levels
of governance within the EU system. The Union has not
replaced or superseded national systems, which continue
to reflect different national balances between centre and
periphery and various approaches to the welfare state; rather,
the EU has ‘fused’ with them (Wessels 1997), leaving
(sub)national governments to implement EU policy accord-
ing to national dictates. In for instance Germany, Austria,
Belgium and Spain, regional/local government is powerful,
bolstered by strong normative claims to legitimacy based
on the principle of local self-government, often enshrined
in national constitutions. As a complex and varied system
of multi-level governance the EU needs to reflect the
demands and roles of governance at local/regional, national
and European levels if it is to be legitimate. Moreover,
democratizing the Union cannot be accomplished solely at
EU level, but also requires change at (sub)national level,
given that it is through actors and institutions there that
most citizens will experience the Union as a policy-maker.
The third balancing act is between output legitimacy
and input legitimacy. Traditionally, output legitimacy has
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been preferred, in the hope that loyalties would be trans-
ferred to the Union as a result of its production of public
goods perceived to increase the general welfare. But this
approach has been insufficient for two main reasons. First,
the EU’s inability to develop the necessary redistributive
policy, the member states having refused to give it the
necessary competence and budget (despite the growth in
relative importance of EU cohesion policy). Second, the
Union’s lack of attention to public participation, which has
created, or at best done nothing to remove, a situation in
which citizens are generally alienated from the integration
process (Eurobarometer 54, Autumn 2000).3 Thus democrat-
ization will require a shift in favour of input legitimacy,
which will not be easy in the absence of a Europeanized
civil society (Warleigh 2001). However, without the emerg-
ence of a self-conscious European demos, institutional
change at EU level will not be perceived as legitimate but
rather as the imposition of a false majoritarianism unrooted
in (political) identity (Chryssochoou 2000[1998] ).
The fourth balancing act is between different normative
views of democracy. There are many different views about
how democracy can be possible in the context of the EU,
which may colour the different and changing national elite
positions on the Union’s finalité politique. However, this
issue increasingly goes beyond national cleavages at the
elite level to academic and popular debates on the best way
to develop institutions like EU citizenship or the principles
on which policy in newly-vigorous fields (such as justice
and home affairs, or security and defence) should be based.
In terms of political theory, this boils down to debates over
the most appropriate way to mix principles of cosmopolit-
anism and communitarianism, both of which are relevant
to the Union given its multi-level and ‘fused’ nature.
Particularities and difficulties: democratization in a
quixotic polity4
The novel nature of the EU – its location at an uncer-
tain and fluctuating point on a spectrum between classic
international organization and supranational federation –
means that it has numerous particularities. With regard to
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democratization, the first of these is the need to specify a
suitable comparator for analysis. As the first case of insti-
tutionalized transnational democracy, however flawed, the
EU is a paragon of legitimacy compared with traditional
international diplomacy or international organizations.
National models are unlikely to be suitable as direct com-
parators, given their dependence on a range of features
and structures that the EU does not possess (see Schmitter
2000: 15–19). In addition, unfavourable comparisons with
the nation-states may exhibit an overly rosy view of demo-
cracy in contemporary Western states, ignoring trends like
the shift to the executive and the emergence of a ‘post-
parliamentary’ system.
Given that the Union is developing in terms of its com-
petence, geographical scope, and modes of policy-making, a
further particularity is the requirement to marry democrat-
ization to a system that is rather more obviously evolution-
ary and process-based than those operating in member
states. There is an unusual clarity in the EU case of the need
to be experimental with forms of democratic governance.
Additionally – and partly as a result – the EU’s democrat-
ization process is uncommon in its blunt revelation of the
links between state power and democracy. This can be
seen in the repeated and ongoing attempts to elaborate the
principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and flexibility as
means of marrying national interest with collective need. It
can also be seen in the crude, but nonetheless instructive,
trade-off between different types of sovereignty: ‘national’
sovereignty (understood as the power of national govern-
ments), and ‘popular’ sovereignty (understood as either that
of a nation or of the collectivity of EU citizens).
A further particularity of the EU context is the failure of
most of the concerned actors to appreciate the implications
of the EU’s quixotic nature for models of democratization.
Although other models of reform have been articulated,
most strategies tend to rely to an unhelpful degree on what
can be called the ‘liberal democratic blueprint’ (LDB). This
is not to say that liberal democracy has no virtues which
could be remodelled for the EU; as Lord and Beetham (2001)
point out, certain classic features of liberal democracy are
certainly capable of such adaptation. However, the LDB,
with its emphasis on majoritarian parliamentary systems,
THE EUROPEAN UNION 193
ultimately provides a zero-sum choice about democratization
as a yes-or-no response to the question whether the EU
should become a federal state. This tends to reduce issues
of democratization to arguments about the desirability or
otherwise of federalism, which tend to be circular and incap-
able of solution. As Schmitter (2000) points out, there is a
danger that citizens: (a) equate democracy as a set of prin-
ciples and practices with one particular (albeit dominant)
democratic tradition, namely liberal democracy; (b) decide
that the EU cannot therefore be democratic on the grounds
of national sovereignty; and (c) decide that the EU is there-
fore at best an undemocratic necessity to be suffered grudg-
ingly, or at worst a system to be rejected in its entirety.
This pre-eminence of the LDB thus in fact creates the
key difficulty of democratization in the EU: the centrality
of the principle of national/state sovereignty in the debate.
Creativity is thereby stifled; moreover, the ‘Europeanization’
of civil society – necessary to create a supportive and re-
sponsive arena for institutional reform (Pérez-Díaz 1998) –
is thereby rendered more difficult. This is because citizens
often simply fail to perceive when they need to engage
with the EU to secure their objectives, as their horizons
remain predominantly national. Moreover, given the pre-
eminence of the LDB ‘frame’, they may consider that such
mobilization is impossible in the EU system. Successful
campaigning activity at EU level by non-governmental
organizations has so far failed to change this situation
(Warleigh 2001). Developing a meaningful set of common
European values and principles requires more than their
proclamation by treaty; without further popular interaction,
citizens will continue to experience those values primarily
as national phenomena.
A further difficulty is the need to address the fact that
EU democratization is part of a general reconfiguring of
the European state. Certain commentators have gone so
far as to say that the integration process actually ‘rescued’
the idea of the nation-state in western Europe by allowing
its successful rearticulation after the Second World War
(Milward 1994[1992] ). Whether or not this is true, it remains
to be seen whether the Union can do as much for the new
nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe as they accede.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the EU is both a response to,
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and a cause of, the changing form of the nation-state in
Europe. It has a similar relationship with the view that the
exercise of sovereignty is often best achieved through its
‘pooling’ – witness the euro currency. However, this means
in turn that democratization of the EU is part of a process
of re-thinking the state itself. This has had two principal
manifestations to date. First, the neoliberal tendency to use
the EU as a means of ‘rolling back the state’ at national
level while failing to reintroduce the same state controls or
functions at EU level. The success of the single European
market and the weakness of Union social policy are illus-
trative. Second, the fact that the EU has opened a Pandora’s
box in terms of centre–periphery contestation, at least in
some parts of some member states. This does not prove
that the EU must always privilege neoliberal tendencies or
lead to a ‘Europe of the regions’. However, it does demon-
strate that the EU’s democratization is all the more diffi-
cult for its impact on intra-, as well as inter-, state relations,
and its use as a means of rethinking what the state can,
or should, do. This means that support for integration can
wax and wane according to current perceptions and com-
parisons with relevant states. As an example, recall the
difficult relationship between the EU and Britain’s political
left. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Union was considered part
of a capitalist project to exploit the working classes; in the
late 1980s, when Jacques Delors led the European Commis-
sion, there was a shift towards seeing it as a potential source
of social democracy; and now, although the mainstream
of the Labour Party remains relatively pro-European, the
EU’s failure to develop its competences in social policy has
triggered a return to Euroscepticism on the left.
The way forward: towards deliberative democracy?
There are of course various positions taken about the way
forward. Communitarians often argue that EU democracy
is a contradiction in terms, given that it depends on the
existence of a demos, which can be found at national but
not ‘European’ level. Others argue in a more cosmopolitan
manner that the way out of the impasse is to apply the
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strictures of Western liberal democracy to the EU, making
it a federation and hoping that the new institutions will
cause demos-formation over time. However, most scholars
are seeking to find a way between these two extremes. For
there is an urgent need for some kind of further demo-
cratization of the Union to protect the benefits to date of
the integration process, yet no great will at elite or popular
levels to turn the EU into a state in its own right (see inter
alia Chryssochoou 2000[1998]; Schmitter 2000).
Many analysts argue that the most suitable way to address
the particularities and difficulties of democratizing the
European Union is to apply a reform model based on deliber-
ative democracy. This is because the principal problem is
the lack of a Europeanized public sphere. That reflects the
lack of a European political identity and solidarity between
member-state nationals, their status as EU citizens having
so far failed to alter significantly their sense of political
identity. At popular and elite levels, there are substantial
differences in perspective about both ‘big picture’ and more
particular policy issues. There is no real sense of com-
munity, or demos (even civically-defined) at the EU level.
Liberal democracy, with its dependence on a tightly-bound
demos and over-reliance upon representative mechanisms
that sit ill in the non-majoritarian EU context, is of limited
help. Instead of implicitly assuming the existence of an
EU political community, reformers must pay attention to
the generation of one. Deliberation is a means by which
this sense of community can be created by a process of
difference management. It is also open-ended and process-
based – which sits well with the evolutionary nature of the
European integration process.
Deliberative democracy argues that the best form of demo-
cratic governance is one in which all those affected by a
public policy engage in a process of deliberation: that is,
they exchange views, try to understand other actors’ needs
and perspectives, and thereby reach a mutually acceptable
outcome (Dryzek 2000). Thus, it is a process of constructing
a common interest by learning and mutual accommoda-
tion. It is not a process of bargaining or interest aggrega-
tion; deliberation envisages the formation of a consensus
through dialogue, not a package deal whereby actors reach
strategic accommodations through processes of log-rolling.
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To facilitate this, deliberative democracy envisages that
issues should be treated in isolation from each other. Thus,
participation is privileged over representation; the franchise
is considered not just the right to vote but rather the ability
to participate effectively in the formation of public policy,
based on principles of pluralism, free debate and mutual
recognition as political equals. Deliberative democracy thus
favours input legitimacy over output legitimacy, and as a
corollary depends on transparency and accountability, so
that those who have engaged in deliberation can ensure
that their input has been reflected in public policy (J. Cohen
1997). As a key asset in this context, deliberative democracy
expects differences to exist, and seeks to provide a mechan-
ism for actors to co-operate and build mutual understanding
despite these differences. It is a means by which community
can be built from the bottom up, and by which socialization
can occur at both popular and elite levels through active
citizenship, iterated contact, and social learning (Christiano
1997).
Further assets of deliberative democracy in the EU con-
text are its adaptability, ability to generate a culture of
voluntary compliance, and correspondence with the EU
culture of informal politics and inter-institutional dialogue
(see Dryzek 2000). Deliberation can be a means of making
decisions in every policy regime, but is capable of providing
different solutions to each issue and involving different
groups of stakeholders as appropriate. This is in keeping
with the EU, whose various competences are subject to dif-
ferent decision rules and involve many different actor sets.
The ability to generate voluntary compliance is a particular
benefit; EU policy depends on the member states (and their
subnational governments and/or agencies) to implement
policy, which leads to many gaps in the implementation
of Union legislation. If legislation came from deliberation
rather than log-rolling, the implementation deficit would
probably diminish. In terms of inter-institutional dialogue,
deliberation is of great relevance. It must be recalled that
EU policy is generated through policy networks, given the
unclear separation of powers and interdependence between
the EU institutions and national equivalents. These net-
works function best when they engender a process of mutual
understanding, such as the growing joint legislative culture
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between the EU Council and the European Parliament (EP)
that is being established as a result of the codecision pro-
cess5 (Shackleton 2000). Such networks can be long-term
or issue-specific. What matters is that they are successful
when marginal utility becomes translated into a process of
mutual understanding and collaboration.
Of course, deliberative democracy is not capable of
application to the EU in unaltered form; like any theory it
must be adapted to the real-world context. First, there is
the obvious issue of communication capacity. Deliberation
is impossible if citizens cannot understand each other. In
the EU there is no popular lingua franca, despite the grow-
ing dominance of English at elite level. This means that at
least in the medium term deliberative democracy will have
to be tempered with representative democracy (Lord and
Beetham 2001), accompanied by creative approaches to the
language issue.
Deliberative democracy is so different from conventional
liberal democratic views that citizens may simply fail to
recognize it as ‘democracy’. Others might find its uses lim-
ited; deliberative democracy is more than capable of recon-
ciling differences of principle rather than policy preference,
but even ‘sincere reasoners (may) . . . find themselves in
principled disagreements’ (Gaus 1997: 231). This means that
arbitration institutions will be necessary; deliberation will
sometimes require some form of political decision-making
institution, to be used sparingly but occupying the apex
of the system. Deliberative democrats often consider that
if no mutual accommodation can be reached the proposal
in question should fall. If this happens regularly, however,
citizens are likely to question the worth of the system, no
matter how greatly they influence it (Gaus 1997). This is
especially problematic for the EU, which does not have great
reserves of legitimacy on which to draw in extremis.
Furthermore, a well-known feature of the EU system is
its ability to produce unanticipated outcomes to policy
decisions through the intervention of opportunistic actors
(Pierson 1996); deliberative democracy would need to
reduce the potential for such outcomes to occur in order
to retain credibility (Lord and Beetham 2001). Moreover,
there are likely to be limits to the amounts of time and
resources individuals are prepared to commit to deliberation:
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‘deliberation fatigue’ is a real possibility if there are no
intermediary or representative mechanisms to channel the
fruits of deliberation into the policy-making process. How-
ever, this should not be taken to mean that uniform solu-
tions to EU problems are always necessary. Deliberation
could be a very useful means of indicating where and how
vague principles like ‘proportionality’ (the idea that the
EU should act only to the minimum extent necessary to
secure an objective), subsidiarity (whereby responsibilities
are allocated to either the (sub)national or the EU level) and
flexibility (the idea that integration need not be uniform
but may instead require differentiated structures and policy
regimes) should be operationalized (see Warleigh 2002).
Thus perhaps the chief virtue of deliberative democracy
here is its reliance upon, and signalling of the need for, a
more participatory political culture. As the EU becomes
much more clearly a process of political unification, the need
for a reform process that draws heavily on active citizenship
is clear if citizens are to be socialized into the EU system
and thereby enable it to develop in ways they consider
legitimate. The recent process of civil dialogue and the ‘con-
stitutional convention’ hold some promise in this regard.6
Conclusion: drawing lessons in democratization
from the EU
The main lessons about democratization from the EU case
should not be considered as a prescription automatically to
be applied in other cases, but more a broad-brush indication.
The initial lesson is that EU democratization must
produce a substantive rather than a Schumpeterian form of
democratic governance. Institutional aspects of democrat-
ization, while certainly in need of further attention, are
merely part of the complex problematic; indeed, a rather
greater part is the absence of a Europeanized civil society.
Without this, democratization will be impossible, for the
existence of a public sphere is what makes it possible for
institutional reform processes to deepen and resonate with
the citizens subject to it (Pérez-Díaz 1998). However, in the
EU’s case this represents a particular challenge: civil society
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must ‘Europeanize’ (i.e. take on a specific EU rather than
narrowly national element) in a context of a sustained
legitimacy crisis and evidence of popular disaffection.
The second lesson is that deliberative democracy has a
vital role to play in aiding this process of democratization-
via-civil-society-Europeanization. Deliberative democracy
places its emphasis on participation and input legitimacy.
This is precisely the prescription needed by the contem-
porary EU, even if the nature of the Union as a polity places
limits on the extent to which ‘pure’ deliberative democracy
can be applied. Democratizing the EU requires the success-
ful execution of a quadruple balancing act in which various
sets of interests are entered into a process of dialogue and
equilibrium generation. This should be conceived as a pro-
cess that requires experimentation and creativity. The EU
is an evolving polity, whose final contours are not yet clear
and which appears to be subject to increasing differentia-
tion in terms of its policy regimes and decision-making
modes, as well as both its member states and their nation-
als. The struggle to democratize the EU is thus likely to be
ongoing, perhaps requiring application of the deliberative
method in different ways in order to reflect the changing
status and composition of the Union and its citizenry.
The third lesson follows logically: it speaks to the need
to reconsider the links between the ‘domestic’ and the
‘international’. The EU is a particularly ‘deep’ form of
regional integration. As such it reflects with great clarity
a more general trend in contemporary politics, in which,
thanks to globalization and interdependence, it is difficult
to separate issues of domestic democratization from others
like ‘global justice’ or ‘ethical foreign policy’. In EU mem-
ber states, national reform is restricted to some extent by
EU norms such as the (albeit challenged) primacy of EU law.
For the EU as a whole, democratization involves issues of
political identity construction. These offer a laboratory for
the study of how different communities can become part of
a collective political culture.
Finally, and optimistically, the EU case suggests that
democratization is a difficult, rather than an impossible,
project. The Union has by no means succeeded in meeting
all the challenges posed by its ‘democratic deficit’. However,
the latter crisis has acted as a catalyst for thought about
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why democracy matters, and how it can best be reconfigured,
in the EU. This thought increasingly points towards the
need for creative solutions and the adaptation of existing
theories and practices of democracy to a contemporary con-
text characterized by increased societal pluralism and a more
diffuse system for the exercise of public power. Innovation
is the key to democratization of the European Union. So
perhaps the main lesson to be drawn here is that democr-
atization is possible, but only if we are prepared to think
‘outside the box’.
Notes
1 EU studies have taken a ‘normative turn’ in recent years. This is, first,
a response to the perceived democratic deficit and the official attention
that has begun to receive. Secondly, it reflects trends within EU integra-
tion theory, which has been going through a period of revision and
reflexive thought combining normative with meta-theoretical issues.
Thirdly, it follows increased interest from scholars outside the interna-
tional relations and political science traditions, alerted by the Treaty on
European Union to the EU as a polity-in-the-making and investigating it
as a novel site of democratization.
2 These agreements were made on an extra-treaty basis in 1985, and
incorporated into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam (agreed 1997;
ratified 1999).
3 Eurobarometer under the aegis of the European Commission regularly
samples citizens’ opinions from all member states.
4 Some of these particularities are described as part of the ‘quadruple
balancing act’ and are thus not revisited here.
5 Codecision is one of the three principal legislative procedures of the EU,
which vary in the degree of power granted to the EP. Codecision gives
the EP the right to both amend and veto legislation, making it the
legislative equal of the EU Council.
6 The Convention on the Future of Europe was established in September
2001 by the EU member states’ heads of government. The members of
the Convention represented the member states’ heads of government,
but also the various national parliaments, the European Parliament and
the European Commission. Their task was to deliberate on four specific
issues (the separation of powers between the EU and national levels; the
simplification of the various EU treaties; the status of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, which had been ‘attached’ to the Treaties by the
Nice Treaty of 2001; and the role of national parliaments in the EU
system). To that end, the Convention produced a Draft Constitution for
the EU, on which the subsequent round of EU Treaty Reform (to take
place in late 2003–early 2004) is based.
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Latin America
george philip
It is possible to argue that Latin America is no more than
a geographical expression, and that, rather than trying to
generalize across a range of different countries, we need to
focus on the history of the individual republics. Certainly
there are significant differences within the region, and path
dependency is a factor in determining particular political
outcomes. However, there are important similarities within
the region as well. All Latin American political systems are
presidential. No Latin American country has achieved a
genuine ‘first world’ standard of living. Social inequality
within the region is very high. Despite widespread poverty,
most Latin Americans live in cities, and enjoy near-‘first
world’ life expectancies. There are also similarities in reli-
gious tradition, legal system and language. The Latin Amer-
ican republics are also significantly influenced by the policies
and outlook of the United States – almost completely so
in the case of the small Central American republics, and
significantly so in the countries of South America.
This discussion adopts a ‘broad picture’ approach to dis-
cuss efforts to conceptualize democracy and democratization
in the region as a whole. Some common trends throughout
the region as a whole make it plausible to do this. Toward
the end of the 1970s, the vast majority of Latin American
republics were under authoritarian rule. Now the vast
majority have democratized. Some countries democratized
much earlier than others, but Latin America can be in-
cluded in the ‘third wave’ of democratic transition that also
occurred in eastern Europe and some parts of Africa and
Asia (Huntington 1991). In the 1980s, therefore, there was a
significant literature on transitions to democracy, with a
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good deal of discussion of pacts and the general tactics of
democratization.
The region as a whole also suffered from a severe eco-
nomic setback, following the foreign debt crisis of 1982.
Even today it has not fully recovered from the resulting
problems, with the result that the region’s record of strongly
positive growth during 1945–82 was followed by a much
more disappointing performance during 1982–2002. Dis-
cussions of political economy were inevitably dominated
during the 1980s by issues concerning debt and economic
stabilization. Later, when most countries in the region
adopted market reforms, these became the main focus of
discussion. Today this kind of approach has evolved into
a literature on the relationship to be expected between
market-oriented reform (or globalization) and democracy.
The tone of the literature has become notably more pessim-
istic over the past few years.
If we abstract from economic issues (which is hard to
do), then a positive case can be made for the consequences
of democratization. The Latin American state now is
responsible for far fewer abuses of human rights than it was
in the authoritarian past. Violence against the person has
probably diminished by less, owing to what most observers
agree has been an increase in organized crime since the
early 1980s. Some civil conflicts, notably those in Central
America, have come to an end under the impact of demo-
cratization. However, other civil conflicts, most notably in
Colombia, have continued and perhaps intensified under
democracy. Even so, it is possible to argue that democracy
has made Latin America more peaceful than it once was.
Politics has also become much more inclusionary. The
emergence into active politics of indigenous organizations,
especially in Bolivia, Ecuador and – most dramatically of
all – southern Mexico is one of many possible examples.
In the end, though, there is no getting away from the
fact that economic progress under democracy has been dis-
appointing, thus far at least. Furthermore, democracy itself
has not operated particularly smoothly. There have been
many constitutional crises, more in some countries than
others. Ecuador saw the removal of one president by congress
for ‘mental instability’ in 1997 and the enforced resignation
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of another president in 2000 owing to military intervention.
The current president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, was
largely unknown to the general public when as Colonel
Chávez he led a coup attempt against a democratically-
elected government in February 1992. This did not stop
him being elected to the presidency in 1998. Peru’s Alberto
Fujimori, though democratically elected in 1990 and 1995,
looked to be on the point of imposing a kind of full-scale
authoritarianism when he finally lost power in 2000.
Argentina saw a sequence of economic disasters, riots and
dramatic presidential resignations late in 2001.
It is true that some countries of the region have endured
much less political turbulence than others. However, it is
not easy to devise general hypotheses to explain why some
countries should have had more problems than others, except
for the fact of greater United States influence in Central
America and the Caribbean than further south. Levels of
development within the region do not seem to relate to
anything much. Argentina has one of the highest levels of
per capita income in the region, but suffered severe polit-
ical problems during 2001–2. The durability of electoral
democracy is also not easy to generalize. Venezuela and
Colombia have been free of overt authoritarian government
since the 1950s, but the first elected a former coup leader
to the presidency and the second is suffering from what
seems like an interminable civil war. The experience of
democratic rupture has been varied too. Chile has had fewer
political upheavals and more policy successes than most
democratic countries in the region; but the Chilean trans-
ition was for a long time the most constrained, owing to the
continuing role of its previous president, General Pinochet.
Only Pinochet’s arrest in London in October 1998 com-
pletely punctured the threat of a military veto. Whatever
may have explained Chile’s relatively successful transition
in the 1990s, it was not any kind of dramatic rupture with
the past. Yet Peru, where there has also been substantial
continuity between military and democratic government,
is one of the most politically troubled cases in the whole
region. There probably is a relationship between marked
cyclical economic decline and political crisis; but that
observation is not particularly remarkable.
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The issue of democratic consolidation in Latin America
What has, therefore, to be explained is a rather ambiguous
outcome. Democracy has indeed survived in the region,
despite policy problems and political crises. However, the
policy problems and political crises that might eventually
threaten democracy and are already reducing its benefits
have not gone away. The concept of democratic consolida-
tion, or more precisely non-consolidation, seems helpful
in this regard. There is a considerable literature on demo-
cratic consolidation in Latin America, but (like the subject-
matter itself) it is ambiguous. According to some definitions,
Latin America is mostly made up of consolidated demo-
cracies. According to other definitions, including the one
preferred by this author, this is not the case. Either way, we
have to try to explain how democracy has survived without
being consolidated or alternatively how it has remained
consolidated (by virtue of its survival) despite many prob-
lems with its operation.
At least four different ideas or approaches can be de-
tected in the literature on democratic consolidation in Latin
America. They are, first, the game-theoretical idea; second,
longevity; third, legitimacy; fourth, the ‘checklist’ approach.
Take each in turn. The game-theoretical idea considers a
democracy to be a set of rules and adopts rational choice
techniques to discuss both rule-making and participatory
strategies. Przeworski’s (1991: 26) famous claim that ‘demo-
cracy becomes consolidated when under particular political
and economic conditions a particular set of institutions
becomes the only game in town’ precisely uses the word
‘game’. Przeworski’s point is that consolidated democracy
can be analysed as a system because political actors can be
relied upon to follow the established rules. This happens
when it becomes in the interest of all parties to accept the
constraints of the democratic process. Failure to do this in
a consolidated democracy is less a threat to democracy than
evidence of irrationality and self-destructiveness. This need
not mean that every political actor obeys all the rules all the
time, but it does mean that successful rule-breaking requires
concealment. It is bad news for a politician in a consolidated
democracy to be found with his hand in the till.
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Few Latin American democracies are fully consolidated
according to Przeworski’s criterion. There are many cases in
which politicians who are openly corrupt and barely trouble
to deny it have won important elections. More important
still, open defiance of the national constitution by figures
such as Chávez, Fujimori and the Peronist majority in the
Argentine congress (which in December 2001 effectively
forced President de la Rúa’s resignation though it had no
official power to do this) has often worked. It is not at all
obvious in Latin America that political actors improve their
chances of success by obeying the rules of the game. It
happens much more often that cynics prosper, while those
who observe the rules finish last.
On Przeworski’s definition few Latin American demo-
cracies are consolidated. Instead of the institutionalization
of uncertainty, there is ‘law of the jungle’ politics. A pure
Hobbesian logic (after Thomas Hobbes, 1588–1679) indicates
that a failure to institutionalize democracy would lead to
the breakdown of democracy and the imposition of govern-
ment by force. However, although this did indeed happen
many times in the region prior to 1980, it has not really
happened since. Empirically, non-consolidated democracies
in Latin America do not tend to break down, but instead
stagger on from crisis to crisis. Latin American democracies,
therefore, are non-consolidated in Przeworski’s sense, but
they are stable in a much broader and possibly more eclectic
sense. The question is why?
A second approach to consolidation, following O’Donnell
(1996) and Schedler (1998), is to regard consolidation as
longevity. A consolidated democracy is a democracy that
does not break down. However, the notion is otherwise
tautologous unless it implies that longevity is itself a factor
that sustains democracy. The problem with the longevity
argument is that it has not worked well in the region. We
have already noted that Colombia and Venezuela, counties
that have held contested elections for many years, have
very problematic democracies. Moreover, during the 1970s
authoritarian governments took power in some countries,
most notably Uruguay and Chile, in which democracy had
in earlier times appeared fully established. In both of those
countries the appearance of stability gave way to crisis and
democratic breakdown. The problem of democratic stability
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has not gone away since 1980, but democratic instability has
not thus far led to democratic breakdown. That is a signific-
ant difference, and one that needs more explanation.
There is more to say about the notion of consolidation
as longevity; but we now turn to the third approach, exem-
plified by Diamond (1999) and Lagos (1997) among others.
These authors draw on public opinion surveys, which have
become increasingly sophisticated during the past decade.
Their core concept of consolidation is based on Lipset’s
earlier (1983) claim that legitimacy and efficiency are keys
to the stability of democracies. Public opinion surveys
routinely measure popular preference for democracy and
popular satisfaction with the performance of democratic
systems. Until recently, most Latin American samples
expressed fairly strong preferences for democracy, but much
less satisfaction with the performances of their political
systems and institutions generally. According to the notion
of consolidation as legitimacy, one could regard a country
as democratically consolidated if the vast majority of its
citizens preferred democracy as their system of government.
This is obviously an important political fact in itself, and
it is also a fact with explanatory potential. If most people
want democracy, then it is likely that they will vote for
democrats and against anti-democrats. This might not be
enough to stop a hypothetical group of committed author-
itarians from seeking or retaining power, but it should
certainly reduce their chances.
There are, though, two reservations worth making. First,
as noted, the surveys showing popular support for democracy
as a concept do not show anything like the same kind of
support for democracy as a set of institutions. On the con-
trary, there is often a deep-rooted cynicism about the work-
ings of congress, the judiciary, the police, the presidency and
the political parties. This outlook can easily translate into
a situation where, although democracy may be the only
political concept in town, the legal rules are not the only
rules. When Fujimori closed the Peruvian congress by force,
his popularity went up. The resulting situation is a complex
one. Plebiscitary democracy is not stable democracy. Mass
support can produce precisely those increasing returns to
power that are most dangerous for democratic stability. What
is to stop this from happening in Latin America?
LATIN AMERICA 207
Earlier in the 1990s some political scientists expressed
the fear that what O’Donnell (1994) referred to as ‘delegative
democracy’ (that is, elective dictatorship) might become
common in the region. This has not really happened. In
part the reason may be that Latin American publics are
capable of recognizing some political leaders as excessively
authoritarian, and reacting against them. This is clearly
what happened to Fujimori in 2000. However, not every
rule-breaker or aspiring dictator is necessarily going to be
inhibited by fear of unpopularity. There seem to be complex
institutional reasons preventing ambitious political leaders
from using a temporary burst of popularity as a means of
overthrowing democratic institutions altogether. A positive
popular orientation toward democracy, unless expressed
in terms of specific support for a particular set of institu-
tions, may not be sufficient guarantee of the stability of a
democratic system. There is therefore something further to
explain that cannot be explained by popular orientations
toward democracy alone.
The other reservation is that public opinion is capable of
changing over time. The most recent surveys (for example,
in The Economist 26 July 2001) have shown a marked
decline in popular support for democracy across much of
Latin America. When asked whether authoritarian govern-
ment could under certain circumstances be preferable to
democracy, a majority of respondents in 2001 still said ‘no’,
except in the single case of Paraguay. However, the very
wide margins of approval given to democracy in 1996 and
1997 are starting to reduce. Almost certainly this can be
attributed to worsening economic circumstances.
Again, there is more that can be said about the notion
of consolidation as legitimacy; but this is a good place to
introduce the fourth approach to democratic consolidation,
which is associated with Linz and Stepan (1996). Their
argument is complex, but best known for attempting to
develop a ‘checklist’ approach to democratic consolidation.
In other words, a democracy is consolidated if it is organized
in accordance with some general principles (laid down by
political scientists) of what democracy should be. Linz
and Stepan refer to five arenas of contestation: the political,
administrative, legal, social, and economic. There must be
free and fair elections, a Weberian civil service governed by
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a concept of state impartiality, an effective and impartial
rule of law, interest group participation in the context of an
active civil society, and respect for property rights.
Linz and Stepan, like Diamond, seek empirical indicators
of democratic consolidation; but those of Linz and Stepan
are empirically far more demanding. Diamond and others
look largely at the state of public opinion – information
that can in principle be acquired in a self-contained way.
In contrast, Linz and Stepan pay more attention to a whole
series of empirical conditions that, they believe, are likely
to underlie the state of public opinion and its orientations
toward a particular status quo. As we move from the first
(game-theoretic) to the fourth of the approaches to consoli-
dation, we move from an analytically neat but empirically
problematic approach to more and more demanding em-
pirical specifications. But can we be sure that they are the
right empirical specifications?
Questioning the approaches
All four approaches can be subjected to the key question ‘how
can we know whether a democracy is consolidated or not?’
The Przeworski test – is open violation of the democratic
process unthinkable? – cannot be verified absolutely. We
cannot be sure that public opinion plus the state authorities
will rally to the support of the democratic order under any
conceivable set of circumstances. Since we cannot know
this, we cannot confirm that any system is necessarily con-
solidated for all time. However, Przeworski’s condition of
consolidation can in principle be falsified. In fact it has been
falsified in a number of Latin American countries. If a pre-
sident closes congress and finds that his popularity has in-
creased, or if congress exceeds its authority and overthrows
an incumbent president on a pretext, then the rules of the
democratic system can no longer be regarded as the ‘only
game in town’. The problem for Latin Americanists is that we
still need some explanation of why non-consolidated demo-
cracy does not break down altogether when these things
occur. Przeworski does not really tell us why it hasn’t, though
he does suggest that the reasons for the non-breakdown of
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non-consolidated democracy are likely to be different from
the non-breakdown of consolidated democracy.
The definition of consolidation as stability over time
is also open to a rather similar objection. It is serviceable
descriptively and has the merit of being simple, but there is
no explanation. An explanation sometimes given is that
the electoral arena is privileged in Latin America, in the
sense that the electoral process is sealed off from the abuses
of the system that occur at the level of the bureaucracy,
the judiciary or civil society. However, this explanation is
empirically unconvincing. There have been many examples
of elections that have been contested, but nevertheless
influenced by rule-breaking. For example in Mexico in 2000,
the presidential candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (the PRI) received significant election funding from
the state oil monopoly Pemex. In Peru in 2000 a close ally
of President Fujimori was caught on video bribing a legislator
to change sides. In Paraguay in 1999 the president was im-
peached by congress on charges that included the murder of
the vice-president. These are clearly interferences with the
electoral process. Overall, to say that consolidated demo-
cracy is long-lived democracy risks tautology.
The idea of consolidation as legitimation has the merit
of being testable. The fact that popular orientations toward
democracy in Latin America have become more negative in
recent years may make further testing necessary. We have
discovered what is in principle a new fact, namely growing
popular disillusionment with democracy. But we have not
yet learned its significance. We have yet to establish if this
will eventually threaten democracy. However, the idea that
democratic consolidation can be judged by whether or not
the polls convey a positive message about popular attitudes
to the system still seems rather limiting. As social scientists
we presumably believe that there is some kind of relation-
ship between underlying structural realities and people’s
systems of belief.
The Linz and Stepan approach therefore has a great deal
going for it, but there are problems as well. For their criteria
for consolidation are very demanding. Taking them strictly
then, Spain (because of the violent opposition of Basque
nationalists), Northern Ireland (because of violence from
republican sympathizers) and the Old South of the United
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States (because of racism) would have to be considered non-
consolidated. The non-consolidated democracies of Latin
America would find themselves in rather distinguished
company.
The Linz and Stepan approach also involves problems of
verification. In this case, the problem has to do with the sig-
nificance of democratic non-consolidation. Even if we could
somehow abstract from problems of measurement and devise
a single scale, all we could know is how country X stood in
respect of the criteria for democratic consolidation. We could
not be absolutely sure whether this fact was significant or
not. It would not be self-evident that local public opinion
would endorse the view suggested by the criteria. Even if it
did, we cannot be sure that a negative public opinion would
fatally wound democracy (though we could be pretty sure
that it wouldn’t do it much good). For example, Linz and
Stepan themselves discover that there is significantly less
popular support for democracy in Chile than might have
been expected in view of that country’s very successful post-
1990 policy performance. The question is: why? Possibly
there is more latent popular support for the Pinochet regime
than people want to tell opinion pollsters. Certainly the arrest
of Pinochet in London was soon followed by a considerable
boost in the fortunes of the right-wing candidate for the
1999 presidential elections. The right has remained strong
in Chilean opinion polls. Idiosyncrasies of perception may
not be the whole story, but they are probably a part of it.
In the end, we have a continuing puzzle. Why have Latin
American democracies neither truly stabilized nor broken
down altogether? When trying to understand this we should
look at a range of factors. These include the opinion polls,
the historical record (which tells us that politically motiv-
ated law-breaking is nothing new in the region), and the
gap between what an idealized form of democracy should
look like and what Latin American politics actually does
look like. Then we may still want to remain agnostic about
ultimate causes, but we should at least have a reasonable
‘common sense’ understanding of the main political prob-
lems facing the region. This understanding should also help
us keep track of growing popular disillusionment that might
translate into something more sinister but has not as yet
done so.
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Institutional aspects of non-consolidation
At an institutional level, the criteria supplied by Linz and
Stepan are extremely useful. They do help to explain non-
consolidation. Most Latin American countries (Uruguay
being the only really significant exception) fill the top
positions of their state bureaucracies via patronage. It is
somewhat true that patronage criteria play a part in filling
the United States’ public bureaucracy as well, but not to
anything like the same extent. If we exclude those state
bureaucrats with tenured positions who do not show up to
work at all, the ratio of patronage to permanent appoint-
ments in Latin American bureaucracies can be as high as 1
to 12. That is vastly higher than in the United States.
In addition, judicial power is relatively weak in Latin
America. Elected presidents sometimes simply refuse to
implement the findings of the courts. Fujimori was notori-
ous for not doing this in Peru, while Argentina’s president
Eduardo Duhalde in January 2002 responded to an adverse
Supreme Court decision on his government’s economic
policies by decreeing non-implementation for 180 days.
Meanwhile, the Argentine congress set about impeaching
the Supreme Court, with whose verdict it disagreed. Other
criteria, notably those of civil society activism and a secure
institutionalization of the economic decision-making pro-
cess, also tend to show up weaknesses.
Interestingly, Linz and Stepan’s work on democratic con-
solidation has little to say about core executives, although
Linz earlier made a scathing critique of presidentialism (Linz
1994). In fact, the nature of Latin American presidentialism
may be of central importance, and although Linz’s scepti-
cism about presidentialism has been criticized in the liter-
ature there is much to be said in its support. Critics point
out, quite rightly, that presidentialism has its advantages
as well as disadvantages. Quite apart from anything else,
most Latin Americans evidently prefer presidential govern-
ment, and there is therefore no chance of introducing a fully
alternative system. Furthermore, there are many different
types of presidentialism, and quite detailed provisions relat-
ing to (say) budgetary policy can make a difference between
a system that works and one that on the whole does not.
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Finally, if there is a climate of political good will, then any
specific problems with any particular variant of president-
ialism can be dealt with by introducing reform.
However these objections do not really deal with the
main problem of presidentialism: while Latin American
presidentialism may operate within a set of formal institu-
tions that are similar to their US counterpart, these have
generally been informed by quite different concepts. US pre-
sidentialism was invented in the eighteenth century as a
means of limiting the power of the state. In contrast, Latin
American presidentialism developed a few decades later as
a means of asserting state authority. Madisonian president-
ialism (after James Madison, 1751–1836) was not and is not
the same thing as Bolivarian presidentialism (after Simon
Bolivar, ‘the Liberator’). One might roughly identify the first
with checks and balances and the second with a leadership
principle that is its antithesis.
As a result, the formal institutional system of checks-
and-balances does not really describe how Latin American
presidentialism works. There is much more of a crude battle
for power in Latin America. Even under normal political
circumstances, Latin American presidents have rights (to
decree legislation, to interpret legislation, to refuse to spend
the national budget) that do not easily fit Madisonian
notions of checks-and-balances. When presidents are power-
ful enough, they may try to close congress outright (Peru in
1992). They may develop new constitutions that reduce con-
gressional power to a minimum (Venezuela in 1999, and Peru
in 1993). Alternatively, they may try to change the rules to
permit their own re-election. In the past, the power of Latin
American presidents was generally restricted by term limits.
However since 1990 constitutions have been changed to
permit presidential re-election in Brazil, Argentina, Peru and
Venezuela. On the other hand, anti-government majorities
in congress have also shown an increased willingness to go
over on to the attack. Before 1990 presidential impeachment
was virtually unheard-of in Latin America. However, in
1992 Brazil’s Collor de Mello was impeached and removed
on corruption charges and Venezuela’s Carlos Pérez was
impeached and briefly imprisoned in 1993. In these cases
(and also with the impeachment of Raúl Cubas in Paraguay
in 1999) there can be no doubt that congress was concerned
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with criminal acts. However, in 1997 Ecuador’s Abdala
Bucaram was removed from office by congress on the ground
of mental instability, and in 2001 Argentina’s de la Rúa
was forced by congress to resign even though there was no
suggestion of corruption or mental instability.
Democratization and international involvements
Almost all the literature on democratic consolidation treats
the main issues as endogenous. But perhaps the main factors
that have prevented renewed democratic breakdown are
exogenous. This is not to deny that most Latin Americans
still want democracy; but it could still be the case that
institutional weaknesses could be exploited by manipulat-
ive authoritarian leaders. The Ecuadorian coup attempt of
January 2000 ultimately failed, though not before deposing
the president. But in acknowledging failure, the coup leaders
stated that Ecuador could not afford the international isola-
tion that a coup would create. Ironically, survey evidence
shows that a successful coup might have been popular in
Ecuador, at least in the short run.
In diplomatic terms, there is little doubt that the US
government and other international bodies prefer demo-
cracy in Latin America. In economic terms, it has generally
been believed that Latin American countries gain material
advantages from being democratic. The point is not whether
or not democracy works better in principle, but rather
that non-democracies would incur bad will in Washington,
and this would hurt their reputation in financial markets.
They would come to be regarded as political risky. It is not
entirely clear that this logic is unbreakable. The Argentine
crisis that began in 2001 has already severely damaged the
market credibility of many Latin American economies.
There is now much less hope in the region than there was
even a few years ago that market reform will bring about
sustained economic progress.
What South America does not have, and Central America
plus Mexico essentially does, is an opportunity to tie in its
future to a larger international community. There can be
little doubt that the prospect of joining the European Union
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has made a significant difference to the development of
democracy in both southern and eastern Europe. Even
Turkey, which is unlikely to join the European Union soon,
has gained considerable material benefit from its interna-
tional position. The United States could not regard the fin-
ancial bankruptcy of a strategic ally like Turkey with the
same equanimity with which it has regarded the Argentine
default and economic crisis that came to a head in 2002. It
is true that international financial institutions like the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund play a (contro-
versial) part in economic policy-making in the region. How-
ever, such involvement is no substitute for the prospect of
joining a powerful collective. Even the North American
Free Trade Agreement, which is a far looser kind of organiza-
tion than the European Union, has demonstrably influenced
the process of institutional change in Mexico.
Conclusions
Latin American countries returned to democracy sooner
than other ‘third wave’ countries in the developing world.
Latin America raises issues concerning democratic con-
solidation and might be expected to teach us more about
that aspect than can countries in, say, Africa, where the
contemporary agenda more closely resembles the trials and
tribulations of political and democratic transition. The dis-
cussion of consolidation in this chapter has moved from
a discussion considering concepts to one based more on
analysing the workings of institutions. This is a necessary
progression. It is not possible easily to understand consolid-
ation in purely conceptual terms without understanding
more of the real world to which the concept relates. How-
ever, there can be no certainty either about whether any
particular set of institutional conditions will prove to be
little more than transient obstacles to the strengthening of
democracy, or instead will ultimately make stable demo-
cracy unviable. We can, though, hope to tease out some of
the ambiguities involved both in the concept of democratic
consolidation and in the empirical realities of Latin Amer-
ican politics through the study of these countries.
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Finally, Latin America – more so than some other regions
– raises in quite a sharp way the tensions created when the
international diplomatic and ‘human rights’ community
seeks to exert influence in one direction and a business and
financial community tries to influence in a different direc-
tion. Although they both refer to such concepts as ‘good
governance’, they tend to mean different things by them.
Markets will often welcome a decisive show of political
leadership, while human rights activists may worry about
democracy being put in danger. The controversy surround-
ing the US-supported anti-drugs and anti-insurgency ‘Plan
Colombia’, in 2002, illustrates the point. Only in Mexico
and Central America is there a coherent project of institu-
tional transformation, and this (broadly speaking) means
integration with the North American economic zone and
political system. The international community as a whole
clearly matters to Latin America, but tends to send out
different messages. That, too, is a factor working against
any secure form of institutional consolidation.
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South Asia
gurharpal singh
In the theorization and general discussion of democratiza-
tion South Asia occupies a distinctive space. The region,
comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal,
Bhutan, and the Maldives, is home to 1.4 billion people
(almost 22 per cent of the world’s population), of whom
around 550 million live below the poverty line. As recent
events have demonstrated, in the popular imagination South
Asia is commonly characterized as suffering from chronic
political instability, protracted ethnic conflicts and the ever-
present threat of nuclear war. But South Asia also boasts
some of the oldest democracies in the developing world.
India remains – despite its many limitations – the premier
example, the ‘largest democracy’ in the world, and Sri Lanka,
its current difficulties notwithstanding, is a reasonably
strong contender as a viable developing democracy. Pakistan
and Bangladesh, though sharing a common ancestry, have
had prolonged periods of alternation between civilian and
military rule. And Nepal has managed a transition from
a monarchy to a parliamentary democracy. In one form or
another democratic governance in South Asia has taken
root against formidable odds, and while the post-colonial
history of these states is not one of linear progress, it would
be misleading to suggest that democratization is essentially
a short-term contemporary phenomenon.
Directly or indirectly, democratization has been central
to the study of South Asian politics over the last decade.
Coinciding with the ‘third wave’, it reflects seismic changes
within the governance of South Asian states. These changes
embrace the collapse of dominant party systems, the tran-
sition from military or monarchical regimes (Pakistan,
SOUTH ASIA 217
Bangladesh and Nepal), the rise of violent ethnic conflicts,
the social mobilization of previously excluded groups, eco-
nomic liberalization, the emergence of a vibrant civil sector,
regionalization and localization in the face of globalization,
international pressure, and domestic demands for political
reform. The old certainties that defined the post-colonial
order are fast disappearing; the new order is yet to emerge.
Transition best represents South Asian politics today, and
democratization as an overarching theme most appropri-
ately encapsulates this change.1
Key issues
Although the sheer size and diversity of the region – India
is itself of continental dimensions – defies any meaningful
generalizations, the common experience of statehood has
given rise to similar concerns in the efforts to establish
viable democracies (Jalal 1995). At the risk of a great deal
of simplicity – and violence – the most important of these
concerns as identified in the literature are: political con-
solidation; structural social change; democratic transition;
and the impact of international developments.
In the last decade much of the analysis of South Asian pol-
itics has been preoccupied with the rise of ethno-national
movements – in Kashmir, Punjab, and the North-Eastern
States, the emergence of the Hindu right (India), Sindh
(Pakistan) and the Tamil–Singhalese conflict (Sri Lanka).
Explanations of these movements have ranged from standard
accounts of political management to those that question
the very bases of political consolidation broadly understood
as both institutionalization and statehood (Singh 2000).
Inasmuch as these movements are resilient, speak the lan-
guage of ethno-nationalism and lay claim, rightly or wrongly,
to self-determination, they have magnified the failures
of South Asian states to build legitimate democracy that
commands consent freely given (Tambiah 1996). Indeed,
violent peripheral ethno-nationalist movements – and the
aggressive mainstream reaction to them – have, in large
measure, undermined ‘official’ nationalism while simultane-
ously throwing into doubt the post-colonial project in which
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nation- and state-building were envisaged as the handmaid-
ens of democracy. For some writers, this confrontation has
revealed the state-centric nature of ‘official’ nationalisms
in South Asia and the limited progress made in democratiz-
ing the state in the half century since independence (Jalal
1995). For others, ethnocracies or ethnic democracies, it is
suggested, are the more appropriate way to conceptualize
the South Asian democratic experience (Singh 2000: 35–
55). Despite these disagreements, the problems of political
consolidation are real. Whether it is the more relatively
institutionalized democracies like India or Sri Lanka or more
fragile polities in transition in Bangladesh and Nepal, the
inability to overcome permanent threats to the stability
of existing regimes has retarded the processes of consolida-
tion. At best it has made consolidation uneven and partial;
at worst a frequent prey to institutional decay, mismanage-
ment and political populism. In a region in which the under-
standing of the nation and the state is deeply contested, the
idea and practice of democracy is similarly compromised
by the inability firmly to resolve these differences in durable
constitutional designs.2
The second major trend evident in the literature is the
focus on social change as the key variable in explaining
recent developments. Epitomized in the novelist Naipaul’s
phrase as ‘a million mutinies’ (Naipaul 1990), it captures
graphically the tumultuous social mobilization of previously
quiescent classes – peasants, lower castes, the petit bour-
geoisie – who were the silent spectators during the transfers
of power from colonial rule. Modernization, urbanization,
economic liberalization and affirmative action policies have
brought these classes/groups into the political systems, and
thereby have altered fundamentally the character of exist-
ing institutions and state policies. This mobilization has
been associated with populist styles and idioms in political
life in which personalities and symbolism have replaced
effective delivery. According to Varshney (2000: 12–13),
on the other hand, the change signifies the emergence of
‘plebeian politics’ along the lines of social democracy in
Europe in the late nineteenth century. A visible transfer of
power is taking place from the upper to lower castes, from
the privileged to underprivileged and from the Western-
educated elites to ‘sons of the soil’ (Corbridge and Harriss
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2000). Such change is most apparent in the populous
northern states of the Indian Union. In Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh and Nepal ‘plebeian politics’ has also made
itself felt, though perhaps less so in terms of representation
than in generating demands upon the respective political
systems. In sum, social change is ‘reinventing’ South Asian
polities by creating new pressures for change through
gradually displacing the traditional elites who have so far
managed the post-colonial settlement.
In Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan the democratization
literature (Waseem 1996; Talbot 1999; Baral 2001) has
also been concerned with the theme of transition. While
in Pakistan the post-1988 transition suffered a dramatic
reversal in 1999, when a military coup led by General Parvez
Musharraf overthrew the government of Nahwaz Sharif,
Nepal’s transition has been disturbed by a widespread
Maoist insurgency. Bangladesh’s parliamentary democracy
remains precarious, in spite of having experienced two
alternations of power between the leading political parties.
In these three states the transition has been influenced by
the efforts of previous regimes to frame the processes of
democratization. Pakistan’s embedded ‘praetorian state’
effectively scuttled the post-1988 phase of democratization
(Waseem 2001); it is currently in the process of fashioning a
new polity that establishes a permanent status for the armed
forces. Likewise Nepal’s monarchy reluctantly conceded
parliamentary democracy in 1990, but against the backdrop
of the palace massacre (2001) and the insurgency it has
been trying to rein in politicians through the emergency
and the anti-corruption drive (Singh 2002). Bangladesh’s
difficult transition has been shaped primarily by the bitter
contest between the Awami League and the Bangladesh
National Party – an entity sponsored by the earlier military
regimes.
The impact of international developments is a recurrent
theme in the literature on democratization in South Asia
(Chadda 2000). The end of the second Cold War coincided
with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and redefined
the geopolitics of the region, which had been locked in proxy
superpower rivalries. The Soviet Union’s collapse, which
undermined the Nehruvian settlement in India, precipitat-
ing the end of centralized planning and the beginning of
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economic liberalization, created new openness in a unipolar
world. Simultaneously the development of new commun-
ications technologies eroded the strict control on political
communications that had been a characteristic feature
of South Asian states (Rajagopal 2001). Combined, these
changes generated two sets of external pressures that directly
affected democratization in the region. First, some writings
recognize that the ‘good governance agenda’ arising from
the Washington consensus has imposed prescriptive require-
ments for public policy based on accountability, transparency
and decentralization (Ahmed 2001). Sri Lanka, Bangladesh,
Pakistan and Nepal have felt the conditionality of this
agenda, particularly in dealing with the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (Singh 2002). And if India
thus far has avoided such blandishments, it is because some
of the major initiatives, such as those in the reform of local
government, have anticipated these developments in some
measure. The second area where international developments
have made a significant contribution, according to some ana-
lysts, is in creating a transnational wedge of local and inter-
national activists who have, through non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and other organizations, created a
vibrant civil society sector committed to deepening demo-
cracy and establishing international norms in such fields
as human rights, women’s rights, and environmental pro-
tection. South Asia is sometimes described as the ‘NGO
capital of the world’ (Kudva 1996:1), where social and polit-
ical conditions are ideal for non-state organizations, and all
the more so as the capacity of the state to influence social
change is undergoing serious decline.
South Asian experience and democratization
Given the range and depth of the themes currently analysed
by specialists studying democratization in South Asia, what
do these studies have most to offer a critical understanding
of democratization as process in a broader sense? There
are many empirical and theoretical lessons that cannot be
adequately covered in a short survey; but taking the region
as whole five aspects merit more detailed consideration.
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First, the overwhelming concern of analysts of demo-
cratization in South Asia regarding political consolidation
suggests a profound disquiet about the teleology of demo-
cratization. In a region in which democracy preceded nation
and state-building the challenges have been correspondingly
difficult. The experience of South Asian states – of India in
particular, it is asserted – offers a revisionist interpretation
of accounts in which state and nationhood are seen as seen
the sine qua non of effective democratization. According to
some (Chadda 2000; Kohli 2001: 1–19) the Nehruvian state
and its progeny appear to have successfully managed the
challenge of building a developing democracy while recon-
ciling a plural conception of nationhood, even if it is bitterly
contested in the peripheral regions. In Sri Lanka, too, the
consociational arrangement between Singhalese and Tamil
elites appears to have broken down only in the late 1970s
(Tambiah 1986). Moreover, if statehood and nationhood are
seen as necessary pre-requisites of effective democratiza-
tion, then Bangladesh, Nepal and, to lesser extent, post-1971
Pakistan should have been more successful in managing the
transitions. Even allowing for the fact that some readings
suggest that a ‘centralised state’ (Kohli 2001: 19) might be
the efficient secret of Indian democracy’s success, or that
the shortcomings of transitions in Bangladesh, Nepal and
Pakistan can be attributed to failures of nation- and state-
building, the South Asian experience, by and large, does not
conform to the European ideal or the experience of demo-
cratization in Southeast Asia.
Second, the problems of political consolidation that beset
most states in South Asia highlight a more basic concern
with the effectiveness of post-transition democracy: that
is, the substantive nature of democracy and its varied
experience. Political decay, de-institutionalization and
malgovernance have become the familiar lament of those
who have attempted to explain away the tenuousness of
post-transition regimes. Yet more considered responses
have sought to rework Moore’s (1981) thesis in the light of
comparative South Asian experience. In India, for instance,
the effectiveness of provincial democracy varies enormously,
with populous states like Bihar on the verge of anarchy,
while others like Kerala have become models of social
democracy. These variations, notes Heller (2000) – and the
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argument is applicable to other Indian provinces as well as
to post-transition regimes in Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan
(1988–99) – can be understood if we revisit Moore’s thesis,
paying close attention to constitutional design and the
configuration of class forces in contributing to a ‘virtuous
cycle of democratization’. Kerala’s case, Heller argues, dem-
onstrates that a hierarchical, caste-ridden society can be
transformed into one in which associational life and class
organizations flourish within a democratic culture. Indeed
‘if democracy works better today in Kerala, it is because its
citizens are active and organised and because horizontal
associations prevail over vertical (clientelistic) forms of asso-
ciation’ (Heller 2000:501). The emergence of civil society
there is not the function of elite engineering or regional
cultural tradition but the outgrowth of conflict and social
mobilization over the last half-century. In a region where
even the best models of democracy function without sub-
stantive horizontal associations, Kerala offers a salutary
counterfactual example.
Third, there is a broad consensus that within South Asia
the ‘third wave’ has coincided with ‘democratization from
below’. Whereas the ‘second wave’ was primarily elite-driven
and reflected a colonial bequest, developments since 1989
have had a greater impact in encouraging political participa-
tion and decision-making at the village level and upwards.
Institutional changes made as a result of external pressure
– or in anticipation of it – have radically transformed the
nature of local government, which had largely been left in
abeyance since decolonization. In India the 73rd Constitu-
tional Amendment Act (1993), which established panchayati
raj (village rule), with delegated funds and reservation for
backward classes/castes and women, has created a new cadre
of trained democrats in India’s 800,000 villages. Ironically,
although panchayati raj was originally intended to under-
mine the states and to centralize power in New Delhi even
further, its actual consequences have been to rework local
democracy in ways that now engage the previously excluded
and underprivileged. Reforms of local government in Bang-
ladesh and Pakistan have also had similar unintended con-
sequences by providing new structures that have unleashed
decades of frustration, though in Pakistan the current mil-
itary regime has sought to use local power to legitimize its
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rule. But perhaps the most significant impact of ‘demo-
cratization from below’ has been to foster, along with the
activities of NGOs, a transparency and accountability
culture that manifests itself in manifold forms of citizen
activism – in local movements against corruption in the
disbursement of development funds, and increasing demands
to audit government programmes. These movements have
increasingly international sponsorships, and some have been
quite successful in influencing policies at the local level.
The growing culture of democratic accountability, more
than anything, is likely to provide the firm bedrock for a
systemic transformation of governance from below in South
Asian states.
Fourth, the strength of ‘democratization from below’ in
some ways can be attributed to the impact of social move-
ments or social activism, particularly, though not exclu-
sively, since the early 1990s. Social movements have been
identified as an important component of democratization
in Latin America, but their contribution in South Asia has
tended to be overlooked because of the state-centric nature
of much of the analysis. As the effectiveness of political par-
ties at all levels has declined, social movements have begun
to take over the discursive and organizational space between
state and society (Katzenstein et al. 2001). These move-
ments, of course, vary enormously, from some whose vision
is transformative to others that are essentially single-issue
organizations. Among the most prominent are women’s,
environmental and local movements, with a variety of
agendas at the local, regional, national or international level,
often collaborating with multinational organizations and
NGOs to bring their demands to the international audience.
Some academics have interpreted the rise of the Hindu right
as a social movement that does not only seek political power,
but also aims to effect long-term social change in values
through the advocacy of Hindutva (Hinduness) (Basu 2001).
The same in a sense could be argued of other revivalist or
fundamentalist movements in other faiths. Nonetheless,
taken collectively the influence of these movements far
exceeds their numbers. Interestingly, social movements have
tended to eschew electoral politics, which have become the
arena for ‘representing and endorsing essentialised ident-
ities and institutionalising them’ (Katzenstein et al. 2001:
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269). Instead, they frequently articulate interests within
the judicial-administrative apparatus of the state primarily
because the latter is far more receptive to the demands
of interest rather than identity, and allows the state to
negotiate the diversity of interests that ‘perform a very dif-
ferent democratic function than party or electoral politics’
(Katzenstein et al. 2001: 269). If institutional sclerosis some-
times seems to typify most South Asian states, then it is in
the sphere of the social, we are informed, that the real resili-
ence of democratization is to be found. Social activism may
not always meet the threshold of institutional significance,
but in South Asia it provides an important ‘discursive space
in which new and transformative meanings are constantly
being generated’ (Katzenstein et al. 2001: 269). Such social
movements provide a crucial element of renewal and cohe-
sion, and the most promising prospects for enduring reform.
Finally, critiques of democratization have generated a
lively debate about the relevance of the process in South
Asia. Much as Marxist analysis provided a counterpoint to
modernization theory in the 1960s and 1970s, today an
equivalent intellectual space in South Asia is occupied by
post-structural analysis that combines the traditional anti-
colonial agenda with critiques of ‘Western-style’ democrat-
ization. At one level there is the frontal assault on the ‘good
governance agenda’ and its political prescription as ‘the new
political economy’, in which, it is claimed, concepts like
social capital have masked the actual appropriation – through
liberalization – of capital through the obfuscating discourse
of neoliberal economics (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2001).
At another there is a fundamental effort to interrogate key
concepts and assumptions that sustain democratization. For
instance, drawing on the experience of South Asian societies,
Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001) have highlighted how unhelp-
ful a concept like ‘civil society’ can be in understanding
the politics of developing societies. They question whether
civil society can be politically manufactured in the ways
that appear to be implicit in some of the writing on demo-
cratization and explicit in the work of multinational agen-
cies engaged in development. That this kind of engineering
might be tantamount to inflicting violence on South Asian
societies is also a point noted by Nandy (2001), a psy-
chologist turned political scientist. For him the project of
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democratization has to be located in a deeper understand-
ing of how modernity has impacted on traditional societies
through secular states. Much of the anomie present in South
Asian politics and societies, insists Nandy, is the result
of renewed searches for certainty manifest in the appeal of
Hindu, Islamic and Singhalese ‘fundamentalism’. These
uncertainties have been compounded by globalization and
economic liberalization, introducing dimensions of personal
development that are at odds with traditional precepts.
For Nandy, any meaningful understanding of such changes
cannot be structured within familiar paradigms such as mass
society: they require, above all, a recognition of the relev-
ance of indigenous knowledge systems, which are refusing
to die but are at the mercy of secularizing states. The need
to realign the cultural and the political in South Asia might
be suggestive of a ‘clash of civilizations’ in which the whole
project of representative democracy is being called into ques-
tion. But for Nandy the failure to recognize the potency of
indigenous knowledge systems and to structure political
institutions accordingly – the state, representative institu-
tions, electoral systems – is the root cause of social and
political dissonance, of schizoid political cultures that mimic
modernity while exuding xenophobic fundamentalisms.
Constraints on democratization in South Asia
There is little doubt that today democratization in South
Asia has become a multifaceted process that is both deep-
ening in its form and extending across the region. Even
when there have been recent reversals, as in Pakistan, these
setbacks have had to acknowledge the need to restore the
democratic process. Yet in a wider sense we need to be
wary of arguments that predict an ever-onward march of
democratization: in reforming or establishing new institu-
tions to meet the challenge of change, South Asian political
elites have proved quite adept at producing outcomes that
can be profoundly undemocratic. In the light of this, what
are the major constraints on democratization in the future?
As developments in Afghanistan and Kashmir have illus-
trated, the problem of political consolidation afflicts all
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South Asian states, and holds the potential to undermine
or arrest progress towards more open and participatory
regimes. Because South Asia’s ‘soft states’ cannot guarantee
territorial integrity, there is always the temptation to resort
to violence or encourage majoritarian nationalisms as
legitimizing ideologies. These weaknesses arise mainly from
the failure to evolve viable polities that combine demo-
cracy and social pluralism in ways that reject majoritarian
impulses. It may well be that we are witnessing a peaking
of the idea of homogenizing nationalism in the region, of
the idea of ‘one nation, one state’. Equally, there is suffi-
cient evidence to suggest that such a judgement is probably
premature. In India the ruling right-wing Bharatiya Janata
Party recently established a constitutional review commis-
sion with a view to assessing the efficacy of the ‘Westmin-
ster model’, a decision that its critics alleged was an attempt
to move the country towards a presidential system that
would make it more possible for the party to implement its
Hindu nationalist agenda. In Sri Lanka the externally spon-
sored peace accord aimed at resolving the Tamil insurgency
is facing increasing difficulties from parties representing
the Singhalese majority. In Nepal the parliamentary regime
and the conduct of the counter-insurgency against Maoist
guerrillas have failed to adequately recognize the extreme
social diversity of the country. In Bangladesh the newly
elected Bangladesh National Party is said to be promoting
Islamicist policies. And in Pakistan Musharraf proposed
changes to the constitution make few concessions to plural
governance. In short, with perhaps the notable exception of
some states in India, there has been remarkably little new
innovation in the shape of new forms of governance that
promote and institutionalize diversity. This major short-
coming is remarkable, given that South Asia is the most
socially diverse region in the world. For democratization in
South Asia to become a self-perpetuating process, it would
seem that the challenges of political consolidation have to
be met by reconciling the needs of the process of governing
plural societies at all levels.
The tensions between social pluralism and political major-
itarianism that plague South Asian states are rooted in the
political elites’ mindsets, which are singularly lacking in
alternative visions of political reform. In contrast with other
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regions – eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union – the
post-1989 changes have not generally produced, with one or
two provincial exceptions, political elites, either traditional
or new, with radically alternative visions of democratic
futures – visions where the secular trends of ‘downsizing’,
‘decentralization’ and ‘deregulation’ and ‘right-sizing’ the
state are embraced as reforming projects capable of mobiliz-
ing new constituencies. Perhaps, as Lustick (1993) observes,
the threshold costs for counter-elites to be able to under-
take these kinds of reforms are currently too high. But given
the size of the sub-continent and the range of problems
of governance, such alternative agendas should have found
natural appeal. That they have not, or have been imposed
piecemeal by external agencies, indicates that for political
elites in South Asia the concept of statecraft is largely one
founded in the post-colonial transition, with nation- and
state-building as a sacred testament. Naturally, this out-
look has created an innate conservative attitude towards
reform, where often change is conceded only when the
pressures becoming unmanageable. Change, moreover, has
sometimes taken place by default (for example, as, in the
case of regionalization in India), rather than as a result of
conscious political design. In contemporary South Asia it
could be reasonably surmised that elite inertia rather than
overt hostility to political reforms is the main constraint
on further democratization.
Lastly, it has been suggested that the effectiveness of
democratization as a process is much richer in societies
where class politics with horizontal associations is the norm
(Heller 2000). In so far as this hypothesis can be applied
to South Asia, it offers sobering lessons. Traditionally left-
wing parties, including the communist parties, have found
it difficult to establish constituencies, despite the wide-
spread poverty throughout South Asia. Communist parties
have been successful in creating enclaves in some provinces,
such as West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala, largely, though
not exclusively, by championing regional nationalisms or,
as in Nepal, by undertaking an anti-establishment struggle.
In a region where caste, language, religion, and tribe medi-
ate class-consciousness, horizontal associations of the kind
found in developed capitalist societies have been very thin
on the ground. Systematic and rapid industrialization might
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erode vertical loyalties, but at current rates this is likely to
be a very gradual process. In the absence of class politics
some commentators have noted a healthy development
from clientelism to identity politics (Heller 2000). Whether
this presages class politics remains to be seen, for there is
no certainty that industrialization will supplant the politics
of identity. In so far as class politics articulates a ‘modern’
politics of interest, with attendant demands for equity, it
would constitute a profound challenge to current state pol-
icies of affirmative action and representation that combine
pre-modern conceptions of identity with modern, demo-
cratic notions of distributive justice.
Conclusion: future trends
In one form or another the theme of democratization will
continue to preoccupy scholars of South Asia for the fore-
seeable future. National peculiarities will, of course, qualify
how democratization is adapted, improved and subsequently
revised. Nevertheless, in the light of the past and recent
developments several broad areas can be identified that are
likely to remain the focus of study.
Political consolidation and the effectiveness of the demo-
cratic process are likely to remain the key area of research.
In the medium term it is unlikely that we will see a dra-
matic transformation in the concerns of territorial integrity
that bedevil South Asian states. In fact the possibilities
that some of the ‘soft states’ might implode, be ‘right-sized’
(have their boundaries changed) or re-sized (have their
internal boundaries changed) as a result of internal and/or
external pressures cannot be ruled out (Singh 2001). Barring
such outcomes, the concerns with consolidation are likely
to persist with those regimes currently negotiating or in
the throes of transition – Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
In more established democracies (India, Sri Lanka) the con-
cern with consolidation is likely to be reflected in the evalu-
ation of effectiveness: in a study of the social and political
factors that explain variations at national and regional levels,
and the growing pressure, from external and internal quar-
ters, for accountability and transparency, democratic audits
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and the need to meet international standards in key areas
such as human rights, anti-discrimination legislation, and
environmental protection. Although international agencies
are increasingly imposing ‘good governance’ conditionality
in their dealings with South Asian states, it remains to be
seen whether such intervention complements ongoing pro-
cesses or becomes a source for counter-mobilization.
There is also every likelihood that in South Asia the
province will become the key unit of analysis. To be sure,
the most challenging examination of democratization has
focused on the provincial level; but comparisons between
provinces and between South Asian states have been lim-
ited or beset by the nationalist polemics that are all too
common. Given that there is a growing recognition of the
need to view South Asia as a continental entity, a region
that is increasingly interdependent in war and peace, with
a tremendous economic potential if political stability is en-
sured, provincial successes and failures will become models
to be emulated or avoided. In India Chandrababu Naidu in
Andhra Pradesh has become the icon of new governance,
delivering political reform and economic change in a way
that marks a radical departure from established traditional
norms in Indian politics. Developments elsewhere suggest
that there are other provincial politicians for whom the
agenda of transparency and accountability is appealing, if
only to undermine opponents or the ruling political parties
(Singh 2002).
The role that social movements play in encouraging the
democratization of both the state and society will certainly
come under greater scrutiny. As has been indicated previ-
ously, thus far this development has been explored mainly
at the point of interface with state structures and in
terms of how they have been reinvigorated and renewed.
But social movements whose vision is tranformative have
tremendous potential to democratize society as well. There
is clearly a great need to examine how social relations are
being transformed by systemic social change and the activ-
ities of social movements. Whether the erosion of tradi-
tional norms results in less hierarchical societies remains
to be seen; but it should radically alter conventional social
roles. The reluctant acceptance by most South Asian states
of the need to address gender discrimination is recognition
230 AREAS
of these imminent changes, even if, at times, it is external
pressures that have prompted policy initiatives. The iterat-
ive experience of these new participatory structures is likely
to provide the opportunities and the demand for political
reform along lines in which social change can be better
represented.
Finally, given the rich intellectual tradition that under-
pins the analysis of the idea of democracy in South Asia
over the last half-century, it is unlikely that the strength
of the critiques of democratization will diminish in the
future. Whereas such ideological critiques as the Marxist,
Hindu, and Islamicist traditions have failed to provide effect-
ive counters to the broad processes currently under way,
analysts reflecting on the wider implications of the South
Asian experience have been to the fore in highlighting the
limitations of key concepts such as civil society. This tradi-
tion is extremely rich and varied, and it is unlikely that it
will concede to democratization as a hegemonic process
without offering correctives or some basic revisions. At the
same time, while these critiques are likely to draw atten-
tion to the shortcomings of democratization processes,
their celebration of regional exceptionalism is likely to be
tempered by an admission that at best they offer confusing
intellectual road maps to achieving more tolerant, trans-
parent and accountable societies. Hence Nandy’s pining for
neo-Gandhism is as utopian as the Taliban’s political agenda
in Afghanistan. Both in their own ways are trapped in time-
warps of the pre-modern (undemocratic) age.
Notes
1 Governability has provided an alternative theoretical framework – see
Kohli (1990). But given its association with the politics of order, govern-
ability as a concept is inherently limited in its ability to explain the
multifaceted nature of the changes currently under way.
2 The problems of political consolidation are much more basic than those
posed by the management of peripheral provinces. The rise of the Hindu
Right in India, for instance, with its objective of a new constitutional
design, suggests that the Nehruvian settlement has failed to become a
hegemonic project.
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The United States
francisco e. gonzález and
desmond king
Any discussion of the United States’ political democratiza-
tion is fundamentally complicated by its role since 1917
as a global model and defender of liberal democracy, a role
that burgeoned after 1941. As a consequence of this respons-
ibility, historically the United States’ democratization has
been both a domestic and international process. National
and international politics have presented two trajectories
that cohere into a common narrative of democratization
(King 2004). This narrative is a continuing one.
Domestically, the hundred years after the Civil War
(1861–65) were characterized by a gradual abandonment of
narrow assimilationism and the enactment – in the 1960s –
of legislation, prompted by the civil rights movement (Morris
1984), to uphold the rights of citizenship of all Americans.
Addressing the legacies of pre-1960s discrimination and
racism (Fields 1990; Jordan 1968; Kelley 1994) proved a plat-
form for a multiculturalist reformulation of American na-
tional identity, or in David Hollinger’s phrase a ‘post-ethnic
politics’ (Hollinger 1995). The transformation of US politics
from a narrowly based assimilationist and exclusionary
system to a broadly defined and inclusive democracy is the
major story of its twentieth-century politics. The historian
Gary Gerstle characterizes this shift as a turn from ‘racial’
nationalism to ‘civic’ nationalism (Gerstle 2001).
There was a parallel international story. In 1917, Presid-
ent Woodrow Wilson decided to bring the United States into
the European theatre of the First World War as an opportun-
ity to ‘make the world safe for democracy’, and outlined
his (unrealized) Fourteen Points for a post-war liberal order.
In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to the
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Pearl Harbor attack by both leading the United States into
the Second World War and formulating (jointly with allies)
the Atlantic Charter doctrine for the post-1945 world. This
Charter was quintessentially American in its aspirations.
Its renunciation of imperialism (a stance opposed by Great
Britain) aligned the United States with a future world
order of liberal democratic states. The Truman Doctrine, as
effected in the defence of democracy in Greece in 1947,
confirmed these values, while the other Western powers’
post-war infirmity made the United States the key Western
defender against communism. President Ronald Reagan arti-
culated the keystone of his administration’s foreign policy
as the defeat of the ‘evil empire’, Soviet communism. These
external postures were accompanied by foreign scrutiny and
criticism of the United States’ own democratic practices
toward minorities and people of colour. Maintaining the
United States’ integrity abroad necessitated remedying its
own democratic deficit; this duality illustrates the overlap-
ping effects of domestic and international politics in the
formation of American nationhood.
In the next section the conventional timing of the United
States’ democratization is assessed, a prelude to considering
how best to conceive the core beliefs and values of Amer-
ican nationhood. The discussion then examines how inter-
national pressures influenced the democratization enacted
in the 1960s. The present role of the United States as a
domestic and international emblem of liberal democracy
concludes the chapter.
First new nation or late democratizer?
Although commonly cited as the world’s first liberal demo-
cracy (Lipset 1963, 1996; McElroy 1999), in many ways the
United States was also a remarkably late democratizer. Not
until the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act in 1965 (and the related US Supreme
Court judgment in 1971) did the United States fully guar-
antee the basic democratic right to vote to all its citizens and
protection of civil rights, that is, the conditions for Robert
Dahl’s idea of polyarchy. In practice, until the mid-1960s
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the United States presented the picture of a restricted demo-
cracy with significant parts of its citizenry de facto or de
jure excluded from democratic participation. This pattern
subverted the triumph of the North in the Civil War. Re-
construction led to segregation, and this consolidated an
exclusionary democracy in the United States, which per-
sisted for one hundred years after the North–South conflict.
The core values of American nationhood expressed in the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were thus
thwarted, and could not be a reality until the federal gov-
ernment was able to enforce the nationwide protection of
civil rights and the guarantee of free and fair contestation
and participation in genuine democratic elections. This did
not happen until the late 1960s.
This picture is at variance with the conventional narrative
presented in those accounts of America’s political develop-
ment reliant upon Alexis de Tocqueville’s nineteenth-
century survey and Louis Hartz’s articulation of American
‘individualist’ liberalism (Hartz 1955). Foremost amongst
this new, reflective, American scholarship is the work of
the political scientist Rogers Smith, who wrote: ‘for over
80 per cent of US history, its laws declared most of the
world’s population to be ineligible for full American cit-
izenship solely because of their race, original nationality
or gender. For at least two-thirds of American history, the
majority of the domestic adult population was also inelig-
ible for full citizenship for the same reasons. Contrary to
Tocquevillian views of American civic identity, it did not
matter how “liberal”, “democratic”, or “republican” those
persons’ beliefs were. The Tocquevillian story is thus
deceptive because it is too narrow. It is centred on relation-
ships among a minority of Americans (white men, largely
of northern European ancestry)’ (Smith 1993: 549). Rogers
Smith’s broadening of the historical narrative of American
democracy offers one in which attention is given to the
United States’ ‘multiple traditions’ (Smith 1997). This
multiple traditions thesis finds in US politics and history
numerous examples of political elites attempting to define
American identity as one rooted in inegalitarian ascript-
ive themes. It provides the ideational context in which co-
existing political ideologies competed to win dominance
(Stears 2001).
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Another characteristic of standard accounts of the United
States’ political development to liberal democracy is their
teleological form (Gerstle 2001). In this view, the United
States shifted from a condition of imperfect individualism,
the imperfections commonly reflecting discrimination
against individuals because of their association with cer-
tain groups, to one of formal equality of individual rights,
and in some accounts to multiculturalism. This influential
version of the transformative narrative underestimates the
endurance of group-based distinctions in American national
identity. It neglects the continuing salience of issues once
considered settled (as for instance in the movement for
reparations for slavery) and overlooks how the United States’
international presence, as a defender and model of demo-
cracy, exposes its domestic policy to foreign scrutiny.
Historians and social scientists have emphasized the
‘exceptional’ character of American democratization, a term
with several implications. First, the weakness of class-based
divisions – as expressed in political behaviour – compared
with the effects of such divisions as race, region and reli-
gion distinguish the United States comparatively (Sombart
1976; Goldfield 1997; Nelson 2000). Second, the effects of
federalism, which not only produced parallel party systems,
rooted in local communities and then organized at state
and federal level, but encouraged voters to maintain strong
ethnic or regional loyalties. Ira Katznelson argues that a dis-
tinction between the politics of community and the politics
of work is a feature of American politics, with significant
effects (Katznelson 1981). A third factor, suggested by the
‘third wave’ democratization literature, is the distinctive
character of the US state (González and King, forthcoming).
The federal government or ‘state’ demonstrated a historical
bias, between the 1880s and 1960s, in favour of segregationist
policies, and instead of challenging the legality of ‘separate
but equal’ arrangements (the system upheld by the US
Supreme Court between 1896 and 1954) often fostered their
diffusion (King 1999). As a set of bureaucratic resources and
institutions, the US federal state also appeared weakly placed
to advance democratization in comparison with other lib-
eral democracies (González and King, forthcoming).
These sources of ‘exceptionalism’ identify distinct fac-
tors in the United States’ national identity as a democracy,
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but do not obviate the need to acknowledge the lateness
– comparatively speaking – of the establishment of full
democracy.
Nationhood, individualism and groups
One important implication of a broader, multiple traditions,
account of the United States’ democratization path is the
need to re-consider the content of American national iden-
tity. This latter combines a rich individualism, guaranteed
in constitutional rights, with a reality of wide group loyal-
ties and ties, based variously upon ethnicity, national back-
ground or race. Politically, a tension has endured between
the individualist and the group components of Americanism:
in practice, American nationalism has consisted in both
individualism and group identities. This is not quite the ‘post
ethnic’ identity envisaged by David Hollinger (1995); but
it is a richer conception than that expressed in traditional
accounts. The change is epitomized by the comments of
Woodrow Wilson in 1917 compared with those of President
George W. Bush in 2001. Wilson declaimed, ‘you can not
become thorough Americans if you think of yourselves in
groups. America does not consist of groups. A man who
thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group
in America has not yet become an American.’ He condemned
‘hyphenated Americans’ as un-American. In contrast, within
days of the 11 September 2001 bombings George Bush pur-
posefully visited a mosque in Washington and, speaking in
Congress, expressed support to Arab and Muslim Americans.
Wilson’s comments epitomize the contemporary expecta-
tion of assimilation promoted federally between the 1870s
and the 1960s. The political imperative to construct an
assimilationist conception of American national identity,
before the 1960s, arose from the United States’ engagement
with Native Americans, openness to immigrants and accept-
ance of segregation. Historically, Americans worried about
threats to national identity arising from unsuitable immi-
grants. Between 1882 and 1965 the United States operated
a restrictionist immigration policy based in discriminatory
guidelines (King 2000). Since 1965, the United States has
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established a non-discriminatory, liberal immigration regime
that has included periodic amnesties for illegal immigrants.
The international context
Since 1917, but particularly from 1941, the United States
has acted as the pre-eminent defender of liberal democracy
in two senses. First, it has espoused democratic values in its
political institutions and political culture and offered them,
at times explicitly, as suitable for emulation by other states.
Second, it has served as the principal military enforcer of
democracy against totalitarianism, in its various guises.
The Truman presidency (1945–52) rejected US isolation-
ism, both for pragmatic reasons (the Soviet Union and China
would exploit such a withdrawal through expansionism)
and for ideological motives, the ‘imponderable, but never-
theless drastic effects on our beliefs in ourselves and in our
way of life of a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves’ (in
Etzold and Gaddis 1978: 432). President Truman’s National
Security Council (NSC) articulated the worth of defending
the United States because of its profound commitment to
individual liberty and a free society: ‘the idea of freedom is
the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than
the idea of submission to authority’ (in Etzold and Gaddis
1978: 388). Anti-communism and anti-totalitarianism drove
US foreign policy from 1947 and dictated the content of
‘Americanism’ as the defence of individualism and demo-
cracy. This agenda is signalled in a 1950 memorandum from
the National Security Council describing Americanism as a
doctrine adhered to at home and abroad: ‘The fundamental
purpose of the United States is . . . to assure the integrity
and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon
the dignity and worth of the individual. The free society
attempts to create and maintain an environment in which
every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative
powers. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to
antipathetic ideas’ (in Etzold and Gaddis 1978: 386, 387–8).
This characterization of American democracy – and there
are numerous comparable formulations – is a complement
to the external cold war strategy of containing communism
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(and for critical reviews of NSC 68 see Schilling et al. 1962
and Hammond 1969). It emphasizes individualism and demo-
cratic rights of citizenship. But this very defence influenced
external commentary about the United States.
Scholars have increasingly recognized one of the surpris-
ing and unintended consequences of America’s global role
as a model of liberal democracy in the Cold War years: it
exposed domestic practices and policies to external scrutiny,
to an extent that intensified the reform of civil rights in
the 1960s (Dudziak 2000; Klinkner and Smith 1998; Kryder
2000; Layton 2000; Plummer 1996; Von Eschen 1997). The
main object of this scrutiny was the United States’ egre-
gious treatment of African Americans and other minorities.
(Already in 1919, Woodrow Wilson’s articulation of his
14-point programme for a new world order was challenged
by Black Americans setting out their 14-point programme for
the achievement of democracy at home (Rosenberg 1999).)
Writing from jail in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963, Martin
Luther King Jr. angrily declared: ‘we have waited for more
than 340 years for our constitutional and God-given rights.
The nations of Asia and Africa are moving with jetlike speed
toward gaining political independence, but we still creep
at horse-and-buggy pace toward gaining a cup of coffee at a
lunch counter.’ Both the United Nations’ agenda-setting in
human rights and the rapid decolonization of the European
empires’ former colonial peoples created a context for
advancing civil rights in the United States.
British and French newspapers provided detailed coverage
of African Americans’ civil rights struggles in the post-1945
decades. Correspondents both reported new developments
in respect to lynching, segregation, presidential initiatives
and Supreme Court decisions; and provided detailed his-
torical portraits of the experience of Black Americans and
the obstacles they faced. Of the latter sort for instance
Le Monde ran a lengthy six-part series by Henri Pierre, ‘Les
noirs aux Etats-Unis’, over a week in June 1950 (the first of
which was tellingly entitled ‘Problème “Noir” ou problème
“Blanc”?’); comparable series appeared in Le Figaro and
La Croix in France and the Manchester Guardian and The
Economist in Britain. Individual lynchings received detailed
coverage overseas, as in due course did both the Brown
decision (1954) and ‘Little Rock crisis’ (1955).
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To some extent French interest in African Americans’
conditions was informed by anti-Americanism. Particularly
during the period when the Parti Communiste Français (PCF)
was a powerful presence in French politics, an eagerness to
unearth defects in American politics and society was not
uncommon. In 1946 Jean Paul Sartre, the doyen of the French
intellectual left, published a critical account of Black Amer-
icans in the PCF’s Combat. But to explain French interest
in the civil rights of Blacks solely by anti-Americanism
would produce a partial account for several reasons. Black
Americans, such as Josephine Baker and Sidney Bechet, had
been important figures in French cultural life during the
inter-war decades, and in the post-war years Paris-settled
writers such as Richard Wright and James Baldwin main-
tained this interest.
Indeed, French affection for Americans was strong after
1918, as the role of the United States in contributing to
France’s victory was recognized. Black American soldiers
served alongside French soldiers at the end of the Great War,
a role they did not achieve within the US military force. In
Britain during the Second World War American GIs were
welcomed, but many British people found African American
soldiers far more polite and interesting than the white
recruits, and were often disturbed by the beatings whites
meted out to their black colleagues. This positive view con-
tributed to subsequent British interest in civil rights in the
United States.
Despite the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s,
aspects of the United States’ race politics continue to engage
foreign commentary and engagement. The debate about the
possible racial bias of prison inmates facing capital punish-
ment has been widely aired in Europe, and the retention of
capital punishment itself has been criticized (instanced by
French protests about the intention of the Attorney General
to seek it in respect of terrorist suspect Zacarias Moussaoui,
a French national, post-‘September 11’). The use of racial
profiling by state and local police forces is another aspect of
the United States’ domestic practices analysed abroad.
Events, internal and external, inevitably exert pressure
on the balance of these individualist and group tendencies.
Engagement in foreign conflicts has commonly had inte-
grative effects – they have heightened Americans’ sense of
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shared national identity – though in the long term such inter-
ventions have also effected profound social and political
changes. For instance, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
in 1941, and the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center
and Pentagon, in 2001, had integrative effects: Americans
disregarded differences between internal groups to forge
common responses. In contrast, the United States’ entry into
the Great War and the Vietnam War had significant disinte-
grative consequences: German-Americans suffered during
the first event, giving up their identity, while in the latter
the fabric of American society was challenged and changed
irreversibly. And of course even those events that were out-
wardly most integrative had significant lines of division:
in 1941 Japanese Americans encountered swift retribution
for the Hawaiian bombing, with 120,000 interned under
emergency legislation.
US foreign policy has often elicited distinct responses
from different groups of Americans. Ethnic lobbying on for-
eign policy is longstanding: for instance, Jewish Americans’
interest in the Middle East or Irish Americans’ advocacy of
Irish nationalism. African Americans have often found them-
selves at odds with US foreign policy, opposing US support
of South African apartheid more vigorously and earlier than
many policy-makers. In an earlier period, African Americans
were dismayed by the failure of the United States to object
to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the 1935. But the 2001
terrorist attack is unlikely to garner any such divisions
among Americans.
The continuing narrative
Democratization is a continuing process as the internal
boundaries of American nationhood are challenged and
redrawn in various ways, for instance by the Japanese
American movement to win compensation for wartime
incarceration, and by the United States’ international roles
in defending liberal democracy against alternative ideologies
and belief systems – what the political scientist Samuel
Huntington calls the ‘clash of civilizations’ (1996). Domes-
tically some scholars – such as Robert Putnam – argue that
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the multiplicity of groups in US society and the diversity of
experience between rural and urban America and between
immigrants and non-immigrants harms the level of social
capital, therefore damaging the resilience of democracy.
Other scholars have emphasized how variations between
states about voter registration may discriminate between
citizens (for example, the disbarring of former felons in
some states). Globally the United States’ role as a defender of
Western democracy against extremist ideologies has both
fanned the resurgence of anti-Americanism and underlined
its international presence. We consider these domestic and
international roles in turn.
Democracy at home
The notion of ‘one people’ expressed in American nation-
hood has been a constant for over two centuries; but the
parameters of who is included, who is excluded and how
these relationships are defined is never fixed. Negotiating
these inclusions and exclusions creates unexpected issues.
For instance, since the late 1960s Native Americans have
restructured their relationship to the United States. On
Thanksgiving Day in 1970 a group of Native Americans
sailed a replica of the Pilgrims’ Mayflower ship and threw a
dummy of a pilgrim in the water. The event was declared
the first National Day of Mourning in commemoration of
the victims of the European conquest of the United States.
It has become an annual pilgrimage. It signalled a wider set
of issues about the relationship between Native Americans
and American nationhood. In the last decade and a half the
repatriation of American Indian human remains has become
integral to the way in which Native Americans configure
their relationship to the American nation. Stretching back
to the nineteenth-century traditions of ethnology, physical
anthropology and phrenology, scientists have collected thou-
sands of skulls and other remains from American Indians,
often from battle sites. Many were stored in the Smithsonian
Institution, which opened in 1846. Some of these were
acquired with appropriate permission, but many were taken
fraudulently or by stealing from mass grave-sites. Native
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Americans have increasingly sought the return of these
human remains for proper burial in appropriate places in
ways that respect tribal cultural beliefs. Especially those
remains of American Indians who died on battlefields need
the full honours of a traditional burial. The Pan-Indian
Repatriation Movement lobbies for federal and state laws
to permit repatriation and to proscribe further dissipation
of human remains. These demands have had some success
with the passage of both the Native American Grave Pro-
tection and Repatriation Act in 1990 (requiring all federal
institutions to compile inventories of their collections of
Indian human remains and artefacts for repatriation where
appropriate) and laws in over ten states (Thornton 2001:
159–61). The National Museum of the American Indian,
created in 1989, is required also to inventorize its cultural
and sacred objects with a view to repatriation.
One of the most influential meditations upon the state
of American democracy in the last quarter of the twentieth
century is found in the political scientist Robert Putnam’s
Bowling Alone (2000). Building on his and other scholars’
arguments about the need for high levels of trust generated
through voluntary civic participation as the basis for a
strong civic society, Putnam finds a decline in the social
capital necessary for such processes to function. Putnam’s
book charts a decline in community involvement and
social connectedness in the US polity. He argues that a
combination of structural changes in American society –
such as changing family household arrangements, suburban-
ization, and the diffusion of television as the main medium
of entertainment – have coincided with a marked decline
in civic engagement by Americans measured in terms of
participation in voluntary organizations and membership
of social activities. This decline in social capital matters,
Putnam maintains, because it has fundamental effects upon
social and political interactions. High social capital implies
the existence of high interpersonal trust, which permits
the resolution of collective action problems through co-
operation rather than formal contracts; it also reduced the
demand for government in certain areas of life, thereby
curbing tax demands. Putnam emphasizes the political costs
of the decline in social capital in America, writing that
‘nowhere is the need to restore connectedness, trust, and
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civic engagement clearer than in the now often empty public
forums of our democracy’ (2000: 412). He calls for reform of
campaign finance rules, an aspiration met by the Congress
in March 2002 when both houses enacted a fundamental
revision of the rules governing ‘soft money’ donations to
electoral campaigns.
There has been much criticism of and debate about
Putnam’s work. Some critics find his social capital agenda
unattractive, while others remain sceptical about the causal
status of the correlation between the general social trends
he sets out and levels of civic engagement. The national and
patriotic response to the bombings of 11 September seemed
to mark a potential resuscitation of community-based
engagement of the sort Putnam advocated. What is not in
doubt is either the enormous impact of his concept of ‘bowl-
ing alone’, as a description of reduced civic engagement,
among many Americans or the international diffusion of
the concept (Putnam 2002).
Democracy abroad
Despite making little of foreign affairs during his electoral
campaign, President George W. Bush has reverted, since
11 September 2001, to the tradition begun with Woodrow
Wilson in 1917 of articulating a distinct global role for the
United States, one rooted in the beliefs valued in domestic
politics. The cornerstone of the Bush administration’s
approach is a war against global terrorism and the states
that support terrorist activity. Bush has specified an ‘axis
of evil’ aligned aggressively against Western democracy. On
20 September 2001 he told Congress that every country fell
into one of two camps: ‘either you are with us [the US] or
you are with the terrorist’.
Citing values closer to those of his Democratic predeces-
sor Bill Clinton than those of many Republicans, President
Bush has stressed the diversity of the United States and its
openness to all religions and beliefs within the twin context
of loyalty to the American nation and the constitutional
separation of church and state. Bush declared, ‘in a free
society, diversity is not disorder. Debate is not strife. And
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dissent is not revolution. A free society trusts its citizens
to seek greatness in themselves and their country.’ He pre-
sents this conception of a ‘free society’ as a model for inter-
national emulation. In his state visit to China in February
2002, President Bush used his live broadcast as an occasion
to proselytize to Chinese people the virtues of democracy
and American values: ‘life in America shows that liberty,
paired with law, is not to be feared’. The US is conducting
a global war of ideas both to promote democracy and to
revise the received views of American institutions. To this
end, a new position, under-secretary of state for public
diplomacy and public affairs, has been created at the State
Department.
The international stance of the Bush administration
towards human rights originates with the policy initiated
during President Jimmy Carter’s incumbency of the White
House (1977–80). Carter campaigned on and implemented
a foreign policy for the United States sensitive to interna-
tional human rights and ethics (Foot 2000). Speaking in
December 1974, the future Democratic president proclaimed
his dream that ‘this country set a standard within the com-
munity of nations of courage, compassion, integrity, and
dedication to basic human rights and freedoms’ (quoted in
Foot 2000: 43). The United States was also associated dur-
ing the Carter presidency and subsequently with devising
mechanisms to enshrine this priority in the federal govern-
ment’s own institutions. At the Department of State, the
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was
created. The Bureau’s staff were responsible for compiling
human rights assessment reports on every country receiv-
ing US aid, a brief extended later to other countries who
were members of the United Nations. Carter appointed
Patricia Derian, a veteran of the civil rights movement, to
serve as Assistant Secretary in charge of the Bureau. This
initiative was continued by the Reagan administration and
over twenty years later – by the time of President George
W. Bush’s presidency – the agency had been renamed the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (still located
in the Department of State, website: www.state.gov/www/
global/human_rights/). It issues an annual human rights
report that receives wide publicity in the international com-
munity and media. Its report on 2001 singled out human
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rights abuses in China, Russia and Saudi Arabia; but the
Bureau’s remit was set broadly, with the government of the
Republic of Ireland, for instance, finding itself criticized for
poor standards in prisons.
Conclusion
External attacks upon the American state heighten Amer-
icans’ sense of unity and shared nationhood. This effect
is pronounced or deflated according to how Americans
behave toward their fellow citizens: if there are groups of
Americans whose ethnicity or national background render
them vulnerable to association with the external enemy,
and that connection is drawn, then any fresh unity is dinted.
The September 2001 terrorist bombings failed to stir up such
internal group divisions (though a number of suspicious
deaths may have been motivated by anti-Arab sentiment,
and close to a thousand suspects, overwhelmingly immigr-
ants, were arrested). This gave them a unique significance as
a mechanism of political integration in the US polity.
Initially, a striking effect of the September 2001 bomb-
ings has been to transcend domestic divisions based in race,
class, ethnicity or national background. The United States
has historically been riven with internal cleavages drawn
along lines of race, ethnicity, national background and
region. These cleavages have not evaporated, but their
political salience declined in the wake of the Islamic
bombings. Americans per se were the objects of the Islamic
terrorists. And because the United States has advanced
politically so much since the civil and voting rights acts
enacted in the 1960s in terms of black political participa-
tion and achievement, it is an integrated polity and people
that experienced this onslaught. The massive sales of the
American flag illustrate national unity and the sense of
patriotic inclusion.
The September bombings forged Americans’ sense of
national identity in another way too: they underline the
existence and strength of an ideology of anti-Americanism
present in certain parts of the world. Anti-Americanism is
not new.
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Several threads to this ideology need to be disentangled.
First, during the Cold War years communist states and their
supporters engaged in immense efforts to cultivate anti-
Americanism, especially in West European democracies
and in Third World countries. This strand has declined in
significance. Second, emerging during the Cold War years,
but retaining its influence, is a set of anti-American critiques
linking US economic and political power with the main-
tenance of undemocratic regimes and governments. The
writers of such intellectual analyses – for instance, those
of orientalism or post-colonialism or dependency theory –
have not always singled out the United States explicitly, but
have often done so implicitly. Third, in the 1990s American-
ization has been equated with globalization, and the anti-
global capitalism movement has therefore often explicitly
attacked the United States and its policies. Critics of the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other
international organizations such as the World Trade Organ-
ization have often equated these organizations’ policies with
those of the United States. This tendency has encouraged
simplistic explanations of Third World problems that blame
the United States. Fourth, American culture is a continuing
source of critique by Western intellectuals. Despite the huge
success of American mass culture, a dichotomy endures
abroad between elite hostility to American values and cul-
tural products and popular embracing of them. In many Arab
countries, significantly, the dichotomy is reversed: the edu-
cated elites welcome Americanization, for its association
with democracy, while the increasingly fundamentalist
masses despise American values and culture. Finally, anti-
Americanism has been stirred by the ultramontane fanatic-
ism espoused by some Islamic fundamentalists. Both religion
(for instance, anti-Christianity) and politics (for example,
anti-Israeli proclamations) feature in this coagulation.
The combined effect of these threads constitutive of
anti-Americanism has been to render anti-Americanism an
ideological world-view, a way of seeing the world and inter-
preting international events (Christie 2002). The United
States’ economic power, political democracy, and cultural
influence are assimilated into a single entity, the object of
hatred and criticism for anti-Americans dispersed through-
out the world. In its most sinister form, anti-Americanism
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is paraded out as an explanation for all evils – political,
economic or cultural – and anti-American ideology enables
its advocates to explain how unrelated phenomena are
in fact part of an integrated ideology and world presence.
While this anti-Americanism is a continuing challenge to
the values of the United States at home and abroad, it has
also proved, in the short term, a source of strengthened
nationhood.
16
Conclusion
peter burnell
The authors of this book were invited to address a number
of key questions in respect of their discipline or region of
special interest, such as: What does it most have to offer a
critical understanding of democratization? In respect of the
disciplines, how is democratization understood and what
conceptual lenses are used to interrogate the subject? In
regard to the regions, what does democratization mean to
the inhabitants, what has been their experience, the main
constraints or limitations and future prospects? The chap-
ters address these prompts each in their own way. In doing
so they reveal not just the issues for which their discipline
or area studies demand priority but also their own insights
and answers. Collectively, they illustrate a combination of
different and overlapping frameworks of analysis for mak-
ing sense of political processes generally, and democratiza-
tion together with democratic possibilities more specifically,
in a wide range of settings. What is abundantly clear is
that democratization does not have to be a discipline’s cen-
tral preoccupation or, even, a cherished value in order that
it provide interesting and important analytical insights,
relevant theoretical propositions and empirically-testable
observations.
A bibliometric analysis would show that not only do the
contributors draw on disparate literatures but, more un-
expectedly, very few authors or texts concerning democrat-
ization are so central as to be cited everywhere. Samuel P.
Huntington and Seymour Martin Lipset are confirmed as
being among the most ubiquitous (Huntington’s ‘waves’
metaphor has become almost universally embedded in the
discourse, notwithstanding various criticisms of his analysis),
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and even more so in the comparative areas studies literat-
ure; Anthony Giddens’s work resonates too. The variety of
perspectives, themes and issues presented by the chapters
holds out a mirror to the very qualities of pluralism, diversity
and respect for difference that, together with a commitment
to inclusiveness, constitute hallmarks of most theories of
democracy. At the same time it is clear that we should
navigate carefully between the two sound tenets articulated
through historical observation and comparativism respect-
ively. On the one side Calvert is right to say that unique-
ness in the detail does not mean that different approaches
are not referring to the same thing or cannot be treated as
belonging to the same family of ‘descriptions’. On the other
we should beware of judging unlike with unlike within a
common temporal dimension – especially any eras that are
chosen more or less arbitrarily (Breslin).
Significantly the chapters provide some major points
of convergence and shared understandings as well as clear
points of contrast. Just as none of the disciplines have
stood still but have evolved over time, so they all exhibit
their own domestic disputes concerning democracy and
its relationship to surrounding factors. Even in Cerny’s
conclusion on the relatively youthful study of international
political economy (IPE) we find different accounts of the
future possibilities for democracy and democratization in a
globalizing world. More particularly, at regional levels such
as Latin America Philip tells us that the very meaning of
democratic consolidation is very far from being settled. In
parts of Africa and Asia where Western notions of demo-
cratization tout court are essentially contested, not only is
democratic consolidation a remote prospect or problematic,
but politics per se is in flux, ‘in transition’ to an unknown
future.
Even the most mathematically rigorous of the social
sciences betrays considerable disagreement over such mat-
ters as the true relationship between democracy, economic
growth and political change, let alone the controversies in
other much more discursive branches of inquiry. Econom-
ists like Addison show an especial sensitivity to issues of
sequencing and to how different time-horizons can affect the
results gleaned from multivariate analysis. But perhaps it is
fitting that it is a sociologist (Wood) who reminds us that
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even as problems persist over how to reconcile democratic
principles with (widening) social inequality and (increasing)
concentrations of economic power, we must not lose sight
of the centrality of state power to democratic concerns. Even
anthropology, influenced by the rise of non-Western scholars,
now grapples increasingly with ‘state effects’, chiefly at the
local level. That said, the stuff of politics generally and the
concerns of democratization specifically clearly extend far
beyond state institutions, as is evident in the anthropo-
logists’ concern with power – whether located in formal
organizational structures and more informal relationships
or when manipulated through the political rhetorics. For
one thing, in democratization there is contestation (Wood)
and struggle – which Rai shows to be especially prominent
in the feminist discourse – and the quest for consensus
across a much broader plane. For another, and as Interna-
tional Political Economy makes abundantly clear, contem-
porary forms of organization of social and economic life
among non-state actors at both sub-state and supra-state
levels, transnational and transgovernmental, pose multiple
challenges to the traditional instruments of state authority,
as they manipulate and bypass state legal systems. Conven-
tional democratic legitimacy appears to be seriously chal-
lenged. By comparison, democratization’s consequences for
globalization seem to have been the focus of far less critical
inquiry by political scientists and others.
All the regions have been touched unevenly by political
transformation, and more specifically by liberal democratic
advance, and even within individual countries there are
signs of both forwards and backwards movements, as well
as overall situations of very little change. Apart from there
being one common observation of regional diversity, it may
be as challenging a task (although not impossible) to estab-
lish sound and significant generalizations within regions as
between regions. The contrasts between different parts of a
single country like India, or, say examination of the impact
that inter-state or supra-state relations make at the local
level, can be every bit as revealing as comparisons between
much more distant points of departure. So, for example, a
comparison of South Africa or Israel with their neighbours
and inquiry into the bearing that relations with the region
have on the internal politics could be every bit as rewarding
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as an attempt to compare the convoluted history of demo-
cratic trends in those two named states.
Of course, history is always open to reinterpretation, not
least in the light of present-day issues and the way more
proximate circumstances are perceived and the particular
concerns these give rise to. And if democratizing states
individually cannot be understood outside their specific his-
torical contexts and capacities (Grugel 2002: 90), then neither
can democratization as a contemporary world historical
phenomenon be fully grasped in isolation from debates over
the political and intellectual well-springs of where it all
began. Put crudely, of the different revolutionary traditions,
which is the more authentic?; do theories based around the
rights and freedoms of the individual, or ideas of political
equality and popular sovereignty, supply dominant genes?
In practice it seems that when providing us with the raw
material even the most celebrated historians can do no more
than bequeath their own versions of rationality and orderly
– or sometimes chaotic – development (Calvert). Yet as
is shown in many places, for example in Africa, society’s
memories of the past (not least of any previous failures to
sustain democracy or to move democratization further for-
wards) can be vital to making sense of present-day develop-
ments and the attitudes taken towards those developments
and future prospects. Myths relating to women, for instance,
can be just as potent, and may be singularly damaging
(Rai). And as South Asia today illustrates all too well, the
legacies of old hostilities can continue to bedevil the pos-
sibility of registering democratic progress through beneficial
co-operation and mutual support among states within a
region, in addition to exerting a negative influence within
countries individually. Yet even in much older demo-
cracies the democratic content is being reconfigured as we
speak. Witness the impact European Union membership
is now having on shifting the boundaries of judicial power
in Britain, where, as McEldowney shows, we need a his-
torical awareness to understand the antecedents and to
appreciate the full significance of more recent advances in
the ‘justicialization of government’. And it is also worth
repeating, as Gonzales and King usefully remind us, that
the United States made a quantum leap forward in respect
of civil rights really only very recently – within the lifetime
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of American citizens now endeavouring to export their
democracy abroad.
The chapters display the particularities within a common
concern for institutional structures and their performance,
ranging over the representation of women, electoral systems
and constitutions (in Africa) and presidentialism (in Latin
America). These objects span the borders of politics and
legal affairs; to which can be added the economists’ inter-
est in democracy’s institutional guarantees more broadly
defined, most notably investment in education (Addison).
South Asia appears exceptional in terms of the inertia dis-
played by formal political institutions and traditional actors,
but the picture takes on a different colour once we turn the
spotlight on the vibrant social sphere (Singh). The various
chapters detail a variety of types of social grouping, includ-
ing especially social movements, but not necessarily polit-
ical parties, as being in the vanguard pressing for change.
The weakness of class conflict relative to other social divi-
sions such as those involving race, ethnicity and religion
is remarked on in several countries and not just the more
prosperous United States and European Union, notwith-
standing growing middle-class interest in political reform
in certain East Asian countries.
At the same time the impact of international influences
is found by most to be ambivalent, not least because of a
widely-shared suspicion of the more adverse consequences
of globalization and the hegemony of the neo-liberal eco-
nomic agenda especially – and for women specifically (Rai).
In contrast, there is the welcome contribution that interna-
tional organizations’ pressures are making to greater trans-
parency in governments’ management of the public finances,
although national controls over the flows of private monies
are becoming considerably weaker. So far the European
Union’s influence on accession candidates (and their
rejection of the past in the shape of Soviet domination) con-
stitutes a special case of benign external influence, although
Lewis and Warleigh offer differing views on the EU’s
capability to help with their democratization in the future.
Yet the tendency of these accession candidates to identify
democratization with Europeanization jars somewhat with
the essentially inward-looking focus of the EU itself, as
the constituent parts grope towards deciding what kind of
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political entity the EU should become and whether, or how,
it could be made more democratic.
The potential for ordinary people to influence through
political processes the economic vectors that can make so
much difference to their daily lives emerges as a central
topic that seems ripe for further study (the key question
being not what political economy perspectives might have
to offer but whether it is any longer meaningful to isolate for
purpose of analysis the purely domestic political economy).
This interdependence of political trends and economic and
social development (or lack of development), inescapable
everywhere and especially salient in the poorest countries
of Africa, is given extra meaning in post-communist soci-
eties. That is because of the transformative approach to eco-
nomic management there, combined in some cases with
the additional imperatives of nation- and state-building. This
provides a clear contrast with the nostalgia for socialism
and distrust of capitalist individualism that Southall reports
in parts of Africa. Perhaps it is all the more remarkable to
find group tendencies bidding for a place among the defin-
ing features of American nationalism too. And if democracy
only thrives where there is some shared identity equivalent
to nationhood (demos), that too must feature in the build-
ing plans for the EU (Warleigh) – as well as being a vital
issue in countries emerging from the dismantling of former
socialist states and in Asia too. Thus issues of both state
and nation feature prominently in alternative scenarios
depicting the democratic possibilities, but with distinct
regional particularities.
Similarly, both Europe and North America present in
their different ways a kind of bridge between domestic and
international dimensions of democratization. But perhaps
most intriguing of all is the colouring of American attitudes
towards their own polity, and thereby the consequences
for political progress in the United States. On the one side
are the carefully crafted myths about America’s past, noted
by Calvert. On the other, paralleling the reservations some
Americans have about the country’s democratic pretensions
owing to its dubious Cold War engagements abroad (Gould),
foreign perceptions of democracy in the United States
prompted by its claims to leadership of the free world have
reverberated inside the country (Gonzales and King). This
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makes the United States absolutely unique. There, external
factors appear to have worked to the benefit of societal
integration. That contrasts starkly with the disintegrative
and possibly very divisive impact of global economic inte-
gration and marketization on the domestic social struc-
tures of many developing countries, including those in Latin
America whose political systems have long been attuned
to US influence (Philip), and in East Asia. The potentially
adverse consequences for democracy are well rehearsed.
The future
The rapid accumulation of political studies of democratiza-
tion in the 1990s came about as a result of political develop-
ments on the ground. The one tracked the other; and it is
worth asking now what are the implications for the future.
The evidence so far has been of dynamism in the study
of democratization. There is scope for further advances in
theory and in practice, such as by moving away from the
standard liberal state model of ‘democratic accountability’
– queried in the sociological and anthropological literatures
and regarded as increasingly obsolete from within IPE –
towards consideration of new possibilities. More truly par-
ticipatory forms of political engagement and the elevation
of meaningful empowerment are obvious examples. The
‘democratization from below’ that Singh finds on the rise
in India could be one source of inspiration. The democratic
development of the European Union offers speculative pos-
sibilities for innovation (Warleigh). Even in Africa – with
few obvious ‘champions’ of democracy and a conviction
that political science largely fails to offer the sort of version
of democracy that Africans are said to want and need –
democracy remains very much ‘on the agenda’ (Southall).
Yet in large parts of the world the democratic openings
of the 1980s and early 1990s and the optimism they gave
rise to have given way to a more sober judgement: the most
sanguine is that we are now seeing a period of democratic
stabilization, or survival without consolidation (‘trendless
fluctuation’). Many ‘transitions’ proved unsuccessful – they
were not transitions to liberal democracy – or remain
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glaringly incomplete. For many societies and communities
the ‘deepening’ of democracy in any meaningful sense still
lies a long way off. The possibility of democratic regression
in some countries cannot be ruled out. Hence, even if his
demo-pessimism regarding China is overstated, Breslin’s
caution against ‘concept stretching’ has value far beyond
just East Asia. And looked at through the lens of IPE in a
gathering climate of globalization, the early rose-tinted
view of a third, or even fourth wave of democratization now
looks to have been only partially sighted, even though the
widespread collapse of old-fashioned autocracies was so
evidently under way.
Furthermore, that democracy has its own limitations is
also now more freely acknowledged: democracy is neither
an instant solution for all political ills nor an answer to
every major problem, social, economic, or environmental;
moreover it seems incapable of confronting some pressing
and major global issues. Democracy may simply be unsuited
to some countries, for the foreseeable future anyway. The
concept of democracy and the route map of democratiza-
tion mapped out in the West do not necessarily offer useful
templates for organizing our understanding of the politics
of diverse societies elsewhere. In some situations they can
actually derange productive analysis. Such reflections as
these certainly resonate well in Africa, where now is not
the first time that attempts have been made to transfer
Western political aspirations, and where current perceptions
are coloured by recollections of a troubled past and the
expectation that unfavourable social and economic con-
ditions will persist. Even in eastern Europe it seems that
democratization studies have shown an inclination to cre-
ate their own image of what is happening, so departing
from the evidence of ‘objective reality’ (Lewis).
If the outlook for democratization looks increasingly
insecure, is that a bad omen for studies of democratization?
Are we doomed to come to the view that, the more we
know, the less we think we understand? Critical scrutiny,
adherence to Karl Popper’s injunction, in The Logic of
Scientific Discovery (1934), for social scientists to seek
out falsifying rather than corroborating evidence, and the
temptation of academics to accentuate the significance of
negative findings, could all put at risk the gains we think
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we have made. Of course, the elimination of errors and
misconceptions should not as such be a cause for concern –
after all, democratic progress has itself been defined in terms
of disillusionment or an evaporation of the blind confidence
formerly placed in the rulers by the ruled (Huntington 1991:
262). But that is no reason for not trying to aim for more
constructive forms of progress than simply the discovery
that there are more puzzles for which we do not have
adequate explanations than was previously realized. In Latin
America Philip reminds us that institutionalized uncertainty
(concerning who will govern after the next or subsequent
elections) is considered by some a defining feature of
consolidated representative democracy. Yet in terms of our
comprehension of democratization, the quest for greater
certainty still constitutes a legitimate ambition, a motivat-
ing force. That claim is made more realistic, not weakened,
by including in the ambit of democratization studies the
slowing of democracy’s progress and the conditions for
democratic weakening or regression, not to mention the
so-called ‘hybrid’ polities. Diamond’s (2002: 34) remark that
issues in comparative democratic studies now run to the
forms and dynamics of ‘electoral authoritarianism’ can also
be seen as lending support. So to conclude, here are at least
two reasons to ‘think positive’.
First, the increase in pessimism about the future for
democratization owes in some measure to the fact that we
now redefine democracy in more exacting ways (Burgess
2001: 58). More correctly, we are simply rediscovering demo-
cracy’s basic values, which had briefly been lost sight of in
the early enthusiasm that greeted the political developments
of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Then, surface develop-
ments captured the imagination, overshadowing more sub-
stantive considerations and time-honoured controversies
over political ideals. More than a decade later, attention has
shifted from the half of the glass that we formerly thought
was full to the half-empty portion of what is now more
often agreed to be a significantly larger glass. That develop-
ment is a testimony of the evolution of the literature, not a
teleological statement, and certainly not grounds for com-
plaint. Anyway, in politics more generally history tells us
the reality all too often falls short of the dream: so demo-
cratization – no exception – at least is in good company.
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Finally, we can be positive about the future study of
democratization even if there is going to be only a small
and dwindling number of new, unambiguous democracies
to study. There is a readily available solution in the event
that political science show signs of running out of steam.
The fact is that political studies have always needed other
disciplines, in order to optimize the chances of making
further advances. The evidence displayed by the looking-
glass reveals the potential to create more ‘added value’ by
expanding the vision. That means seeking a closer engage-
ment among disciplines and increasing the scope for broad-
based comparative analysis, thereby highlighting distinctive
cases, confirming important variations, and enhancing the
quest for cross-cultural generalizations, both intra- and cross-
regional. And for activists, including but not only activists
in the women’s movement, there is even the possibility of
sponsoring more fruitful exchanges over effective strategies
for achieving sought-after political change. That put on one
side, and regardless of whatever reservations we might have
about democratization as a practical vision or a normative
undertaking, the possibilities for increasing our understand-
ing that are offered by adopting a more holistic approach
are clearly there for the taking.
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